MARK MOFFETT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The appellate court reversed a lower court's denial of a motion to correct sentence. The appellant argued his habitual felony offender sentences were illegal due to a single-subject rule violation in a prior law and that he didn't meet the statutory criteria for such sentencing.
The court held that Moffett's allegations were facially sufficient to establish a basis for relief regarding the illegality of his habitual felony offender sentences. The court found that the accuracy of these allegations could be determined from the record.
[1] A habitual felony offender sentence is illegal if the offenses were committed during the window period when the habitual offender statute was invalidated by a single subj…
[2] A defendant is not eligible for habitual felony offender sentencing under the pre-amended version of the statute if all prior convictions were from out of state and the d…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Moffett contends that his habitual felony offender sentences for dealing in stolen property in circuit court ease number 90-2952 and failure to appear in circuit court case number 91-2118 are illegal because: (1) in Johnson v. State, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1993), the supreme court held that chapter 89-280 violated the single subject rule and his offenses fall within the relevant window period of October 1,1989, through May 2,1991; and (2) he does not meet the criteria of section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1988), for habitual felony offender sentencing because all of his prior convictions were from out of state.”
This quote outlines the appellant's main arguments for why his sentence was illegal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMark Moffett was sentenced as a habitual felony offender for dealing in stolen property and failure to appear. He argued these sentences were illegal …
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PER CURIAM.
Mark Moffett appeals an order denying his motion to correct sentence filed pursuant to rule 3.800, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moffett contends that his habitual felony offender sentences for dealing in stolen property in circuit court ease number 90-2952 and failure to appear in circuit court case number 91-2118 are illegal because: (1) in Johnson v. State, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1993), the supreme court held that chapter 89-280 violated the single subject rule and his offenses fall within the relevant window period of October 1,1989, through May 2,1991; and (2) he does not meet the criteria of section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1988), for habitual felony offender sentencing because all of his prior convictions were from out of state. The motion alleges that Moffett’s offenses were committed on August 11, 1990, (dealing in stolen property) and February 26, 1991, (failure to appear).
Thus, all the offenses were committed prior to May 2, 1991, the date that chapter 91-44’s biennial reenactment of chapter 89-280, Laws of Florida, cured the single subject violation of chapter 89-280. Johnson. The motion additionally alleges that Moffett also is directly affected by the amendment to section 775.084 contained in chapter 89-280 that expanded the definition of habitual felony offenders to include defendants with “other qualified offenses,” because he had no prior felony convictions in Florida and, thus, did not qualify under the pre-amended version of the statute. These allegations are facially sufficient to establish a basis for relief; and since the accuracy of these allegations apparently can be determined from the record in this case, we must reverse the order denying relief and remand this 'cause for further proceedings. See Marshall v. State, 623 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
On remand, the trial court may reimpose an enhanced sentence if the state produces sufficient evidence to allow proper findings pursuant to the habitual felony offender statute in effect before May 2, 1991.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ZEHMER, C.J., and BARFIELD and KAHN, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Garret Edwin Brown v. State, 664 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…od during which the 1989 amendments to section 775.084 were unconstitutional, and that his [*312] out-of-state conviction could be used as a basis for habitual offender sentencing, see State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1993), and Moffett v. State, 638 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). However, the error does not entitle appellant to relief since he also had two prior Florida felonies to qualify him for habitual offender status under the pre-amended version of the statute. As to the second issue, appellant c…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1993)
- Marshall v. State, 623 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)