WILLIAM RICHARD LORMAN, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
JOYCE LORMAN, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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In this family law appeal, the former husband and former wife challenged various provisions of a final judgment dissolving their marriage, including child support calculation, life insurance requirements for spousal support, and allocation of pre-dissolution federal income tax liability. The appellate court affirmed the child support calculation and rejection of the wife's tax argument but reversed and remanded regarding the life insurance requirement and tax liability allocation.
The court affirmed the child support calculation without factoring in the wife's interest income and rejected the wife's argument regarding tax impact on alimony. However, the court reversed the additional $250,000 life insurance requirement imposed without evidentiary basis and reversed the requirement that the former husband assume total pre-dissolution tax liability without the trial court first determining the amount and considering financial consequences on equitable distribution.
[1] A trial court errs by imposing an additional life insurance requirement as security for support obligations without an evidentiary basis.
[2] On remand, a trial court must consider the necessity, availability, cost, and financial impact of additional life insurance requirements.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“However, without any evidentiary basis, the trial court imposed an additional $250,000 life insurance requirement in another provision of the judgment. This was error.”
Establishes that the trial court erred by imposing duplicative life insurance requirements without factual support.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were divorced and disputes arose over several provisions of the final judgment. During proceedings, the former husband agreed to maintain …
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LAZZARA, Judge.
The parties challenge various provisions of an amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The former husband argues on direct appeal that the trial court erred by (1) fixing his child support obligation without factoring in the former wife’s interest income from an award of lump sum alimony; (2) ordering him to provide as security for spousal support a life insurance policy in the sum of $250,000; and (3) requiring him to be solely responsible for the parties’ federal income tax liability for the years pre-dating the petition for dissolution of marriage. The former wife contends on cross-appeal that the trial court erred by not considering the impact of federal income taxes on her award of alimony. We reject both the former husband’s first argument and the former wife’s contention and affirm on those points. We find merit in the former husband’s other two arguments and reverse and remand on those points.
During the course of the proceedings, the former husband agreed to continue to maintain a life insurance policy in the sum of $325,000 as security for his alimony and child support obligations. The trial court properly incorporated this agreement in one provision of the final judgment. See Edwards v. Edwards, 559 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). However, without any evidentiary basis, the trial court imposed an additional $250,000 life insurance requirement in another provision of the judgment. This was error. Sobelman v. Sobelman, 541 So. 2d 1153, 1154 n. 2 (Fla.1989).
On remand, the trial court shall consider whether this additional insurance is necessary and, if so, the availability and cost of such insurance and the financial impact it will have on the former husband. Kremer v. Kremer, 595 So. 2d 214, 218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). The trial court shall also have the option of reserving jurisdiction on this issue if it is not ripe for immediate resolution. See Bassett v. Bassett, 571 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
The trial court further erred by requiring the former husband to assume total responsibility for the parties’ federal income tax liability for the years preceding the petition for divorce. Although we recognize the trial court’s discretion to impose such a requirement under the facts of this case, Hair v. Hair, 402 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), nevertheless, before it may do so, it must first determine the amount of the tax liability and then give appropriate consideration to the financial consequences this liability will have on an overall scheme of equitable distribution. Nicewonder v. Nicewonder, 602 So. 2d 1354, 1357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). The trial court failed to engage in this analysis and thus committed reversible error. Id. Moreover, we would note that there was no evidence in the record to suggest the amount of this tax liability or that it will ever be imposed on the parties.
If on remand the trial court finds that this liability is substantial and not merely speculative and again orders the former husband to assume full responsibility for its payment, then the trial court shall have the authority to revisit its original plan of equitable distribution, including spousal support, and determine if it should be modified in any respect in order to accomplish equity and justice between the parties. E.g., Eagan v. Eagan, 392 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
BLUE, A.C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur.
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Dalton Santiago v. Tabatha Santiago, 51 So. 3d 637 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…sets and allocation of liabilities.”). The trial court may have also believed that the marital tax liability was less than $101,000 (as argued by the husband). But again, the trial court failed to make a finding to this effect. See Lorman v. Lorman, 633 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that before trial court may impose tax liability solely on one party, “it must first determine the amount of the tax liability and then give appropriate consideration to the financial consequences this liability will…
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Mohamed S. Rashid v. Shanta Rashid, 35 So. 3d 992 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)…ng party.” Duffey v. Duffey, 972 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). In ordering this protection, the court should consider the “availability and cost of such insurance and the financial impact it will have on the former husband.” Lorman v. Lorman, 633 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); see also Kotlarz v. Kotlarz, 21 So. 3d 892, 893 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Schoditsch v. Schoditsch, 888 So. 2d 709, 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Burnham v. Burnham, 884 So. 2d 390, 392 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The final judgment should i…
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Schere v. Rhoda Schere, 645 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…t the trial court erred in ordering the husband to purchase a [*22] life insurance policy or an annuity as security for alimony, without considering the cost and financial impact on the husband. See Sobelman, 541 So. 2d at 1154 n. 2; Loman v. Loman, 633 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Kremer v. Kremer, 595 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to make that determination, and affirm the judgment in all other respects. Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Goldie Sobelman v. Sobelman, 541 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989)
- Kremer v. Kremer, 595 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- McQUIGGAN v. State, 392 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Hair v. Hair, 402 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Eagan v. Eagan, 392 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Nicewonder v. Arstine Nicewonder, 602 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Edwards v. Edwards, 559 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Bassett v. Bassett, 571 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)