PETER IVAN PEREZ, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Peter Perez, a deputy sheriff convicted of DUI causing serious bodily injury, sought to suppress his spontaneous statement "I'm a deputy sheriff and I fucked up" made immediately after a collision, claiming it was protected by Florida's accident report privilege statute. The court affirmed his conviction, holding that the privilege applies only to statements made in compliance with the statutory duty to report an accident, not spontaneous utterances made before any formal investigatory inquiry.
The court held that the accident report privilege does not apply to Perez's spontaneous utterance because it was not made in response to a specific investigatory inquiry or in compliance with the statutory duty to report an accident. The privilege applies only to statements made when a driver is compelled to comply with the statutory duty to report under section 316.066(1) and (2).
[1] A statement made by a driver to a law enforcement officer during an accident investigation is privileged and inadmissible in court if it is made in compliance with the st…
[2] The statutory privilege for accident reports does not extend to spontaneous utterances made by a driver that are not in response to a specific investigatory inquiry.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the purpose of the statute is to clothe with statutory immunity only such statements and communications as the driver, owner, or occupant of a vehicle is compelled to make in order to comply with his or her statutory duty under section 316.066(1) and (2)”
Establishes the narrow scope of the accident report privilege—it applies only to statements required by the statutory duty to report, not spontaneous utterances
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePerez, a Hillsborough County Sheriff's deputy, was driving when his car collided with a truck, severely injuring the truck driver. Perez had been drin…
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FRANK, Chief Judge.
The ear Peter Perez was driving collided with a truck and the driver was severely injured. Perez, a deputy with the Hillsbor-ough County Sheriffs Office, had been drinking that night and upon exiting his car simply stated to the officer who had arrived at the scene, “I’m a deputy sheriff and I fucked up.” He was convicted and sentenced for violating section 316.193(3),1 Florida Statutes. In reliance upon section 316.066(4),2 Florida Statutes (1991), which provides for the confidentiality of certain statements made to an officer during the course of an accident investigation, Perez sought to suppress his spontaneous utterance. The trial court rejected his contention reasoning that the declaration was not a response to a specific investigatory inquiry. We agree and affirm Perez’s conviction; each of the points he has urged upon us is meritless. We write to reduce in this district any uncertainty as to the manner in which the statutory immunity may be conferred.
Every driver of an automobile in Florida who is involved in a motor vehicle accident is required to report the event to law enforcement. See § 316.062, Fla.Stat. (1991). The information providéd in the report is privileged and may not be used against the driver in any trial arising out of the occurrence. Section 316.066(4), Fla.Stat. (1991). The functional purpose of section 316.066(4) is to achieve in the public interest an accurate truthful relation of the facts surrounding the accident and to relieve persons involved in it from incrimination when the circumstances are described. Hoctor v. Tucker, 432 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). In short, the accident report privilege confers confidentiality upon any admission a driver makes in compliance with the statutory duty to report that which occurred in the accident. See Brackin v. Boles, 452 So. 2d 540 (Fla.1984). It is plain from our review of this matter that Perez’s words were not privileged. When the trooper arrived and approached Perez, Perez left his car and immediately spoke the words he wanted the trial court to suppress. In that setting this matter is not factually distinguishable in any significant way or degree from Goodis v. Finkelstein, 174 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). In Goodis the assisting police officer heard Mrs. Goodis exclaim upon her post-accident return to consciousness: “Oh my God, I must have passed out again!” 174 So. 2d at 602. The Third District found the utterance not to be a part of an “accident report” and deemed the statement admissible “as a declaration which was a part of the res gestae and ... against interest.” 174 So. 2d at 602. We have found nothing in the record to suggest that at the moment when Perez’s words were spoken the officer had initiated a criminal investigation. We agree with the trial court’s determination not to suppress Perez’s words and conclude that our resolution of this matter fits comfortably within the supreme court’s emphatically expressed view that “the purpose of the statute is to clothe with statutory immunity only such statements and communications as the driver, owner, or occupant of a vehicle is compelled to make in order to comply with his or her statutory duty under section 316.066(1) and (2).” Brackin, 452 So. 2d at 544.
Accordingly, we affirm Perez’s conviction.
RYDER and PATTERSON, JJ., concur. . That section, in relevant part, reads:
(3) Any person:
(a) Who is [under the influence of alcoholic beverages];
(b) Who operates a vehicle; and
(c) Who, by reason of such operation, causes:
2. Serious bodily injury to another ... is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
. Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part:
Except as specified in this subsection, each accident report made by a person involved in an accident and any statement made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing an accident report required by this section shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting. No such report or statement shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal.
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Vedner v. State, 849 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…es v. Perry, 702 So. 2d 294 [*1212] (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Its purpose is to promote a truthful reporting of the facts surrounding the accident, while relieving persons involved from incrimination for their compliance with the law. See Perez v. State, 630 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Hoctor v. Tucker, 432 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). The statute prohibits the use of statements made by persons involved in accidents in order to avoid violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See…
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State v. Shepard, 658 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…the alphabet and heel-to-toe counting tests. We affirm that portion of the trial court’s order suppressing statements made during the accident investigation conducted by Officer Kamp and the initial statements made to Deputy Watts. Perez v. State, 630 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). However, the statements made to Watts after he had given appellee Miranda warnings are admissible. In State v. Norstrom, 613 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1993), the supreme court held that statements made after a motorist has been given Mira…
Authorities Cited
- Brackin v. Boles, 452 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1984)
- Goodis v. Finkelstein, 174 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Hoctor v. Tucker, 432 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)