FELIPE SARRAIN, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Felipe Sarrain appealed his grand theft conviction, challenging both a speedy trial motion denial and a probation condition requiring deposition testimony. The Florida appellate court affirmed the conviction and the denial of the speedy trial motion, but remanded for clarification of the probation conditions to address potential Fifth Amendment concerns.
The court affirmed the conviction and denial of the speedy trial motion because the motion was premature, having been filed on the 175th day rather than after the expiration of the 175-day period. The court remanded for clarification of the probation conditions because the order lacked sufficient guidance to determine whether Sarrain's Fifth Amendment rights were violated.
[1] A motion for discharge under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(d)(1) is invalid if filed before the expiration of the statutory period for trial.
[2] A motion for discharge is timely if filed on or after the expiration of the period of time for trial.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A motion for discharge shall be timely if filed and served on or after the expiration of the periods of time for trial provided for herein; however, a motion for discharge filed before expiration of the period of time for trial is invalid and shall be stricken upon motion of the prosecuting attorney.”
Establishes the legal standard for timeliness of speedy trial motions under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(d)(1), which the court applied to reject Sarrain's motion as premature.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSarrain was arrested on August 22, 1991, and charged with grand theft by information dated September 12, 1991. He filed a motion for discharge on Febr…
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm Felipe Sarrain’s conviction for grand theft, first degree, however we remand for clarification of the sentence imposed.
Sarrain was arrested on August 22, 1991 and charged with grand theft by information dated September 12, 1991. Pursuant to the applicable rules, under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a), if the crime charged is a felony, the defendant is to be brought to trial within 175 days. Here, the 175th day was February 13, 1992. The defendant filed his motion for discharge on February 13, 1992. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(d)(1) reads as follows:
Motion for Discharge; Trial; When Timely. A motion for discharge shall be timely if filed and served on or after the expiration of the periods of time for trial provided for herein; however, a motion for discharge filed before expiration of the period of time for trial is invalid and shall be stricken upon motion of the prosecuting attorney.
Here, the motion was premature as it was filed on the 175th day rather than the 176th day when it would have been ripe and possibly meritorious. Thus, we reject Sarrain’s claim of speedy trial violation and affirm the trial court’s denial of Sarrain’s motion for discharge.
Additionally, Sarrain argues that when he was adjudicated guilty of grand theft and the trial court sentenced him to five years probation, part of that probation was the erroneous imposition of a special condition that he submit to deposition by a member of the victim’s insurance company. Sar-rain had testified at trial, denying his involvement in the crime charged, and specifically denying the receipt of any money. The trial judge, in ordering Sarrain to submit to the special condition of deposition, commented that he expected Sarrain to tell “exactly what happened to the money.” Sarrain complains that the special condition that he submit to deposition interferes with his right against self-incrimination. Because the order requires only that Sarrain submit to deposition, but provides no further guidance or limitation, we conclude that it is premature to determine whether the defendant was stripped of his right against self-incrimination.
Thus, we return the case to the trial judge with plenary authority for him to refine and clarify the nature and scope of the conditions of probation in view of the immunity statutes. See § 914.04, Fla.Stat. (1993); § 837.021, Fla.Stat. (1993). Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s conviction but remand for clarification of sentence,
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Clark v. State, 698 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…two so that the recapture period may be complied with. See generally Salzero v. State, 697 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). On the other hand, since a “motion to discharge” may not be granted unless it is well taken when filed, see Sarrain v. State, 632 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); see also Fla. R.Crim.P. 3.191(h), there is no necessity for scheduling it at any particular time. As defense counsel may well have anticipated, see Reaves, 609 So. 2d at 701, that is exactly what, as a direct result of the fact t…
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Brown v. State, 798 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…Fla. R. Crim P. 3.191(b)(4), (p)(2). Instead of waiting, however, Mr. Brown filed his notice of expiration on January 10, 2001, forty-four days after he filed his demand. As such, the notice was premature and properly stricken. See Sarrain v. State, 632 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Because the notice was properly stricken, Mr. Brown was not entitled to discharge.3 Petition for writ of prohibition denied. PARKER, A.C.J., and NORTHCUTT, J., Concur. . A prisoner in Florida in state custody may demand speedy…