STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, APPELLANT,
v.
BEN HILL GRIFFIN, INC., APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Department of Transportation appealed a judgment awarding attorney's fees to Ben Hill Griffin, Inc. in an eminent domain proceeding. The court reversed, holding that attorney's fees under Florida's eminent domain statute require the party to have an ownership interest in the property, which Griffin lacked.
An ownership interest in the property is a statutory requirement for recovery of attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings under section 73.091, even when a party is dismissed from the suit prior to trial.
[1] A party must have an ownership interest in property to be entitled to an award of attorney's fees in an eminent domain proceeding.
[2] Statutory authority is required for the award of attorney's fees in an eminent domain proceeding.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A party must have an ownership interest in the property in order to be entitled to an award of attorney's fees.”
Establishes the core holding that ownership interest is a statutory requirement for fee recovery in eminent domain cases.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDOT initiated eminent domain proceedings and included Griffin as a defendant based on a possible prescriptive easement interest in a dirt driveway. Gr…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Statutory Authorization For Attorney'S Fees cases and more on FLexlaw
BLUE, Judge.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) appeals a final judgment awarding attorney’s fees to Ben Hill Griffin, Inc. (Griffin) in an eminent domain proceeding. DOT contends the fee award is erroneous because there is no statutory authority to award attorney’s fees to a party with no ownership interest in the subject property. We agree and reverse.
DOT initiated eminent domain proceedings over a parcel of property. The suit included a claim against Griffin due to a possible prescriptive easement interest in a dirt driveway contained in the parcel. Griffin retained an attorney and filed an answer admitting an ownership interest in the property. Griffin subsequently concluded it had no interest in the property and notified DOT it would agree to being dropped as a party. DOT filed a notice dropping Griffin from the lawsuit.
Griffin then filed a motion for attorney’s fees and a memorandum of law admitting the lack of an ownership interest. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Griffin was placed in the lawsuit by DOT and it was reasonable for Griffin to incur attorney’s fees to investigate and protect any interest it might have in the property. Relying on City of Miami Beach v. Manilow, 253 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971), the court determined that Griffin was entitled to have its attorney’s fees paid even though it was dismissed from the lawsuit prior to trial. The court awarded Griffin fees for 8.9 hours for a total of $1,330.
Section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1993), provides for the award of attorney’s fees in eminent domain proceedings. The purpose of the fees provision is to satisfy the state constitutional requirement that a property owner receive full compensation for the taking of private property. A party must have an ownership interest in the property in order to be entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. Shavers v. Duval County, 73 So. 2d 684 (Fla.1954); Grieser v. Division of Admin., State Dep’t of Transp., 371 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). We conclude an ownership interest in the property is required for a fee award under section 73.091, even when a party is dismissed from the suit prior to trial.
Under the facts presented in this case, the circuit court’s fee award was equitably correct but legally erroneous. Attorney’s fees cannot be taxed as costs in any cause unless provided for by contract or by statute or where a fund has been created or brought into court. Colvin v. Homan, 442 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Because section 73.091 authorizes the award of fees only to a party with an ownership interest in the property, there was no authority for the award of fees. Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment awarding attorney’s fees to Griffin.
THREADGILL, A.C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Golf Course Resorts, Inc. v. Dep't OF Transp., 816 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…egations that they are interested in the property within the meaning of section 73.051, and they must prove the amount of their recoverable fees and costs pursuant to sections 73.091 and 73.092. See State, Dep’t of Transp. v. Ben Hill Griffin, Inc., 636 So. 2d 825, 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Reversed and remanded. FULMER and GREEN, JJ., Concur.…
-
Seminole Cnty. v. M.G. Invs. OF Orlando, Inc., 714 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…d, in this regard, to fall in the class with judgment creditors and other lienholders, as to whom no attorneys’ fees are allowable. Shavers, 73 So. 2d at 687. Similarly, in the more recent case of State, Dep’t of Transp. v. Ben Hill Griffin, Inc., 636 So. 2d 825 (Fla., 2d DCA 1994), a case upon which appellant also relies, the court rejected the attorney’s fee claim of a possible prescriptive easement holder and named defendant in a condemnation case who hired an attorney and defended its alleged interest i…
Authorities Cited
- Shavers v. Duval Cnty., 73 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1954)
- City OF Miami Beach v. Manilow, 253 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Colvin v. Homan, 442 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Grieser v. Division OF Administration, 371 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)