STEVEN GEOHAGEN, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court clarified that while a trial judge imposing a lenient sentence on a habitual offender need not make an explicit finding that an enhanced sentence is unnecessary (the lenient sentence itself implies this), the judge must provide written reasons for any downward departure from sentencing guidelines.
The Court held that no explicit finding that an enhanced sentence is unnecessary is required; by imposing a lenient sentence, the judge has necessarily decided a habitual offender sentence is not necessary. However, when not imposing a habitual offender sentence, the trial judge must provide written reasons for any downward departure from sentencing guidelines.
[1] Sentencing a habitual offender to a more lenient sentence than required by statute implicitly signifies that an enhanced sentence is not necessary for public protection.
[2] When a trial court imposes a sentence other than a habitual offender sentence, it must still adhere to the sentencing guidelines.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We did not intend nor do we read King to require a specific finding that an enhanced sentence is not necessary for the protection of the public. By virtue of sentencing a habitual offender to a more lenient sentence than that required by section 776.084, Florida Statutes (1991), the judge has necessarily decided that a habitual offender sentence is not necessary.”
Establishes that an implicit decision against enhancement is sufficient; no explicit finding required
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSteven Geohagen pleaded no contest to grand theft and fraudulent use of a credit card. The trial court found him to be a habitual offender but sentenc…
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GRIMES, Chief Justice.
We review State v. Geohagen, 633 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), in which the court certified the following as a question of great public importance:
IN ADOPTING THE “RATIONALE” OF THE EN BANC OPINION IN KING V. STATE, 597 SO.2D 309 (FLA. 2D DCA 1992), DID THE DECISION IN McKNIGHT V. STATE, 616 SO.2D 31 (FLA.1993) EXPRESSLY ADOPT THAT PORTION OF THE OPINION IN KING HOLDING THAT UPON SENTENCING A HABITUAL OFFENDER TO COMMUNITY CONTROL OR PROBATION, THE TRIAL COURT MUST (1) FIND PURSUANT TO § 775.084(4)(C) THAT A SENTENCE AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER WAS NOT NECESSARY AND (2) SENTENCE THE OFFENDER UNDER THE GUIDELINES, SETTING FORTH WRITTEN REASONS FOR DOWNWARD DEPARTURE SHOULD THE GUIDELINES RECOMMENDATION CALL FOR A SENTENCE OTHER THAN PROBATION OR COMMUNITY CONTROL?
Id. at 24. We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution.
Steven Geohagen pled no contest to charges of grand theft and fraudulent use of a credit card. The trial court found that Geohagen was a habitual offender yet sentenced him to five years’ probation, a downward departure from the two and one-half to five and one-half years of incarceration recommended by the sentencing guidelines. The trial judge did not provide written reasons for the downward departure.
The State appealed and the district court of appeal, relying on McKnight v. State, 616 So. 2d 31 (Fla.1993), reversed Geohagen’s sentence. The court stated that there was no indication in the record of a determination by the trial judge that a habitual offender sentence was not necessary to protect the public. In addition, the court held that the trial judge erred by not providing written reasons for his downward departure from the sentencing guidelines recommendation.
In King v. State, 597 So. 2d 309, 316 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 602 So. 2d 942 (Fla.1992), the court held that a judge who wishes to impose a sentence upon a habitual offender more lenient than the one provided by the habitual offender statute must decide that an enhanced sentence is not necessary to protect the public. See § 775.084(4)(c), Fla.Stat. (1989); id. at 316. Further, if the judge chooses not to impose a habitual offender sentence, the judge must still adhere to the sentencing guidelines. Id. In McKnight, 616 So. 2d at 31, this Court adopted King’s holding and rationale.
We did not intend nor do we read King to require a specific finding that an enhanced sentence is not necessary for the protection of the public. By virtue of sentencing a habitual offender to a more lenient sentence than that required by section 776.084, Florida Statutes (1991), the judge has necessarily decided'that a habitual offender sentence is not necessary. However, the rationale of King clearly requires that if a habitual sentence is not imposed, the trial judge must state appropriate reasons for any downward departure from the sentencing guidelines.
We answer the first part of the certified question in the negative and the second part in the affirmative. We approve the decision of the district court of appeal to the extent indicated in this opinion.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (24 total)
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King v. State, 681 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1996)…la. Stat. (1989).7 Even where a judge determines that a defendant is an habitual felony offender, the judge can still determine that sentencing under the habitual offender statute is not necessary for the protection of the public. Geohagen v. State, 639 So. 2d 611 (Fla.1994). Moreover, the judge need not make a specific finding that an enhanced sentence is not necessary for the protection of the public; the judge necessarily makes such a decision by virtue of sentencing an habitual offender to a more lenient…
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State v. Australia Ozell Rinkins, Jr., 646 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1994)…habitual felony offender to five years in prison, followed by life on probation. Id. However, the district court certified the question to this Court as one of great public importance. Id. at 766. This Court’s recent decision in Geohagen v. State, 639 So. 2d 611 (Fla.1994), is controlling in this ease, and requires that we answer the certified question in the negative and quash the decision below. Geohagen involved a defendant that the trial court found to be a habitual offender yet sentenced to probation,…
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Lett v. State, 805 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…offender statutes. See King v. State, 597 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). However, if the court sentences a defendant below the recommended guideline score, the court must state appropriate reasons for such downward departure. See Geohagen v. State, 639 So. 2d 611 (Fla.1994). Defendant was not sentenced below his guideline score of 4.9 to 8.1 years DOC. (See Exhibit 2: scoresheet, attached). This is why the court did not provide written reasons for a downward departure. Defendant’s sentence is therefore legal…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 24 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- King v. State, 597 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- McKNIGHT v. State, 616 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1993)
- THE Florida BAR v. Neckman, 616 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1993)
- State v. Geohagen, 633 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)