ATKINSON DREDGING COMPANY, PETITIONER,
v.
JUDGE PATTI ENGLANDER HENNING, A JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Atkinson Dredging Company petitioned for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Henning from presiding over their case because one of the parties' law firms was simultaneously representing the judge and her husband in an unrelated matter. The court granted the petition, holding that the judge must be disqualified based on the appearance of impropriety, regardless of actual bias.
The trial judge must be disqualified from presiding because the appearance of justice prohibits her from continuing, regardless of whether actual bias exists. The judge erred by focusing solely on her subjective belief that she would not be biased while failing to consider the ramifications of her attorney-client relationship with counsel appearing before her.
[1] A judge must be disqualified from presiding over a case when the law firm representing a party in that case also represents the judge and her husband in a separate, unrel…
[2] The appearance of impropriety, rather than actual bias, can necessitate a judge's disqualification from a case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We cannot perceive a trial judge considering argument from counsel on a case then going to counsel's office to discuss the judge's case.”
Establishes the fundamental conflict inherent in the judge presiding over a case involving her own attorney
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA trial judge was assigned to preside over a case involving two parties, one of which was represented by a law firm that also represented the judge an…
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PER CURIAM.
We grant the petition for writ of prohibition sought herein, it being unnecessary that the writ itself issue. At issue is whether the trial judge/respondent should be prohibited from presiding over the pending ease before her in which ease one of the two parties’ law firms is the same firm representing the trial judge and her husband in a separate, unrelated action. We conclude that she should.
First, the trial judge apparently focused solely on her belief that she would not be biased and failed to consider the ramifications of her relationship with the attorneys representing her, which attorney-client relationship involves financial arrangements and •confidentiality. We cannot perceive a trial judge considering argument from counsel on a case then going to counsel’s office to discuss the judge’s case.
Second, the appearance of justice proscribes the trial judge from continuing, even though the record may be void of any actual bias or prejudice on her part. On this point, while we have not been provided, nor have we located, Florida decisions which are factually similar, there are decisions from other jurisdictions, albeit not altogether identical, which support our conclusion.
In Smith v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 420 F.Supp. 661 (C.D.Cal.1976), a federal district court judge sua sponte recused himself, stating that although he was not in fact biased, his impartiality might reasonably be questioned because a member of the law firm representing the plaintiffs had in the past acted as counsel for the judge both personally and in his judicial capacity.
Similarly, in Potashnick v. Port City Construction Co., 609 F. 2d 1101, 1110-13 (5th Cir.1980), the reviewing court stated that disqualification of a judge was required where it was contended that the plaintiffs attorney represented the judge in several unrelated cases while the case was pending, where the judge was engaged in business dealings with the plaintiffs attorney while the case was pending, and where the judge’s father was a partner in the law firm representing the plaintiff. The court noted, when discussing the first two grounds for disqualification, that the “appearance of impartiality” was important. Id. at 1111.
See also Zoline v. Telluride Lodge Ass’n, 732 P. 2d 635 (Colo.1987); In re Fiftieth District Court Judge, 193 Mich.App. 209, 483 N.W. 2d 676 (1992). While these cases may be factually distinguishable, the basic premise, with which we agree, is that: “QJustice must satisfy the appearance of justice,” Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954), even though this “stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties.” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955).
We have duly considered and rejected all of the arguments in response to the petition, albeit not discussed herein.
DELL, C.J., and GLICKSTEIN and WARNER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Marcotte v. Hon. Linda Gloeckner, 679 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…firm no longer represents the judge, at [*1226] one point it was representing both the judge and the insurer simultaneously. On the instant facts, the trial court should have granted the motions to disqualify. See Atkinson Dredging Co. v. Henning, 631 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (recusal was required where the law firm representing one of the parties was the same law firm representing the trial judge and her husband in a separate, unrelated action); see also Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F. 2d…
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Berry v. Berry, 765 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…judge reasonably called into question the judge’s impartiality and thus rendered the motion legally sufficient requiring him to disqualify himself. See Marcotte v. Gloeckner, 679 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Atkinson Dredging Company v. Henning, 631 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). However, notwithstanding the legal sufficiency of the motion, the trial judge maintained that his disqualification should be entered only after the judgment resolving the issues litigated in the case had been entered. This rulin…
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Bethesda Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Cassone, 807 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…998)(finding that motion to disqualify should have been granted where the trial judge’s stepson had a claim pending against the insurance company which had retained counsel to represent the defendant in the action); Atkinson Dredging Co. v. Henning, 631 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)(granting prohibition based on motion to disqualify when one of the parties’ law firms was the same firm representing the trial judge and her husband in a separate, unrelated action). As this court stated in Kielbania v. Jasberg,…1 / 2
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (U.S. 1955)
- Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (U.S. 1954)
- Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co. & United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980)