WILLIAM H. SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1994-05-27
No. 92-04014
FRANK, C.J., and LAZZARA, J., concur.
637 So. 2d 343 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1994) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

William H. Smith appeals judgments and sentences in multiple cases, specifically challenging two trial court orders denying motions to suppress. The court reverses the suppression denial in one case, finding the investigatory stop lacked a well-founded suspicion, but affirms the other suppression denial and remaining judgments.


Holding

The court held that the deputy did not have a well-founded suspicion to support the investigatory stop. A report of criminal activity in an area alone does not justify a stop absent circumstances creating reasonable suspicion that the person stopped participated in or will participate in the criminal activity.


Headnotes

[1] An investigatory stop requires a founded suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.

[2] A founded suspicion for an investigatory stop must have some factual foundation in the circumstances observed by the officer, interpreted in light of the officer's knowle…

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Key Quotes

“A founded suspicion is one which has some factual foundation in the circumstances observed by the officer when those circumstances are interpreted in light of the officer's knowledge.”

Establishes the standard for what constitutes sufficient suspicion to justify an investigatory stop

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Facts & Procedural History

On September 24, 1991, a deputy sheriff observed Smith's car parked at the edge of a closed business's grounds near woods. The deputy had been advised…

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Opinion of the Court
PARKER, Judge.

PARKER, Judge.

William H. Smith appeals the judgments and sentences in a number of eases, but specifically challenges only two trial court orders denying his motions to suppress in two cases. We reverse the trial court order in Case No. 91^1634. We find no error in the order of the trial court in Case No. 91-4472 and affirm the judgment and sentence in that case and in the remaining cases without farther comment.

On September 24, 1991, at approximately 9:00 p.m., a deputy sheriff on patrol observed Smith’s car parked next to the woods at the edge of the grounds of the Wise Company building. The business was closed at the time. At first, the deputy did not see anyone in the car. The deputy testified that he had been advised that burglaries of businesses were occurring with unusual frequency on a particular street and, therefore, decided to investigate. The officer turned his vehicle around to approach the ear but, by that time, Smith had begun to drive away from the parking lot exit. The deputy then stopped Smith and told him to go back into the drive because he wanted to see some identification. Smith hastily exited his car, leaving the door open, and approached the deputy’s vehicle before the deputy was able to get out of his vehicle. The deputy exited his car and met Smith at a point between the two vehicles. Smith handed the deputy his wallet and told the deputy that he was there spying on his girlfriend at the motel across the street. Because Smith acted so hastily in getting out of his automobile, the deputy thought Smith was trying to keep the deputy away from Smith’s car. The deputy, therefore, walked over to Smith’s car, looked in, and saw a gun in plain view on the rear floorboard behind the driver’s seat.

Smith was charged with possession of a firearm by convicted felon. After his motion to suppress the firearm was denied, Smith entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge, reserving the right to appeal.

In order to justify an investigatory stop, a police officer must have a founded suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. § 901.151, Fla.Stat. (1991); Randall v. State, 600 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). “A founded suspicion is one which has some factual foundation in the circumstances observed by the officer when those circumstances are interpreted in light of the officer’s knowledge.” Smith v. State, 592 So. 2d 1206, 1207 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). The deputy testified that although he thought Smith might have been a trespasser, that was not the reason he decided to investigate the situation. The officer stopped Smith because of the burglaries in the area. A report of criminal activity in the area will not justify a stop absent circumstances which create a reasonable suspicion that the person being stopped has participated or will participate in the criminal activity. Estep v. State, 597 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); McKinnon v. State, 617 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

We conclude that the deputy did not have a well-founded suspicion to support the investigatory stop. The circumstances involving the stop in this case are virtually identical to those in McCloud v. State, 491 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), wherein this court concluded that the stop was not based upon a well-founded suspicion. We are compelled to reach the same result in this ease.

We reverse the order on the motion to suppress in Case No. 91-04634 and remand that case to the trial court. We affirm the judgments and sentences in the remaining cases.

FRANK, C.J., and LAZZARA, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Turner v. State, 674 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
    …ner might be carrying a weapon because he had previously recovered weapons from others at that location. In essence, Duncan had a hunch that Turner might be carrying a weapon. A hunch alone is not enough for an investigatory search. Smith v. State, 637 So. 2d 343, 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that law enforcement officer must have founded suspicion that person has committed, is committing or about to commit crime before there can be an investigatory stop). The law enforcement officer must be able to artic…
  • Salem v. State, 645 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
    …phasized that “[a] report of criminal activity in the area will not justify a stop absent circumstances which create a reasonable suspicion that the person being stopped has participated or will participate in the criminal activity.” Smith v. State, 637 So. 2d 343, 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (emphasis added). As noted, the radio dispatch provided Detective Potter with a description of the suspect’s race, sex, height, weight, and clothing. He was only able to verify, however, that appellant was a black male. This…
  • Sinclair v. State, 816 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
    …on of Sinclair. “A report of criminal activity in the area will not justify a stop absent circumstances which create a reasonable suspicion that the person being stopped has participated or will participate in the criminal activity.” Smith v. State, 637 So. 2d 343, 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (denial of a motion to suppress was reversed on facts showing that before the detaining officer stopped the defendant, he had received information that there had been an unusual number of burglaries on a particular street, an…

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