THERESA L. COELHO, APPELLANT,
v.
PETER V. BALASKY, ET AL., APPELLEES
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Theresa Coelho, a laid-off full-time employee receiving unemployment benefits, voluntarily quit a part-time job to pursue education and better employment opportunities. The court reversed the Unemployment Appeals Commission's decision to terminate her benefits, holding that denying unemployment compensation based on voluntary termination of secondary employment contradicts the legislative purpose of unemployment insurance and would discourage part-time work.
An employee in Coelho's position cannot be denied unemployment benefits for voluntarily quitting part-time employment when those benefits were originally based on the non-disqualifying termination from full-time employment. Benefits must be reinstated without reduction based on the voluntary termination of part-time work.
[1] A claimant who voluntarily quits part-time employment without good cause attributable to the employing unit is subject to total disqualification from unemployment benefit…
[2] Legislative amendments to unemployment compensation statutes have clarified that the term "work" includes full-time, part-time, and temporary employment for the purpose o…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“would not further legislative purpose of Unemployment Compensation law — to ease the financial hardships caused by unemployment — but could discourage part-time employment and give a windfall in the form of reduced contribution rates to the former full-time employer.”
Establishes the core principle that denying benefits based on voluntary termination of part-time work contradicts unemployment insurance's fundamental purpose and creates perverse economic incentives.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCoelho was laid off from Wang Labs after nearly ten years of employment earning approximately $50,000 annually. While receiving maximum unemployment b…
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PER CURIAM.
Theresa Coelho was an employee of Wang Labs for almost ten years. At the time of her layoff from Wang, she was earning approximately $50,000 yearly. Coelho applied for and began receiving maximum unemployment compensation. As she looked for similar work, Coelho accepted a part-time position as a veterinarian’s assistant, working between 10 and 20 hours a week, earning from $6.75 to $7.00 an hour. The amount of pay she received from her part-time position was subtracted from the full-time benefits she was being paid. In spring 1992, her unemployment benefits were extended by the Emergency Unemployment Act.
On May 23, 1992, Coelho decided to go back to school and spend more time seeking suitable work and voluntarily quit her part-time job. Coelho received unemployment compensation until December 28, 1992, when she received a notice that benefits were not payable because Coelho had quit her part-time employment in May for a reason not attributable to her employer. At the hearing Coelho requested, the appeals referee affirmed the determination of the claims adjudicator which held that Coel-ho had voluntarily left her employment with her part-time employer without good cause and therefore was not entitled to any unemployment benefits after May 23, 1992 (the date of Coelho’s termination of part-time employment).1 Coelho appealed the referee’s decision to the Unemployment Appeals Commission (UAC). On April 30, 1993, the UAC issued an order affirming the appeals referee’s decision. Coelho timely filed this appeal.
There is no doubt that as Coelho contends the division erred in denying her unemployment benefits for the “non-disqualifying” termination from Wang based upon the fact that she voluntarily left her part-time, second job. As clearly stated in Wright v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 512 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), to deny benefits to an individual in Coelho’s position
would not further legislative purpose of Unemployment Compensation law — to ease the financial hardships caused by unemployment — but could discourage part-time employment and give a windfall in the form of reduced contribution rates to the former full-time employer. Wright, 512 So. 2d at 334; see Neese v. Sizzler Family Steak House, 404 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Furthermore, we reject the UAC’s argument that the benefits due Coel-ho should be reduced by some approximation of what she would have earned had she continued her part-time work.
Accordingly, we reverse the UAC’s decision upholding the premature termination of Coelho’s unemployment benefits and remand with instructions to immediately reinstate Coelho’s entitlement to the remainder of her unemployment benefits without any reduction in benefits due to Coelho’s voluntary termination of her part-time employment.
Reversed and remanded.
. Section 443.101(1)(a) provides in pertinent part:
1. Disqualification for voluntarily quitting shall continue for the full period of unemployment next ensuing after he has left his work voluntarily without good cause and until such individual has earned income equal to or in excess of 17 times his weekly benefit amount; "good cause” as used in this subsection shall include only such cause as is attributable to the employing unit or which consists of illness or disability of the individual requiring separation from his work.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Alderman v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 664 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…benefits had been awarded based upon the worker’s previous full-time employment. See Tierney v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 640 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Coelho v. Balasky, 631 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Barry v. Faulk Investments, Inc., 621 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). The UAC suggests that reliance upon case law such as Neese is improper because the legislature’s recent amendment to chapter 443 was a direct response to Neese…
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Groudas v. Pinellas Cnty. Sch. Bd. & Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 793 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Alderman v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 664 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Tierney v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 640 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Coelho v. Balasky, 631 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), the 1999 amendment to section 443.101(l)(a)(l) — which became effective July 1, 1999 — was expressly enacted to overrule the foregoing case law and its progeny, see Fla. H.R. Comm, on Business Development & International Trade, A…
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Rochussen v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n & Opinion Research Corp., 795 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…); Alderman v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 664 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Tierney v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 640 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Coelho v. Balasky, 631 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). This bill would require the total disqualification of individuals who work a full-time and part-time job simultaneously and qualify for partial benefits based on being separated from the full-time employer, if they subsequently q…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Neese v. Sizzler Fam. Steak House & Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 404 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- The City OF Coral Gables v. Mayol, 512 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)