STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
T. MITCHELL DEAN, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida's First District Court of Appeal addressed whether double jeopardy bars criminal prosecution for DUI when the defendant previously paid fines for related civil traffic infractions arising from the same incident. The court held that prosecution is not barred because the DUI charge and civil traffic offenses contain different elements.
The court answered the certified question in the negative. Prosecution for DUI is not barred on double jeopardy grounds because the DUI charge requires proof of elements not contained in the previous civil traffic offenses, and vice versa.
[1] Prosecution for a criminal traffic offense is not barred on double jeopardy grounds simply because the defendant has paid a fine for a civil traffic infraction arising fr…
[2] The Supreme Court's decision in Grady v. …
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Is prosecution of a criminal traffic offense barred on grounds of double jeopardy because the defendant has paid a fine for a civil traffic infraction and the state, in order to prove an element of the criminal offense, would prove the same conduct constituting the civil infraction offense?”
The certified question of great public importance presented to the appellate court
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe respondent was charged with DUI. He had previously paid fines for speeding, disregard of a traffic sign, and violation of the open container law, …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Blockburger "Same Elements" Test cases and more on FLexlaw
ALLEN, Judge.
The state petitioned for discretionary review of an order of the county court dismissing an information charging the respondent with driving under the influence (DUI). In its order the county court certified the following question as one of great public importance:
Is prosecution of a criminal traffic offense barred on grounds of double jeopardy because the defendant has paid a fine for a civil traffic infraction and the state, in order to prove an element of the criminal offense, would prove the same conduct constituting the civil infraction offense?
We accepted jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule Of Appellate Procedure 9.160(e)(2). We answer the certified question in the negative.
The respondent was charged by information with one count of DUI. He moved to dismiss the information on double jeopardy grounds because he had previously paid fines for speeding, disregard of a traffic sign and violation of the open container law, all of which arose from the same incident as the DUI charge. He asserted, and the state conceded, that the prosecution would have to prove the conduct involved in the traffic offenses in order to establish his guilt on the DUI charge. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, but certified the question we address herein.
In Grady v. Corbin, the Supreme Court barred prosecution for reckless manslaughter, second degree-vehicular manslaughter, criminally negligent manslaughter and other charges stemming from an alcohol-related accident on double jeopardy grounds where the defendant had previously pled guilty to and was convicted of misdemeanor counts of DUI and failing to keep right of the median arising from the same accident. The court held that double jeopardy prohibits “a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted.” Id. at 510, 110 S.Ct. at 2087. However, the Supreme Court subsequently overruled Grady and this specific holding in United States v. Dixon, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556, (1993), finding that standard “wholly inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court precedent and with the clear common-law understanding of double jeopardy.” Id. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2860. The court reaffirmed and applied the “same elements” test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).
Under Dixon, the order of dismissal must be reversed. Because the DUI charge in the instant case requires proof of elements not contained in the previous civil traffic offenses and the civil traffic offenses require proof of elements not contained in the DUI charge, the prosecution for DUI is not barred. — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2856-59; see also State v. Coupal, 626 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Indeed, the respondent has conceded that reversal is mandated.
We answer the certified question in the negative and reverse and remand for further proceedings.
WEBSTER and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Murray, 644 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…civil traffic infraction requires proof of elements not contained in the DUI charge, prosecution for the DUI charge is not barred by double jeopardy. The first and fifth districts have reached the same conclusion in similar cases. See State v. Dean, 637 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); State v. Knowles, 625 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). Even if appellee may be prosecuted under Dixon for DUI, he argues that the trial court’s decision should still be upheld because Dixon should not be applied retroactively. In…
-
Fierro v. State, 653 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…DCA 1994) (DUI and civil traffic infraction each require proof of element the other does not); State v. Miranda, 644 So. 2d 342 (Fla.2d DCA 1994) (aggravated stalking and injunction each required proof of elements the other did not); State v. Dean, 637 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (DUI prosecution required proof of elements not contained in previous civil traffic infractions, and civil traffic infractions required proof of elements not contained in DUI). A review of the record indicates the initial inform…
-
State v. Mathews, 654 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…e Procedure. We answer the certified question in the negative, and reverse. We observe that our sister courts considering this issue have likewise each reached a similar conclusion. State v. Murray, 644 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); State v. Dean, 637 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); State v. Coupal, 626 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); State v. Knowles, 625 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). The defendant in each of the cases under review was charged with Careless Driving, for which he received a traffic citat…
Authorities Cited
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (U.S. 1932)
- Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (U.S. 1990)
- State v. Coupal, 626 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)