FRANK J. LAVELLE, APPELLANT,
v.
MARTHA LAVELLE, APPELLEE
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In this divorce case, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a final judgment because the trial court unequally distributed marital assets without adequate factual findings, failed to distribute all marital property, and awarded alimony without proper equitable distribution analysis.
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in all three respects: it was required to make written findings explaining any unequal distribution and should have divided assets substantially equally absent compelling factors; it failed to value and distribute all marital property including household furnishings, jewelry, and the land trust; and the alimony award could not be justified under the flawed distribution scheme.
[1] A trial court must include written findings in a final judgment setting forth the rationale for the distribution of marital assets.
[2] In the absence of equitable factors compelling a different result, the division of marital assets should be substantially equal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In the absence of equitable factors compelling a different result, the division of marital assets should be substantially equal.”
Establishes the presumption of equal distribution unless justified by written findings of equitable factors
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFrank and Martha Lavelle were married for 45 years; both are in their seventies and in poor health. Martha was a homemaker who primarily raised their …
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BLUE, Judge.
Frank J. Lavelle, the husband, appeals the financial terms of a final judgment terminating his 45-year marriage to Martha Lavelle. He contends the trial court unequally distributed the marital assets without factual findings to support the distribution, failed to distribute all of the marital assets and, based on the equitable distribution, improperly awarded permanent periodic alimony to the wife. Because we agree with each of these contentions, we reverse and remand this ease to the trial court for further proceedings.
The parties are both in their seventies and in poor health. The wife was a homemaker for all but the first few years of the marriage and assumed primary responsibility for the rearing of the parties’ two children. The husband was a “workaholic” who traveled extensively, providing for his family financially but leaving the domestic responsibilities to the wife.
Much of the wife’s trial testimony related to suspicions of philandering by the husband. Although this testimony appeared to be the focal point of the trial, the trial court made no findings of adultery or dissipation of marital assets as a result of adulterous conduct. There was also evidence of $31,000 in legal fees spent by the husband to defend an earlier criminal charge stemming from his job. Again the trial court made no findings on this issue. While the general lack of factual findings was error, we cannot say that the error resulted from the court’s silence on these two issues because they do not appear to support the court’s disparate distribution.
In the equitable distribution, the trial court awarded each party a motor vehicle, one-half of the husband’s pension accrued during the marriage, and one-half of four limited partnerships. The court then awarded approximately $305,374 of investments to the wife and approximately $109,381 of investments to the husband. The wife also received the marital home valued at $134,500 as lump sum alimony and $75 per week in permanent periodic alimony. No provision was made for the distribution of the household furnishings, the wife’s jewelry, or a jointly owned land trust. For the following reasons, we conclude the trial court erred.
First, the trial court is required to include in the final judgment written findings setting forth the rationale for the distribution of marital assets. § 61.075(3), Fla.Stat. (1991); Strickland v. Strickland, 567 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). In the absence of equitable factors compelling a different result, the division of marital assets should be substantially equal. Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So. 2d 491 (Fla.1991). Here the distribution of assets is clearly unequal, but there are no findings to support the disparity. On remand, the trial court should reconsider the equitable distribution and either provide a legally sufficient factual basis or provide a more equal division of marital assets.
Second, the trial court is required to establish values and award all marital assets as part of the equitable distribution. Macaluso v. Macaluso, 523 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 531 So. 2d 1354 (Fla.1988). Before reaching an impasse in court-ordered mediation, the parties settled the distribution of a majority of the household furnishings. This signed settlement was filed with the court. We are unable to tell from the record if this property was distributed as agreed or if it remains in the wife’s sole possession. On remand, the court should establish values for and distribute the household furnishings, the wife’s jewelry, and the Egret Cove Land Trust.
Finally, although the award of alimony appears unjustified based on the current distribution scheme, the trial court may again consider alimony after distribution of all the marital assets and reconsideration of the equitable distribution.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
PARKER, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (15 total)
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Harreld v. Harreld, 682 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…ion be equal, the trial court must analyze all relevant factors, including the ten set out in section 61.075(l)(a) through (j). The court must provide a legally sufficient factual basis for its distribution in the final judgment. Lavelle v. Lavelle, 634 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). The only finding in the final order here that could be read as an explanation of the court’s unequal distribution of the assets is that “the husband, in direct violation of this Court’s Order has liquidated numerous items of mari…
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Brock v. Newman Brock, 690 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…gment, whether or not there was a close to equal distribution of marital assets and liabilities because there are insufficient value findings, and identification of marital assets and debts. This constitutes reversible error. See Lavelle v. Lavelle, 634 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Carroll v. Carroll, 471 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 482 So. 2d 347 (Fla.1985). Further, the record on appeal is lacking as to evidence to support findings on valuation for some of the marital assets, since none was p…
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Alpert v. Alpert, 886 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…e same result by treating the $25,000 as a marital liability that was assigned to the Husband and by making written findings of fact to support the unequal distribution. See Feger v. Feger, 850 So. 2d 611, 615 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Lavelle v. Lavelle, 634 So. 2d 1111, 1112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). We need not decide whether the trial court could have achieved the same result by other means because the trial court erred by finding that the $25,000 debt was the Husband’s nonmarital obligation. We reverse this aspect of…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1991)
- Fica v. State, 523 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- MacAluso v. MacAluso, 523 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Manning v. State, 567 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Strickland v. Strickland, 567 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)