STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
C.S., A CHILD, APPELLEE
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The State appeals a trial court order suppressing evidence obtained from a vehicle search. The appellate court reverses, holding that the defendant's consent to search was voluntary despite the trial court's findings that the defendant's youth and lack of reflection weighed against voluntariness.
C.S.'s consent was voluntary. Although the trial court identified factors suggesting involuntariness (C.S.'s youth, spontaneous consent without reflection, and being detained without license/registration), the appellate court found that factors supporting voluntariness (lawful stop, single officer, no weapon drawn, advice of right to refuse, no threats or misrepresentations) were weightier. The state proved by clear and convincing evidence that consent was not the product of duress or coercion.
[1] A search of a vehicle is lawful when consent to search is voluntarily given.
[2] Consent to search is voluntary when, under the totality of the circumstances, it is not the product of duress or coercion.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the state proved by clear and convincing evidence that C.S.'s consent was not the product of duress or coercion”
Establishes the standard of proof required to demonstrate voluntary consent and the ultimate holding that consent was voluntary
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn officer lawfully stopped C.S. for driving with inoperable taillights. The officer took C.S.'s license and registration back to the patrol car. With…
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PARKER, Judge.
The State of Florida appeals the trial court’s order granting a motion to suppress evidence seized from a vehicle. We reverse because we conclude that the trial court erred in finding that C.S.’s consent to search was not voluntary.
An officer lawfully stopped C.S. for driving a vehicle with inoperable taillights. The officer took C.S.’s license and registration back to the patrol car. Within three to five minutes the officer approached C.S.’s car and asked permission to search the vehicle. The officer advised C.S. that he was free to refuse consent or to stop the search. C.S. immediately said, “Yes, there is no problem with that.” The officer searched underneath the driver’s front seat and found an opened black leather bag containing a scale and baggies with marijuana residue and seeds inside. The officer also found a box of baggies in the trunk.
The trial court found based on the totality of the circumstances that the consent was not voluntary. The trial court enumerated the following factors which supported that holding: C.S. was being held there, without his license and car’s registration, until the officer completed the citation; C.S.’s youth; and C.S. gave the consent spontaneously and without reflection.
The facts in this case are undisputed. This court, therefore, is in as good a position as the trial court to apply the law to the uncontested facts. See United States v. Valdez, 931 F. 2d 1448 (11th Cir.1991).
The three factors which the trial court specified do weigh in favor of holding that the consent was not voluntary. We, however, conclude that the following factors weigh in favor of holding that the consent was voluntary: the initial stop was lawful; only one officer approached C.S.; the officer’s weapon was not drawn; the officer advised C.S. that he had the right to refuse consent; and the officer made no threats or misrepresentations. Considering all of these factors, the state proved by clear and convincing evidence that C.S.’s consent was not the product of duress or coercion. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
HALL, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur.
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Gonzalez v. State, 59 So. 3d 182 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…his own property during daytime hours and not in a coercive environment; the encounter was relatively, short; defendant was not threatened or promised anything to induce his consent; and the defendant executed a written consent form); State v. C.S., 632 So. 2d 675, 675 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that state proved by clear and convincing evidence that juvenile’s consent to officer’s search of his vehicle was voluntary where “the initial stop was lawful; only one officer approached [juvenile]; the officer’s we…
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M.H.M. v. State, 668 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See State v. C.S., 632 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) and State v. Brown, 619 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). GOSHORN, GRIFFIN and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.…
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W.L.D. v. State, 724 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…t then found that appellant had had eighteen prior contacts with the juvenile justice system, had experience and was mature and had an understanding of what it meant to be stopped by a law enforcement officer and how to respond. As in State v. C.S., 632 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) the stop was lawful, the trial court found the officer’s testimony to be persuasive in that his weapon was not drawn, he spoke to appellant in a normal tone, made no threats and that appellant freely consented to the search. A tr…
Authorities Cited
- United States v. Valdez, 931 F.2d 1448 (11th Cir. 1991)