CIRCLE K CORPORATION AND GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INC., APPELLANTS,
v.
JOAN LACKEY, APPELLEE
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Circle K Corporation and its servicing agent appealed an order awarding Joan Lackey permanent total disability benefits in a workers' compensation case. The appellate court found competent evidence supporting the disability award but reversed and remanded because the trial judge's concurrent order directing further orthopedic evaluation was ambiguous regarding whether it contemplated remedial or palliative treatment, which would affect the consistency of the maximum medical improvement finding.
The court held that competent, substantial evidence supported the permanent total disability award. However, the court reversed and remanded because the purpose of the order directing further medical evaluation was unclear—specifically whether it was remedial, palliative, or both—creating an apparent inconsistency that needed clarification.
[1] An order directing further medical evaluations or treatment with a remedial purpose is logically inconsistent with a finding of maximum medical improvement.
[2] Medical evaluations aimed at determining whether palliative treatment might be appropriate are not inconsistent with a finding of maximum medical improvement.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The date of [maximum medical improvement] marks the point after which no further recovery or improvement from an injury or disease can be reasonably anticipated.”
Establishes the legal definition of maximum medical improvement, which is central to the inconsistency analysis.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJoan Lackey was a claimant in a workers' compensation case. The judge of compensation claims awarded her permanent total disability benefits. On the s…
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WEBSTER, Judge.
In this workers’ compensation case, the employer and servicing agent seek review of an order awarding claimant permanent total disability benefits. They raise two issues: (1) whether the award is erroneous because the judge of compensation claims overlooked or ignored evidence that claimant had not yet reached maximum medical improvement; and (2) whether the award is irreconcilable with an order entered on the same day which directed that claimant submit to an orthopedic evaluation and “possible further workup.” We conclude that there is competent, substantial evidence in the record from which one might conclude that claimant was permanently and totally disabled.
However, because we are unable to discern from the record the purpose of the order directing that claimant submit to an orthopedic evaluation and “possible further work-up,” we are constrained to reverse, and to remand for clarification.
It is not clear from the order directing that claimant submit to an orthopedic evaluation and “possible further work-up” whether the intended purpose was remedial, palliative or both. “The date of [maximum medical improvement] marks the point after which no further recovery or improvement from an injury or disease can be reasonably anticipated.” Kirkland v. Harold Pratt Paving, Inc., 518 So. 2d 1320, 1323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), review denied, 525 So. 2d 878 (Fla.1988).
Accordingly, an order directing further medical evaluations or treatment with a remedial purpose in mind is logically inconsistent with a finding of maximum medical improvement. See Florida Structures, Inc. v. Morton, 443 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
However, “[p]alliative treatment for the relief of pain is awardable after a claimant has attained maximum medical improvement.” Baron Transport v. Riley, 491 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Accordingly, medical evaluations aimed at determining whether palliative treatment might be appropriate would not be inconsistent with a finding of maximum medical improvement. Because we are unable to divine from the record the intent behind the order directing that claimant submit to an orthopedic evaluation and “possible further work-up,” we reverse, and remand with directions that the judge of compensation claims clarify his intent. E.g., Hewett v. Town of Mayo, 614 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Gulf Life Ins. v. Mullaly, 566 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.
MINER and DAVIS, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Anderson & Padgett Sawmill & Ftba Self-Insurers' Fund v. Collins, 686 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…ned palliative, it would have no effect on an award of such benefits. Under the circumstances, we reverse the award of PTD benefits and remand the case with directions for the JCC to clarify the nature of the treatment. See Circle K Corp. v. Lackey, 637 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). The E/SA alternatively argues, assuming the treatment is considered palliative, that PTD benefits should not have been awarded because the MMI date which the JCC established was incorrect in that claimant was gainfully employe…
Authorities Cited
- Kirkland v. Harold Pratt Paving, Inc., 518 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Fla. Structures, Inc. v. Hallie A. Morton, 443 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Baron Transp. & Claims Ctr. v. Riley, 491 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Gulf Life Ins. & Md. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mullaly, 566 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Hewett v. Town OF Mayo, 614 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)