EUMIR HOLMES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1994-06-14
No. 93-2179
SMITH, LAWRENCE and BENTON, JJ., concur.
638 So. 2d 986 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1994) Positive Treatment
Cited by 17 cases

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Synopsis

In this appeal of a robbery conviction involving a firearm, the appellate court affirmed the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal, finding sufficient evidence that a firearm was used. However, the court reversed the sentence and remanded for resentencing after determining the trial court erroneously believed it lacked discretion to impose youthful offender sentencing as an alternative to the mandatory minimum firearm sentencing requirement.


Holding

The appellate court affirmed the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal because sufficient evidence supported submission of the question of whether an actual firearm was used. However, the court reversed the sentence and remanded because the trial court erroneously believed it lacked discretion to impose youthful offender sentencing as an alternative to the mandatory minimum firearm sentencing requirement.


Headnotes

[1] A motion for a judgment of acquittal requires the movant to admit all facts in evidence and all reasonable inferences favorable to the state.

[2] A jury question exists regarding whether a real firearm was used in an offense if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for such a determination.

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Key Quotes

“when a party moves for a judgment of acquittal, he admits all facts in evidence adduced and every conclusion favorable to the state reasonably in-ferable therefrom”

Establishes the legal standard for reviewing motions for judgment of acquittal, supporting affirmance of the denial

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant Holmes was convicted of robbery with a firearm. The trial court denied Holmes's motion for a judgment of acquittal, determining there was su…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

In this appeal of a judgment of conviction and sentence for robbery with a firearm, appellant argues that the lower court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal. We find there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for submission of the question of whether an actual, as opposed to, a toy firearm was used in the commission of this offense. We note that when a party moves for a judgment of acquittal, he admits all facts in evidence adduced and every conclusion favorable to the state reasonably in-ferable therefrom. Anderson v. State, 504 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the motion for a judgment of acquittal.

We do agree, however, that a remand is necessary. The record reflects that the lower court, after receiving comments by the assistant state attorney, was under the impression that it did not have the option of avoiding the mandatory minimum sentence for use of a firearm, section 775.087(2)(a), Florida Statutes, by sentencing appellant as a youthful offender. The youthful offender sentencing statute itself expressly provides that the sentencing alternatives prescribed therein are “[i]n lieu of other criminal penalties authorized by law_” Section 958-04(2), Florida Statutes (1993). The record is unclear as to whether the lower court would have imposed a youthful offender sentence had the court been aware that this option was available. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence imposed and remand for reconsideration of the sentence. See, Blackmon v. State, 616 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Notwithstanding our remand, we emphasize that the lower court is under no obligation to sentence appellant under the Youthful Offender Act unless the lower court believes such a sentence would be appropriate.

We AFFIRM in part; REVERSE in part, and REMAND.

SMITH, LAWRENCE and BENTON, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Jackson v. State, 191 So. 3d 423 (Fla. 2016)
    …rther support that it is not a fundamental right for defendants. A “lower court is under no obligation to sentence [a defendant] under the Youthful Offender. Aqt unless the lower court believes such a sentence would be appropriate.” Holmes v. State, 638 So. 2d 986, 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also Ellis v. State, 476 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (“Application of the Youthful Offender Act to any particular defendant is discretionary with the trial judge who is in the best position to determine whether…
  • Criston Olympia McKINNEY v. State, 27 So. 3d 160 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
    …ant’s 21st birthday. § 958.04(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). However, “[t]he lower court is under no obligation to sentence [a defendant] under the Youthful Offender Act unless the lower court believes such a sentence would be appropriate.” Holmes v. State, 638 So. 2d 986, 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also Bell v. State, 429 So. 2d 403, 404 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “[A]pplieation of the Youthful Offender Act to any particular defendant is discretionary with the trial judge who is in the best position to determine whether…
  • State v. Drury, 829 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
    …33. b. Charged pursuant to sub-subpara-graph l.b. or sub-subparagraph l.c., shall be subject to sentencing under s. 775.087(2)(a), notwithstanding s. 985.233. § 985.227(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2000). While this court previously held in Holmes v. State, 638 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), that the Youthful Offender Act supersedes the 10/20/Life statute, section 775.087(2)(a), the State contends that section 985.227(2)(d)2.b. requires a different result. We disagree. The State argues that the use of the word “sha…

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