ROBERT C. WATTLES, APPELLANT,
v.
PAMELA A. WATTLES, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage appeal, the former husband challenged the trial court's custody, visitation, and asset distribution decisions. The appellate court affirmed the custody and asset distribution rulings but vacated the visitation order, finding the trial court improperly delegated its decision-making authority by adopting a generic 'standard' visitation program that did not account for the child's young age.
The appellate court found merit only in the visitation challenge. The trial court abused its discretion by imposing a 'standard' visitation schedule that did not account for the child's young age and was based in part on school year considerations when the child was only two years old. The court cannot delegate its decision-making authority to the attorneys of record. The custody and asset distribution portions of the judgment were affirmed.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by delegating its decision-making authority regarding child visitation to the parties' attorneys.
[2] A trial court must establish a child visitation schedule in compliance with the evidence and applicable law, rather than relying on a generic or "standard" program.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The court cannot delegate its decision-making authority to the attorneys of record.”
Establishes the core legal error: the trial court improperly allowed attorneys to propose visitation terms rather than making the judicial decision itself.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobert and Pamela Wattles dissolved their marriage. The parties had a child who was only two years old at the time of the dissolution proceeding. At t…
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BROCK, N.D., Associate Judge.
Robert Wattles, the former husband, appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. He asserts that the trial court erred in: (1) awarding primary custody to the former wife; (2) awarding insignificant visitation to the former husband; (3) awarding insignificant visitation to the paternal grandmother; (4) inequitably distributing the marital assets and liabilities; and (5) refusing to allow particular witnesses of former husband to testify. The only issue that has merit is the former husband’s contention that the court abused its discretion in entering the visitation order. We vacate the visitation portion of the final judgment; otherwise, the final judgment of dissolution of marriage is affirmed.
At the conclusion of the hearing the court stated, “I am going to order that visitation be in accordance with our standard visitation program ... unless the parties, themselves, agree to something different, whatever you agree to is fine with me.” The court then requested the parties to submit a proposed final judgment to include their suggested visitation provisions, which both parties did. The trial court, without further hearing, entered a final judgment of dissolution of marriage that included the previously announced “standard” visitation program. The judgment provides for visitation by the former husband every other weekend from 8:00 A.M. Saturday until 6:00 P.M. Sunday during the school year. If there is no school the following day, visitation ends at 7:30 P.M. The former husband also has visitation from 4:00 P.M. until 7:00 P.M. on a weekday every other week. In addition, former husband has a total of five weeks of visitation, with the weeks configured variously at his option, from the day after school is dismissed in June of each year until four days before school begins in the fall of the year. Finally, former husband has visitation during one-half the holiday periods. The former husband complains that the “standard” visitation program is inappropriate in that it is based in part on the school year notwithstanding that the parties’ child is only two years old.
There are no “standard” visitation rights as defined by any rule or statute. The trial court did not ask the parties’ attorneys, as officers of the court, to prepare a judgment in accordance with specific directions by the trial court after the evidence was in and his decision was made. Rather, the trial court requested the parties’ attorneys to submit their suggested visitation schedules in their proposed judgments. The court cannot delegate its decision-making authority to the attorneys of record. See Polizzi v. Polizzi, 600 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Rather, it is the responsibility of the trial court, who finds the facts and applies the law in a dissolution proceeding, to establish a visitation schedule in compliance with the evidence and in accordance with Florida law.
The trial court abused its discretion by imposing a “standard” visitation schedule. Accordingly, the portion of the final judgment ordering “standard” visitation is vacated and the cause is remanded with directions to the trial court to provide for an appropriate visitation schedule more in conformity with the age of the child. The trial court may take additional testimony if needed.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; and REMANDED.
HARRIS, C.J., and DIAMANTES, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Flint v. Fortson, 744 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…, concerning attorney’s and expert fees, and hand wrote his rulings concerning those issues. Also, the judge did his own computations on the child support issues. Relying on White v. White, 686 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) and Wattles v. Wattles, 631 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), Flint argues that the trial judge failed to fulfill his responsibility as a finder of fact by delegating his decision making authority to the attorneys, such that the final judgment was the “equivalent of a legal argument writte…
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Rykiel v. Rykiel, 795 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…So. 2d 427 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Corporate Management Advisors, Inc. v. Boghos, 756 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Ford Motor Co. v. Starling, 721 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); White v. White, 686 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Wattles v. Wattles, 631 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Review of the findings and conclusions of such a judgment is hampered or made impossible by the trial court’s lack of participation. Boghos. In this case, the record contains no findings or conclusions by the trial court, and th…
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Larocka v. Larocka, 43 So. 3d 911 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)…24 So. 2d 941, 942 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“Courts may not delegate their statutory authority to determine visitation to [guardians ad li-tem], attorneys, or experts.” (citing McAlister v. Shaver, 633 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Wattles v. Wattles, 631 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Roski v. Roski, 730 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999))). There is no transcript of the trial proceedings and the record before us is rather sparse. The lack of a transcript or an incomplete record would usually hamper this court’s…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Polizzi v. Polizzi, 600 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)