SHEREE JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Sheree Jones, a minor tried as an adult, appealed her 22-year sentence for second-degree murder, arguing the trial court impermissibly considered gain-time credits in sentencing. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the sentence, finding the court's remarks reflected concern for the defendant's educational opportunities and future prospects rather than an improper departure based on gain-time.
The sentence was properly imposed and does not violate sentencing principles. The trial court's remarks were explanatory reassurance addressing the defendant's youth and future opportunities, not an indication that the 22-year sentence was necessary to achieve an appropriate actual service time after gain-time reductions.
[1] A sentence imposed within the guideline range is not impermissible merely because the sentencing court considered the potential impact of gain-time on the actual length o…
[2] A sentencing court's remarks intended to reassure a youthful defendant about future opportunities after release do not demonstrate an intent to impose a sentence greater…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it is impermissible to base a departure sentence upon a reason [such as potential gain-time] already factored into the guidelines”
Established the legal principle that gain-time cannot justify departure sentences, which appellant relied upon
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSheree Jones, a 16-year-old female, was tried as an adult and convicted of second-degree murder. The trial court imposed a 22-year sentence, which fel…
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WENTWORTH, Senior Judge.
This is an appeal from a 22-year sentence, within the guideline range of 7-22 years for the conviction of second-degree murder in this case. We affirm on the single issue raised, finding that the record does not show an intention by the court to sentence the appellant Jones, a minor tried as an adult, for a greater term of years than would have been imposed absent potential gain-time impact on the length of that term.
At the sentencing hearing the trial court stated that before deciding on the sentence he made inquiries:
... to determine exactly what will happen to a 16-year old female ... sentenced to state prison for a lengthy period of time.... I wanted to find out because of the age whether or not some special treatment may be given to you by way of opportunities to continue your education ... so that ... this sentence will not slam the door ... on your future forever. These remarks, in context, appear to be intended as explanatory reassurance to the youthful defendant that opportunities would be available to build a meaningful life after her release, as the court expressly stated in conclusion:
Given the amount of time that you will serve, 51 percent, and given your age, you are going to be a young person still when you are released from state prison.
Appellant relies upon clearly distinguishable decisions that “[i]t is impermissible to base a departure sentence upon a reason [such as potential gain-time] already factored into the guidelines.” (Emphasis supplied). Brooks v. State, 490 So. 2d 173, 174 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Bruton v. State, 510 So. 2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Unlike those cases, we are reviewing a sentence within the guidelines where the court did not indicate that a 22-year sentence was necessary in order to achieve actual service of an appropriate sentence after gain-time. We do not, by our conclusion here, approve such motivation with respect to sentences within the guidelines range. We believe, instead, that the sentence before us does not directly or indirectly overstep the judicial function in these premises. Cf. Depson v. State, 363 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Valdes v. State, 469 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
AFFIRMED.
MINER, J., concurs.
BENTON, J., concurs in result only.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Brooks v. State, 490 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Depson v. State, 363 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Valdes v. State, 469 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Bruton v. State, 510 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)