MARCUS BARTLETT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Bartlett was convicted of lewd and lascivious assault on a child after pleading nolo contendere to a reduced charge from capital sexual battery. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed in part and remanded for correction of the sentence to conform to the trial court's oral pronouncement, adjustment of court costs, and opportunity to contest the public defender fee assessment.
The written judgment must conform to the trial court's oral pronouncement and be remanded to include the ninety-day waiver. The $50 court costs assessment was improper; only $20 could be charged because the crime was committed before the October 1, 1992 effective date of the increased amount. The trial court did not err in ordering a public defender fee sua sponte, but on remand must give appellant thirty days to contest the amount of the assessment.
[1] A written judgment and sentence must conform to the trial court's oral pronouncement in open court.
[2] A defendant may only be assessed court costs in the amount prescribed by statute at the time the offense was committed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the written order must conform with the trial court's pronouncement in open court”
Establishes the fundamental principle that sentences must conform to what the judge announced in open court
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was charged with capital sexual battery on a minor. He petitioned the trial court to enter a plea of nolo contendere to lewd and lascivious …
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[*632] PER CURIAM.
Appellant was charged by information with capital sexual battery on a minor. He petitioned the trial court to enter a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of lewd and lascivious assault. The trial court adjudicated him guilty of lewd assault on a child under sixteen and sentenced him to a term of seven years in prison followed by a term of eight years probation. The trial court imposed various fees and costs as special conditions of probation. It also orally ordered that the costs of supervision for probation and payment of court costs be waived for ninety days from the date of appellant’s release from prison, but this provision does not appear in the written judgment or probation order. Appellant appeals to this court, raising three issues.
Appellant first argues, and the state concedes, that the written order must conform with the trial court’s pronouncement in open court. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.700; Kord v. State, 508 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (general rule is that written order must conform to the oral pronouncement of judgment and sentence). Accordingly, we reverse this point on appeal and remand for the inclusion of the ninety days’ waiver from cost of supervision and court costs from the date of appellant’s release from prison.
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $50 court costs pursuant to section 960.20, Florida Statutes, alleging that the charge should have been for the payment of only $20. We agree. Under section 960.20, Florida Statutes (1991), the amount was $20. The legislature increased the amount payable to the crimes compensation trust fund from $20 to $50, effective October 1, 1992. Ch. 92-287, Laws of Fla. Appellant committed the crime in the instant case between December 26, 1991 and September 1, 1992. Therefore, he can be charged only $20 on remand. State v. Yost, 507 So. 2d 1099 (Fla.1987).
On the third point, the trial court did not err in sua sponte ordering appellant to pay a public defender fee. See Mounts v. State, 638 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). However, on remand the trial court should give appellant an opportunity within thirty days to contest the amount of the assessment. Mounts, at 603-604 (citing Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.720, and Bull v. State, 548 So. 2d 1103 (Fla.1989)).
ANSTEAD, HERSEY and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Bull v. State, 548 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1989)
- State v. Yost, 507 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1987)
- Kord v. State, 508 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Mounts v. State, 638 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)