MICHAEL LEE STATON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Michael Lee Staton appeals the denial of his motion to correct sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing a three-year mandatory minimum term without the information specifically charging the mandatory minimum provisions. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that Florida law does not require the charging document to specify mandatory minimum sentences.
The trial court did not err. Florida law does not require that a charging document specifically charge mandatory minimum sentence provisions. The information's allegation that Staton carried a firearm while committing kidnapping is sufficient to incur the penalty of a three-year mandatory minimum upon conviction.
[1] A charging document need not specifically allege the provisions of a statute imposing a mandatory minimum sentence for a conviction.
[2] A statute imposing a penalty for a conviction of a felony committed with the employment of a firearm operates in the same manner as statutes describing other penalties.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“under Florida law ... there is no requirement [in the charging document] that a defendant be advised of any mandatory minimum sentence”
Establishes foundational principle from Bryant v. State that mandatory minimums need not be pleaded in charging document
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStaton was charged with kidnapping while carrying, displaying, or using a firearm in violation of Florida Statutes sections 787.01(1) and 775.087(1). …
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PETERSON, Judge.
Michael Lee Staton appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct sentence. He contends that the trial court erred by failing to vacate the portion of his sentence which imposed a three year minimum mandatory term of incarceration because the information did not specifically charge the mandatory minimum provisions of section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1991).
The information charged Staton with kidnapping and that:
... during the commission of said kidnapping, MICHAEL LEE STATON carried, displayed, used, threatened or attempted to use a weapon or firearm, to wit: A handgun-type firearm, in violation of Florida Statutes 787.01(1) and 775.087(1);
Staton entered a plea of nolo contendere to this charge after the following transpired at the sentencing hearing:
THE COURT: Did you [sic] attorney tell you the maximum sentence you could receive for these charges?
DEFENDANT: Yes, he did, your Hon-or....
THE COURT: What did he tell you?
DEFENDANT: It’s a three year minimum mandatory, sir. In Bryant v. State, 386 So. 2d 237, 241 (Fla.1980), the supreme court ruled that “under Florida law ... there is no requirement that a defendant be advised [in the charging document] of any mandatory minimum sentence.” Notwithstanding, Staton urges that Bryant is not the current state of the law because of changes occurring in intervening years as reflected by such cases as Sullivan v. State, 562 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Bland v. Singletary, 601 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); DuBoise v. State, 520 So. 2d 260 (Fla.1988); Gordon v. State, 603 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Helmick v. State, 569 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
We find those cases inapplicable to the issue raised by Staton. Those cases involved a failure to charge an essential element of a crime. The instant case involves a penalty for the conviction of a felony committed with the employment of a firearm. The information alleged that Staton carried a firearm while he was committing the crime of kidnapping and that is all that is required in order to incur the penalty of a three year minimum mandatory if conviction results. Section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes, simply imposes a penalty for a conviction in the same manner as the penalties described in section 775.-082, Florida Statutes. No requirement exists that would require the latter penalties to be described in an information and we see no reason to require the former to be included.
The order denying Staton’s motion to correct sentence is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HARRIS, C.J., and DIAMANTIS, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Bundrage v. State, 814 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…enc-ing. CASANUEVA and SALCINES, JJ., Concur. . An information does not have to refer to section 775.087 for the enhancement to apply, see Bryant v. State, 386 So. 2d 237 (Fla.1980), as long as it alleges the use of a firearm, see Staton v. State, 636 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). See also Matthews v. State, 774 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA) (en banc) (holding that sentence enhancement for crimes committed against law enforcement officers may be applied when information charges qualifying offense; information do…
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Ibarra v. State, 45 So. 3d 911 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…, 814 So. 2d 1133, 1135 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“An information does not have to refer to section 775.087 for the enhancement to apply, see Bryant v. State, 386 So. 2d 237 (Fla.1980), as long as it alleges the use of a firearm, see Staton v. State, 636 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).”). Appellant’s attorney acknowledged at the rule 3.800(b)(2) hearing that appellant was aware when he entered his plea that the ten-year mandatory minimum could be imposed based on his possession of a firearm. The trial court c…
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Anderson v. State, 736 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Howard v. State, 732 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Staton v. State, 636 So. 2d 844, 845 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Bryant v. State, 386 So. 2d 237, 241 (Fla.1980). WARNER, SHAHOOD and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- DuBOISE v. State, 520 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1988)
- Bryant v. State, 386 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1980)
- Helmick v. State, 569 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Patrick v. Brown, 603 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Sullivan v. State, 562 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Bland v. Singletary, 601 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)