JOHN ALLEN LUKE, APPELLANT,
v.
INDIAN RIVER COUNTY, AND FELLSMERE WATER CONTROL DISTRICT, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Luke sought damages for personal injuries from a car accident, alleging that Fellsmere Water Control District breached its duty to remove overhanging vegetation that obstructed the driver's view. The trial court granted summary judgment for the District, but the appellate court reversed, finding that disputed questions about the duty allocation between the District and Indian River County precluded summary judgment.
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Luke, as a public invitee, had protection from a duty to exercise reasonable care by either the District or the County. Whether the District specifically had and breached such a duty is a genuine issue of material fact requiring interpretation of the ambiguous agreement between the defendants, which should not be resolved on summary judgment.
[1] A public entity may have a duty to exercise reasonable care for the protection of a public invitee on a public right-of-way.
[2] Whether a public entity breached its duty to maintain a public right-of-way, causing injury, can present a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Luke was a public invitee on the right-of-way. See Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146 (Fla.1972). See also Darley v. Marquee Enterprises, Inc., 565 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). In that capacity, either the District or the County had a duty to exercise reasonable care for his protection.”
Establishes Luke's legal status and the corresponding duty owed by the defendants
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohn Allen Luke was injured in an automobile collision on a public right-of-way where the Fellsmere Water Control District allegedly failed to remove …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Breach Of Duty cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
In the underlying action, John Allen Luke sought to recover for personal injuries arising out of an automobile collision. One theory of recovery against Fellsmere Water Control District was that the accident was caused by the District’s breach of its duty to remove overhanging tree branches and shrubbery on the public right-of-way where the accident occurred. Such removal, it was alleged, would have provided operators of motor vehicles with an unobstructed view. An agreement between the District and Indian River County becomes a factor in determining whether one of those two entities must ultimately bear the financial burden for Luke’s damages.
The trial court entered final summary judgment for the District (without elaborating on its reasoning). This was error. Luke was a public invitee on the right-of-way. See Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146 (Fla.1972). See also Darley v. Marquee Enterprises, Inc., 565 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). In that capacity, either the District or the County had a duty to exercise reasonable care for his protection. Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 492 So. 2d 1309 (Fla.1986). Thus, whether the District had such a duty and breached its duty, causing injuries to Luke, .is a genuine issue of material fact. While the existence of a duty is ordinarily a question of law for the court, the issue here is a question of fact, asking which defendant had the duty. The answer to that question requires an interpretation of the ambiguous agreement between the defendants; a factual determination that should not have been made by the trial court on summary judgment.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
DELL, C.J., HERSEY, J., and DAUKSCH, JAMES C., Jr., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Freeman v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 954 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…20, 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (observing that the standard of review of a ruling on a motion for directed verdict is de novo). The trial court correctly found Joyce Freeman to be a public invitee on the right-of-way.2 See Luke v. Indian River County, 639 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). As such, BellSouth owed her a duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and to warn of any concealed peril that BellSouth should have known of through the exercise of reasonable care. BellSouth was requ…
Authorities Cited
- Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1972)
- Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 492 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1986)
- Darley v. Marquee Enters., Inc., 565 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)