BEVERLY MORLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
LADY ALLISON, INC., APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1994-03-22
No. 93-1849
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUBBART and COPE, JJ.
633 So. 2d 1173 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1994) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Beverly Morley, a crew member injured aboard a yacht, sued the vessel's owner Lady Allison, Inc. for damages. The trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Delaware corporation, but the appellate court reversed, finding that the defendant's substantial and continuous business operations in Florida—including vessel operations, maintenance, repairs, and crew hiring—satisfied Florida's long-arm statute.


Holding

The court held that Lady Allison, Inc. was subject to Florida jurisdiction under section 48.193(2) because the corporation engaged in substantial and continuous, not isolated, activity within Florida. The defendant's nearly exclusive focus on Florida operations—basing all cruises in Miami, conducting annual refits and repairs there, and hiring crew locally—constituted continuous and systematic activity sufficient to establish both statutory and constitutional jurisdiction.


Headnotes

[1] A foreign corporation is subject to the jurisdiction of Florida courts if it engages in substantial and not isolated activity within the state, regardless of whether the…

[2] Substantial and not isolated activity within Florida for jurisdictional purposes requires the foreign corporation's activities to be continuous and systematic.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity.”

The statutory provision governing personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations under Florida law.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

On January 2, 1991, Beverly Morley was injured in a maritime accident while working as crew on the M/V Lady Allison, a pleasure yacht docked in the Vi…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

On January 2, 1991, Beverly Morley, a Jones Act seaperson and member of the crew of the pleasure yacht M/V Lady Allison, was injured in a maritime accident on board the vessel while it was docked in the Virgin Islands. She sued the owner of the yacht, Lady Allison, Inc., a Delaware corporation which maintains its business office and bank account in New Jersey and New York respectively, in the Dade County Circuit Court. She now appeals from an order dismissing the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, entered on the ground that the substituted service she secured under section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes (1991) was unjustified.

We reverse on the holding that the defendant has “engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within the state” so as to sustain jurisdiction under that statute.

The sole purpose of the defendant corporation is to own and operate the yacht; the sole purpose of the yacht, in turn, is to provide pleasure voyages for guests of Lady Allison, Inc.’s parent corporation, Hartz Mountain Industries, Inc., the pet food company. The corporation took possession of the vessel in February 1990 in Fort Lauderdale. Since that time, Miami has been the location from which each cruise begins and at which it ends. For approximately three months of each year, the vessel is refitted and repaired at its only yard in the United States, Merrill-Stevens in Miami. Up to the time of the plaintiffs accident, the corporation had expended approximately $400,000 in Florida for maintenance and repairs, $50,000 for fuel, which it purchased through a Miami concern, and $45,000 for other necessities. In addition, the corporation hired most, if not all of its crew, including the plaintiff, here.

Section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes (1991) provides:

(2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity.

We have stated that these provisions require that the activities of the foreign corporation in our state be “continuous and systematic.” Ranger Nationwide, Inc. v. Cook, 519 So. 2d 1087, 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), review denied, 531 So. 2d 167 (Fla.1988). In our view, it would be difficult to imagine a situation in which that is more obviously the case. Indeed, the activities of the corporation involve Florida almost to the exclusion of any other jurisdiction.

Hence, the service obtained below was both statutorily and constitutionally justified. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984); Noury v. Vitek Mfg. Co., 730 F.Supp. 1573 (S.D.Fla.1990); Universal Caribbean Establishment v. Bard, 543 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).

In contrast, the cases relied upon by the appellee, Price v. Point Marine, Inc., 610 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), Spanier v. Suisse-Outremer Reederei A.G., 557 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), and Ranger, each of which involves sporadic or isolated visits of a vessel or vehicle to Florida, are plainly impertinent. Cf. also American Overseas Marine Corp. v. Patterson, 632 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

Reversed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • …1355, 1356 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)); Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F. 3d 1264, 1273 (11th Cir.2002) (finding general jurisdiction over defendant, whose Florida subsidiary coordinated over 50% of all its hotel guests); Morley v. Lady Allison, Inc., 633 So. 2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (exercising general jurisdiction where defendant’s activities of operating a yacht "involved Florida almost to the exclusion of any other jurisdiction” since its voyages depart and arrive in Miami; it spent $400,000 in Flori…
  • Bafitis v. ARA, 815 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
    …” which has been defined as “continuous and systematic.” See Woods v. Nova Cos. Belize Ltd., 739 So. 2d 617, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Pafco Gen. Ins. Co. v. Wah-Wai Furniture Co., 701 So. 2d 902, 904 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Morley v. Lady Allison, Inc., 633 So. 2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Milberg Factors, Inc. v. Greenbaum, 585 So. 2d 1089, 1091 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). A review of the record indicates that the former husband’s activities within Florida have not been “continuous and systematic.” See Latta v. Latt…
  • In re Arb. Between Johns & Taramita, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (S.D. Fla. 2001)
    …any Florida decisions have addressed factual circumstances where vessels were at one time located in Florida, and these cases require more than mere berthing or delivery of the vessel in the state. For example, in Morley v. Lady Allison, Inc., 633 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), the court held that the trial court had jurisdiction over a Delaware vessel owner where the owner took delivery of the vessel in Florida, but the Florida delivery was not the only fact that gave rise to personal jurisdiction. The…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw