GAINESVILLE COCA-COLA AND GENERAL ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, APPELLANTS,
v.
EDWARD E. YOUNG, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court denied the appellee's motions for rehearing and clarification, and for rehearing en banc.
The appellee filed motions for rehearing and clarification, and for rehearing en banc, after the court's per curiam decision. The motions largely rest…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Impairment Rating cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The employer/carrier appeal from a workers’ compensation order awarding wage loss benefits and reimbursement of retraining expenses with interest. They contend that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) abused his discretion in accepting the 1% impairment rating of the physician who performed the independent medical evaluation (IME) over the 0% impairment rating of the treating physicians.
We agree and reverse the order. This court has previously reversed this case and remanded it for the JCC to state its reasons for selecting the IME doctor over the treating physicians because the reasons were not apparent from the record. Gainesville Coca-Cola v. Young, 596 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
None of the reasons stated by the JCC on remand was supported by competent substantial evidence. See Curry v. Miami Dolphins, Ltd., 522 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (JCC’s discretion is not unbridled; JCC must give adequate reasons for accepting the testimony of one physician over another where the reason is not apparent from the record or it appears that the JCC has overlooked or ignored evidence).
In the absence of competent sub stantial evidence supporting the JCC’s acceptance of the IME doctor’s impairment rating over that of claimant’s treating physicians and the absence of any evidence of permanent impairment, we must REVERSE the JCC’s order. BOOTH, MINER and KAHN, JJ., concur.
PER CURIAM.
In response to this court’s two paragraph Per Curiam decision, appellee has filed a Motion for Rehearing and Clarification and a Motion for Rehearing En Banc. The Motion for Rehearing and Clarification consists of eight pages which restate the case law and facts contained in appellee’s brief. We deny this motion as improper reargument.
Of somewhat more concern to this court, appellee has also filed a Motion for Rehearing En Banc. Except for the title, concluding paragraph, and citation to Rule 9.331, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Motion for Rehearing En Banc tracks word for word appellee’s Motion for Rehearing and Clarification. Although the sole issue upon which this court reversed was whether the record contained competent substantial evidence to support the order entered by the JCC, counsel concludes the Motion for Rehearing En Banc by expressing his belief “based on a reasoned and studied professional judgment, that the panel decision in this case is of exceptional importance.” Obviously this statement is to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9.331(c)(2). Nothing in the motion, however, even remotely suggests that any issue passed upon in this court’s opinion is of exceptional importance. More to the. point, appellee does not and cannot suggest that the court’s decision has any impact upon the workers’ compensation jurisprudence of this state. This motion is totally without merit and we deny it.
We hope that publication of this opinion would deter the type of motion practice appellee has engaged in. There are, however, other remedies available to the court. See Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Reitzes, 631 So. 2d 1101, (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
BOOTH, MINER and KAHN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
In re Petition of Jane DOE for a Judicial Waiver of Parental Notice of Termination of Pregnancy. Jane Doe, 973 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…nting en banc consideration on the issue of “the mechanistic approach of reviewing the trial court’s discretion based solely upon fixed percentages assessed against noncustodial wage-earners” in domestic cases), with Gainesville Cocar-Cola v. Young, 632 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (denying motion for rehearing en banc in a case where the district court’s panel decision reversed the judge of compensation claims’ order in favor of the worker because the record did not contain competent, substantial evidence…
-
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Liggon, 668 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…that opinion. See Smith v. Seminole Kraft Corp., 649 So. 2d 261, 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (in reversing TTD award, court noted that IME physician testified that claimant had not yet reached MMI as of date of hearing); Gainesville Coca-Cola v. Young, 632 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (court reversed JCC’s order where JCC failed to state reasons for accepting IME physician’s impairment rating over that of claimant’s treating physicians); Turner v. Carl Blanchard Plastering, 590 So. 2d 1025, 1026-27 (Fla. 1st D…
-
Osceola Cnty. v. Best Diversified, Inc., 936 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…my view, a motion for rehearing is not appropriate to challenge a panel decision based solely on the conclusion that the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the decision of the trier of fact. In Gainesville Coca-Cola v. Young, 632 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), the court rejected the argument that a panel decision finding competent, substantial evidence to support a final judgment was one of exceptional importance and noted the argument was “totally without merit.” A motion for rehear…
Authorities Cited
- Emory Curry v. Miami Dolphins, Ltd., 522 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Gainesville Coca-Cola & Gen. Accident Bureau v. Young, 596 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Reitzes, 631 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)