MIGUEL MADRASO, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1994-03-29
No. 92-2434
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and COPE and GODERICH, JJ.
634 So. 2d 749 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1994) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Miguel Madraso appeals his convictions for attempted first-degree murder with a firearm and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, claiming prosecutorial improprieties and erroneous admission of flight evidence. The court affirmed the convictions as harmless error based on overwhelming evidence but vacated and remanded the sentences due to improper habitual offender designations.


Holding

The convictions are affirmed because any prosecutorial error and evidentiary error were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the overwhelming evidence. The sentences are vacated and remanded because the trial court improperly imposed a habitual offender sentence for the life felony of attempted first-degree murder, and the formal sentence for firearm possession by a convicted felon must be modified to conform to the oral pronouncement.


Headnotes

[1] Prosecutorial misconduct during opening statement or closing argument, or the erroneous admission of flight evidence, may be deemed harmless error beyond a reasonable dou…

[2] A habitual offender sentence cannot be imposed for a life felony, such as attempted first-degree murder with a firearm.

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Key Quotes

“we must conclude— on the basis of the overwhelming, indeed undisputed, evidence against the appellant— that the incidents in question were individually and collectively harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”

Establishes that despite finding trial error, the court affirmed convictions based on harmless error analysis due to overwhelming evidence

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Facts & Procedural History

Madraso was convicted of attempted first-degree murder with a firearm and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial involved th…

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Opinion of the Court
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

Madraso appeals from his convictions and sentences for attempted first-degree murder with a firearm and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

The primary claims of trial error arise from alleged prosecutorial improprieties in the opening statement and final argument 1 and the allegedly erroneous admission of evidence of flight. While we are inclined to agree that error has indeed been demonstrated on these issues, we must conclude— on the basis of the overwhelming, indeed undisputed, evidence against the appellant— that the incidents in question were individually and collectively harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986); State v. Murray, 443 So. 2d 955 (Fla.1984); Hall v. State, 444 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).2 Therefore, the convictions are affirmed.

As the state concedes, however, there is error in the sentences imposed as to both counts below.

1. The trial court improperly entered a habitual offender sentence for attempted first-degree murder with a firearm, which is a life felony. Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla.1992). Consequently, Madra-so is to be resentenced as to this charge under a properly calculated guidelines score-sheet. Because, however, the trial judge— who imposed the sentence in the period before our contrary decision in Lamont v. State, 597 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) was reversed by the supreme court — was not aware that he was bound by the guidelines, he may enter an upward departure at resentencing so long as appropriate written reasons are then assigned. State v. Betancourt, 552 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1989); Roberts v. State, 547 So. 2d 129 (Fla.1989). Compare Cook v. State, 632 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (habitual offender status erroneously assigned as basis for upward departure).

2. The formal sentence imposed for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon should be modified to omit the reference to habitual offender status as to that count so as to conform to the oral pronouncement of the trial court at sentencing.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded.

. Perhaps the worst of these remarks was that: If Miguel Espinosa [the victim] tells you what happened and the only witness who tells you what happens is Miguel Espinosa, nobody contradicts him, then you must believe what Miguel Espinosa said.

. As we said in Hall:

Our function is to determine the result of this and every other appeal in accordance with the demands of essential justice to all litigants in the cause. That high purpose is not achieved if a reversal is employed in a criminal case solely to discipline an attorney for misconduct which did not affect the outcome of the trial or the substantial rights of the defendant. Other means in appropriate cases exist for that purpose.

**

3. It is obvious that the mere fact that prosecutorial misconduct does not result in reversal does not render it acceptable behavior. See United States v. Beckett, supra, 706 F. 2d at 521-22.

Hall v. State, 444 So. 2d 1019, 1020 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).


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Citator

Cited By

  • Nathan v. State, 689 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
    …the revised score-sheet. Ricardo v. State, 608 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). (2) The trial court should be permitted to consider departing from the guidelines as to that offense so long as legal written reasons are then assigned. Madraso v. State, 634 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) [review denied, 645 So. 2d 453 (Fla.1994)]. (3) The new sentence imposed under the guidelines for the burglary offense may run consecutive to the habitualized offenses so long as the total sentence (guidelines and habitual-ized s…
  • Roberts v. State, 698 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
    …arture sentence. In either of those situations, Florida courts have held that the trial court, on remand, may again impose a departure sentence if valid written reasons are provided. State v. Betancourt, 552 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1989); Madraso v. State, 634 So. 2d 749, 750 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 645 So. 2d 453 (Fla.1994); Mills v. State, 623 So. 2d 840, 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). Distinguishable is Grimes v. State, 616 So. 2d 996, 997-98 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), review dismissed, 617 So. 2d 319 (Fla.1993). Ther…

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