GORDON J. GLUESENKAMP, III, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Gluesenkamp appeals a restitution order imposed as a condition of probation following his no-contest plea to driving under the influence causing serious bodily injury. The court reverses the portion of the restitution award directed to the victim's parents, holding that under Florida law, parents of a living victim do not qualify as "victims" entitled to restitution.
The court holds that family members do not fall within the statutory definition of "victim" unless the aggrieved party is deceased as a result of the offense. Therefore, the victim's parents are not entitled to restitution under the statute.
[1] Family members of a victim are not considered "victims" for the purpose of restitution unless the victim is deceased as a result of the offense.
[2] The statutory definition of "victim" for restitution purposes applies to any provision of law relating to restitution.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The term 'Victim' as used in this section and in any provision of law relating to restitution includes the aggrieved party, the aggrieved party's estate if the aggrieved party is deceased, and the aggrieved party's next of kin if the aggrieved party is deceased as a result of the offense.”
The statutory definition of "victim" that limits family member eligibility for restitution to cases where the victim is deceased
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGluesenkamp entered a straight plea of no contest to driving under the influence causing serious bodily injury and driving with a suspended or revoked…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Gordon J. Gluesenkamp, III, appeals from an order awarding restitution. Appellant entered into a straight plea of no contest on charges of driving under the influence causing serious bodily injury and driving while his license was suspended or revoked. The trial court placed appellant on probation and required that appellant make restitution as a condition of probation in accordance with section 948.03, Florida Statutes. In addition to awarding restitution to the victim, the trial court awarded restitution to the victim’s parents for travel, telephone and lost wages incurred and attendant upon the care of their child. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in awarding restitution to the victim’s parents because the victim’s parents do not fall within the definition of “victim” provided by section 775.089(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1991). We agree and reverse the award of restitution to the victim’s parents.
Section 775.089(l)(a) provides that the court shall order the defendant to make restitution to the victim.1 Section 775.089(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1991) provides:
The term ‘Victim” as used in this section and in any provision of law relating to restitution includes the aggrieved party, the aggrieved party’s estate if the aggrieved party is deceased, and the aggrieved party’s next of kin if the aggrieved party is deceased as a result of the offense.
Family members do not fall within the statutory definition of “victim” unless the aggrieved party is deceased as a result of the offense. See Catoe v. State, 618 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (families of rape victims, none of whom are deceased, are not encompassed within statutory language of section 775.089(l)(c)); Ocasio v. State, 586 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (mother of child victim is not a victim within the meaning of section of 775.089(l)(e) since the child is not deceased); Watson v. State, 579 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (award of restitution to mother of victim for expenses other than child’s medical and mental health costs improperly extended the definition of “aggrieved party”).
The state argues that section 948.03(l)(e) does not preclude the payment of restitution to the parents as aggrieved parties.2 The state’s argument is without merit because the definition of “victim” as provided in sec tion 775.089(l)(e) applies “in any provision of law relating to restitution.”
We reverse the award of restitution to the victim’s parents. This cause is affirmed in all other respects.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part.
MINER, MICKLE and DAVIS, JJ., concur. . In 1984, the Legislature amended section 775.-089 by providing that restitution be made to the “victim” as defined by section 775.089(l)(c). Prior to the 1984 amendments, section 775.089 provided that restitution be made to the "aggrieved party.” The former statute did not provide a definition of "aggrieved party.”
. The state cites Ballance v. State, 447 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) and Milton v. State, 453 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The state’s reliance on Ballance and Milton is misplaced since those cases involved the award of restitution to aggrieved parties other than the victim prior to the 1984 amendments to section 775.089, Florida Statutes.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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P.H. v. State, 774 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…that the mother of an attempted sexual assault child victim could not be awarded restitution for her own counseling required as the result of her daughter’s victimization because she did not meet the definition of a victim. In Gluesenkamp v. State, 636 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), the defendant was convicted of DUI with serious bodily injury. The trial court awarded restitution to the victim’s parent’s for travel, telephone calls, and lost wages. The First District Court of Appeal reversed holding that th…
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Hollingsworth v. State, 835 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…BROWNING, J. This is an appeal from an order granting restitution to the minor victim’s mother for the mother’s lost wages. Appellant relies on Gluesenkamp v. State, 636 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), P.H. v. State, 774 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), and Ocasio v. State, 586 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), all of which hold that the mother of a victim is not a “victim” for purposes of the restitution statute, section 775.089…
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Williamson v. State, 687 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…see also Baldwin v. State, 558 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Williamson also argues that it was error to impose restitution for the victim’s parents’ or guardian’s counseling expenses. The state properly concedes error. See Gluesenkamp v. State, 636 So. 2d 1367, 1368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (“Family members do not fall within the statutory definition of ‘victim’ unless the aggrieved party is deceased as a result of the offense.”); Ocasio v. State, 586 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (holding that mother of chi…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ballance v. State, 447 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Watson v. State, 579 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- Efrain Ocasio v. State, 586 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- Catoe v. State, 618 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
- Milton v. State, 453 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)