REGENT BANK, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT WOODCOX AND VIRGINIA WOODCOX, APPELLEES
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Regent Bank sought to implead a third party in supplementary proceedings under Florida Statute § 56.29 to satisfy an unsatisfied writ of execution. The trial court denied the motion, concluding it lacked jurisdiction absent a reservation of jurisdiction in the original judgment. The appellate court reversed, holding that the statutory procedure requires impleading of third parties when the judgment creditor makes the requisite showing.
The trial court has jurisdiction to implead third parties in supplementary proceedings under § 56.29 regardless of whether the original judgment reserved jurisdiction. Once a judgment creditor makes the required statutory showing (filing an affidavit that the sheriff holds an unsatisfied writ of execution that is valid and outstanding), the trial court has no discretion to deny the application and must implead the third party.
[1] An order denying a motion to implead a third party in proceedings supplementary under section 56.29, Florida Statutes, is appealable as a non-final order entered after fi…
[2] The predicate for impleading a third party under section 56.29, Florida Statutes, is the filing of an affidavit by the judgment creditor showing an unsatisfied writ of ex…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a judgment creditor may treat an attempted fraudulent transfer of property to which his debtor had legal title as a nullity and sell said property under execution as though no transfer had been made.”
Establishes the core purpose of § 56.29 supplementary proceedings—to allow judgment creditors to reach fraudulently transferred property.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRegent Bank, a judgment creditor, held an unsatisfied writ of execution against debtors Robert and Virginia Woodcox. Regent Bank filed an affidavit de…
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FARMER, Judge.
A judgment creditor seeks review of an order denying its motion to implead a third party in proceedings supplementary under section 56.29, Florida Statutes. The order is appealable as a non-final order entered after final order on authorized motion because the court has determined finally that it would not allow the party to be so impleaded. See Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)(4); Sverdahl v. Farmer’s & Merchants Savings Bank, 582 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (rule 9.130(a)(4) jurisdiction to review order entered in proceedings — supplementary attaches only when trial court has entered final order on subject). The circuit judge denied this motion on the grounds that he lacked jurisdiction because the final judgment did not reserve jurisdiction for this purpose. We reverse.
The predicate for impleading a third party under section 56.29 is that the judgment creditor file an affidavit showing that the sheriff holds an unsatisfied writ of execution on a money judgment and that the unsatisfied execution is valid and outstanding. The judgment creditor here filed such an affidavit. No other showing is necessary in order to implead the third party.
Under section 56.29, “a judgment creditor may treat an attempted fraudulent transfer of property to which his debtor had legal title as a nullity and sell said property under execution as though no transfer had been made.” Richard v. McNair, 121 Fla. 733, 164 So. 836 (1935). The statutory proceeding provides “a useful, efficacious, and salutary remedy at law enabling the judgment creditor not only to discover assets which may be subject to his judgment, but to subject them thereto by a speedy and direct proceeding in the same court in which the judgment was recovered." [e.s.] Richard, 164 So. at 840. It is “intended to afford to a judgment creditor the most complete relief possible in satisfying his judgment.” Riley v. Fatt, 47 So. 2d 769, 772 (Fla.1950). The statutory procedure was designed to avoid the necessity of the judgment creditor initiating an entirely separate action for a creditor’s bill. Advertects Inc. v. Sawyer Industries Inc., 84 So. 2d 21 (Fla.1955); Richard, 164 So. at 840; Ryan’s Furniture Exchange Inc. v. McNair, 120 Fla. 109, 162 So. 483 (1935).
Hence the court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction — that the judgment creditor was required to commence an entirely new civil action simply to subject goods in the hands of a third party to its unsatisfied writ of execution — was plainly in error. Moreover, because the judgment creditor made the required statutory showing, the trial court had no discretion to deny the application. Richard, 164 So. at 840 (under section 56.29 judges have the duty to implead third parties wherever it appears relief against them may be warranted). On remand the trial court shall enter an order impleading the third party under section 56.29 and conduct further proceedings consistent with due process.
REVERSED.
KLEIN and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Amjad Munim, M.D., P.A. v. George Azar, M.D., 648 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…nuation of business. Pursuant to section 56.29, judgment creditors have a “useful, efficacious and salutary remedy” to subject assets to “a speedy and direct proceeding in the same court in which the judgment was recovered.” Regent Bank v. Woodcox, 636 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 4th DCA, 1994); Allied Indus. Int'l, Inc. v. AGFA-GEVAERT, Inc., 688 F.Supp. 1516, 1517 (S.D.Fla.1988), aff'd, 900 F. 2d 264 (11th Cir.1990). Proceedings supplementary are equitable in nature and should be liberally construed. Ferguson v. Stat…
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Fundamental Long Term Care Holdings, LLC v. The Est. of Juanita Amelia Jackson, 110 So. 3d 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…Sec., Inc., No. 10-61582-CIV, 2011 WL 1674963, at *2 (S.D.Fla. May 3, 2011). “The statutory procedure was designed to avoid the necessity of the judgment creditor initiating an entirely separate action for a creditor’s bill.” Regent Bank v. Woodcox, 636 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); see Office Bldg., LLC, 2011 WL 1674963, at *3. In B & I Contractors, 66 So. 3d at 1037, this court explained that section 56.29(1) provides that an affidavit be filed to commence the proceedings but this court noted that m…
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Biel REO, LLC v. Barefoot Cottages Dev. Co. LLC, 156 So. 3d 506 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…a creditor’s bill.’ ” Fundamental Long Term Care Holdings, LLC v. Estate of Jackson ex rel. Jackson-Platts, 110 So. 3d 6, 7-8 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), reh’g denied (Feb. 8, 2013), review denied, 118 So. 3d 220 (Fla.2013) (quoting Regent Bank v. Woodcox, 636 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)). The proceedings are intended to give “the most complete relief possible in satisfying [a creditor’s] judgment.” Riley v. Fatt, 47 So. 2d 769, 772 (Fla.1950). And courts may “en [*509] ter any orders required to carry out t…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ryan's Furniture Exch., Inc. v. McNair, 120 Fla. 109 (Fla. 1935)
- Advertects, Inc. v. Sawyer Indus., Inc., 84 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1955)
- Richard v. McNair, 121 Fla. 733 (Fla. 1935)
- Riley v. Fatt, 47 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1950)
- Sverdahl v. Farmers & Merchs. Sav. Bank, 582 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)