ROBERT L. NAUGLE, APPELLANT,
v.
EVELYN NAUGLE, APPELLEE
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Robert Naugle appeals a dissolution of marriage judgment challenging the distribution of marital assets, permanent alimony award, and attorney's fees obligation. The appellate court affirmed the asset distribution and alimony but reversed the requirement that Robert pay his ex-wife's attorney's fees, finding an abuse of discretion after the parties were equalized financially.
The court affirmed the equitable distribution of marital assets (51%-49% split) and the permanent alimony award as proper exercises of judicial discretion consistent with Florida law. However, the court reversed the award of attorney's fees, finding the trial court abused its discretion by requiring payment after placing the parties in equal financial positions.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in distributing marital assets and awarding permanent alimony when it considers the length of the marriage, accumulated assets…
[2] An award of attorney's fees in a dissolution of marriage case is intended to ensure that both parties have a similar ability to secure competent counsel, based on their r…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The purpose of section 61.16, Florida Statutes (1991), is to assure that each party in a dissolution of marriage case has a similar ability to secure competent counsel. The award is not based upon who 'wins,' but on the relative financial circumstances of the parties.”
Establishes the legal standard for attorney's fees awards in dissolution cases—based on financial capacity, not outcome.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobert and Evelyn Naugle were married for 28 years. Robert had superior earning capacity throughout the marriage. The trial judge distributed 51% of m…
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THOMPSON, Judge.
Robert L. Naugle appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. He appeals the distribution of marital assets, the award of permanent alimony and the award of attorney’s fees and costs to his former wife Evelyn Naugle. We affirm the judgment of dissolution except the requirement that Robert pay Evelyn’s attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm in part and we reverse in part.
Robert and Evelyn were married for 28 years before the judgment of dissolution was entered. There is no dispute that Robert has always had superior earning capacity. The final judgment is thorough and indicates the trial judge reviewed the length of the marriage, the assets accumulated during the marriage and the relative earning capacity of the parties. Although neither party was very candid concerning their assets, the judge did not act capriciously or arbitrarily, in distributing the assets of the marriage and awarding permanent alimony. He awarded Evelyn 51% of the marital assets and Robert 49% of the marital assets. His rulings are consistent with the judicial requirements enunciated by the Supreme Court in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980).
The judge entered both oral and written findings as to the equitable distribution of marital assets and liabilities. See § 61-075(3), Fla.Stat. (1991).
The judge also considered all of the statutory requirements of section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes (1991), before awarding alimony. He did not abuse his discretion. See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 622 So. 2d 1033, 1034 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
We affirm the distribution of marital assets and the award of permanent alimony.
We reverse, however, the requirement that Robert pay Evelyn’s attorney’s fees and costs.
The trial court abused its discretion in this regard after making an equal distribution of marital assets and equalizing incomes through the alimony award. See Ariko v. Ariko, 475 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
The purpose of section 61.16, Florida Statutes (1991), is to assure that each party in a dissolution of marriage case has a similar ability to secure competent counsel. The award is not based upon who “wins,” but on the relative financial circumstances of the parties. Seitz v. Seitz, 471 So. 2d 612, 615 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
Having placed the parties in the same relative financial position, it was error to require that Robert pay Evelyn’s attorney’s fees. See Blankenship v. Blankenship, 502 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Sizemore v. Sizemore, 487 So. 2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
The trial judge may have had reasons for awarding attorney’s fees, but he did not give oral reasons at the hearing or written reasons in the final judgment. Additionally, there were no findings by the trial court as to the reasonableness of Evelyn’s fees and costs or any findings as required by Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla.1990) and Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985). We reverse the award of attorney’s fees.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.
HARRIS, C.J., and GRIFFIN, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Vitalis v. Lesli Vitalis, 799 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…o. 2d 61 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). A trial court abuses its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees if the equal distribution of the marital property has been achieved and the trial court equalized incomes through its alimony awards. See Naugle v. Naugle, 632 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). While the trial judge may have a sufficient basis to award attorney’s fees to the wife, such basis was not announced on the record or in the final judgment. Absent the trial court’s reasoning and given the uncertainty of the ali…
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Galligar v. Terrie Galligar, 77 So. 3d 808 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…able distribution of the marital property has been achieved and the trial court has equalized incomes through its alimony award, the trial court abuses its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. Vitalis, 799 So. 2d at 1133 (citing Naugle v. Naugle, 632 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)); accord Gaudette v. Gaudette, 890 So. 2d 1161, 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the former wife. REVERSED AND REMANDED. HAWKES, J., concurs; BENTON, C.J., co…
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Winn v. Winn, 669 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…1991); Pitts v. Pitts, 626 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Allen v. Heinrich, 623 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Lochridge v. Lochridge, 526 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). . Overbey v. Overbey, 664 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Naugle v. Naugle, 632 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Schiller v. Schiller, 625 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)
- Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990)
- Seitz v. Seitz, 471 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Kennedy v. Kennedy, 622 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
- Ariko v. Ariko, 475 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
- Thad Richard Sizemore, Jr. v. Sizemore, 487 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Blankenship v. Blankenship, 502 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)