MARY JANE MARSHALL, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
DONALD MARSHALL, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT; DONALD MARSHALL, APPELLANT, V. MARY JANE MARSHALL, APPELLEE
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PER CURIAM.
We hereby sua sponte consolidate Case Numbers 92-3019, 92-3258 and 93-0397.
In view of the overall findings and holdings of the trial court, and especially the distribution of marital property and the award of lump sum alimony to the wife, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in the denial of permanent alimony or the distribution of marital assets. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980). Similarly, we find no error by the trial court in the continuation of the husband’s obligations for certain expenses after the final hearing and the denial of credit to the husband for these payments, or any error in the assessment of costs and attorney’s fees against the husband.
We agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in restricting her discretion as to the use and disposition of the assets awarded to her. We remand with directions that these restrictions mandating the rental or sale of any of her real estate be stricken from the final judgment and the post-judgment order. In all other respects we affirm.
ANSTEAD and FARMER, JJ., and MAY, MELANIE G., Associate Judge, concur.
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Rothschild v. NME Hosps., Inc., 707 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…s entirely ignores the statutory language which states- that the claimant shall have sixty days “or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever, is greater,” in which to file suit. § 766.106(4). That is why Mason v. Bisogno, 633 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), is distinguishable. In Mason, the claimants filed their notice of intent to initiate malpractice litigation against the physician only seven days before the expiration of the statute of limitations. Prior to the conclusion of th…
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Maelee Wilder v. Hillsborough Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 686 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…, her suit was timely filed. On the other hand, if Wilder did receive a written rejection from the hospital, the limitations period expired sixty days after the date she received the rejection notice. See Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.650(d)(3); Mason v. Bisogno, 633 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 641 So. 2d 1345 (Fla.1994). It is undisputed that the hospital mailed a rejection letter dated June 3,1993, to Wilder. However, the letter was sent by regular mail instead of by certified mail, return receipt requested,…
Authorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)