D.V.S., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A juvenile appellant challenges a six-month community control sentence imposed after pleading nolo contendere to trespass, arguing it exceeds statutory limits on juvenile sanctions. The court affirmed, holding that statutory restrictions on sentencing duration apply only to adjudicated delinquent children, and the appellant's non-adjudicated status permitted the imposed sentence under section 39.053(2).
The court held that statutory restrictions on the duration of juvenile sanctions, including section 39.054(4) limiting commitments to the maximum adult sentence and section 39.054(1) limiting community supervision duration, apply only to adjudicated delinquent children. Since D.V.S. was non-adjudicated, these restrictions did not apply, and the six-month community control sentence was appropriate under section 39.053(2).
[1] A court's imposition of community control for a non-adjudicated delinquent child is governed by section 39.053(2), Florida Statutes, and is not restricted by provisions a…
[2] Statutory provisions limiting the duration of commitment or supervision for delinquent children do not apply when a court disposes of a matter on a non-adjudicated basis.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Any commitment of a delinquent child to the department shall be for an indeterminate period of time, but the time shall not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment which an adult may serve for the same offense”
Section 39.054(4) statutory language that appellant relied upon; court distinguished this as inapplicable to non-adjudicated children
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceD.V.S., a child, pled nolo contendere to the reduced offense of trespass, a second degree misdemeanor. The trial court withheld adjudication and place…
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HARRIS, Chief Judge.
D.V.S. pled nolo contendere to the reduced offense of trespass, a second degree misdemeanor. The judge ivithheld adjudication and pursuant to section 39.053(2), disposed of the matter on a non-adjudicated basis. D.V.S. was placed on community control un der the supervision of H.R.S. for a period of six months. He appeals contending that the court erred in imposing a six-month period of community control when the maximum adult incarceration for trespass would have been sixty days.
D.V.S. relies on section 39.054(4) Florida Statutes which provides:
Any commitment of a delinquent child to the department shall be for an indeterminate period of time, but the time shall not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment ivhich an adult may serve for the same offense ... (emphasis added.)
But it appears that a “placement” into community control is in “lieu of’ (therefore distinguished from) “commitment to the custody of the department.” Section 39.01(12), Fla.Stat. (1991). Therefore, even if section 39.054(4) were otherwise applicable, by its own terms 'it appears inapplicable to this case.
D.V.S. also relies on section 39.054(1) which provides that:
[W]hen supervision or a program of community service is ordered by the court, the duration of such supervision or program shall not exceed the term for which sentence could be imposed if the child were committed for the offense.
But this provision (as well as section 39.-054(4) mentioned above) applies' only when the court is dealing with “an adjudicated delinquent child.” Section 39.054(1), Fla. Stat. Since D.V.S. was non-adjudicated, the provisions of 39.058 are applicable and the restrictions relating to “commitment” or comparisons with adult sanctions are not involved.1
We find the six-month term of community control is an appropriate sentence under section 39.053(2) and affirm.
AFFIRMED.
THOMPSON, J., concurs.
W. SHARP, J., concurs specially with opinion.
. A.R. v. State, 593 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) and M.G. v. State, 556 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), are distinguishable in that those courts were dealing with adjudicated children. However, E.J. v. State, 595 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) appears to be in conflict. That court did not discuss the distinction between an adjudicated and a non-adjudicated delinquent child.
W. SHARP, Judge,
concurring specially.
Sections 39.054 and 39.053, Florida Statutes (1991) are not as clear as one might wish regarding the maximum outside time limits to which a juvenile can be placed on community control whether he is adjudicated or not. I concur with the majority in this case, relying primarily on section 948.15 [adults can be placed on probation for six months for this type of crime]. However, it makes little sense for this statute to provide that a sanction (six months) is possible if adjudication is withheld, but only sixty days if the child is adjudicated.
If the Legislature intended to limit community control programs for juveniles to adult maximum prison terms for comparable crimes, it should make that intent clear and unambiguous. Reading all of sections 39.052, 39.053 and 39.054 together it is apparent that short time limits will make many of the community control programs, educational programs and community service alternatives provided for by sections 39.052, 39.053 and 39.054 impractical because most require far more time than sixty days for rehabilitation/treatment to have any appreciable effect. Such an interpretation, as is argued for by D.V.S. in this case, deprives juvenile judges of a great many of their statutory sentencing alternatives provided for in chapter 39 for less serious juvenile offenders, and (in effect) appears to defeat the purpose of those statutes.
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N.W. v. State, 767 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 2000)…t 1066-67; accord M.G., 696 So. 2d at 1341. In a similar manner, the Fifth District at one point also recognized the distinction that section 39.054(1) only applies to juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent. For example, in D.V.S. v. State, 632 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), just as in N.W., a juvenile was found guilty of a second-degree misdemeanor. The court withheld adjudication and placed D.V.S. on community control for six months. D.V.S. challenged his six-month community con [*449] trol dispos…
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G.R.A. v. State, 688 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…rm of imprisonment which an adult may serve for the same offense.” § 39.054(4), Fla. Stat. (1995). While section 39.054 specifies the disposition powers of a trial court when it has jurisdiction over an adjudicated delinquent child, D.V.S. v. State, 632 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), there is no corresponding statute governing a court’s disposition powers when adjudication is withheld. But cf. E.J. v. State, 595 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (holding, in case where adjudication was withheld, that under…
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T.J. v. State, 743 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…set forth in section 985.231. See M.G. v. State, 696 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); M.B. v. State, 693 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (both cases involving nearly identical older version of statute contained in former chapter 39); D.V.S. v. State, 632 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). . Section 985.23 l(l)(a)(l)(a) provides that if a program of supervision is ordered by the court, the duration of the program may not exceed the amount of time the juvenile could have been committed to the DJJ for the offense.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- E.J. v. State, 595 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- A.R. v. State, 593 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- M.G. v. State, 556 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
- Woods v. Hon. Carven D. Angel, 556 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)