JUDITH MAYO CARLSON, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
ROBERT CHARLES CARLSON, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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In this post-judgment modification proceeding, the former wife appealed the denial of her request to extend rehabilitative alimony or convert it to permanent alimony, and challenged the trial court's partial award of attorney's fees. The former husband cross-appealed the attorney's fees award. The court affirmed the denial of alimony modification but reversed and remanded on the fee award because the trial court failed to make required detailed findings regarding hours expended by various personnel and improperly included interest charges.
The court affirmed the denial of alimony modification and the partial award of attorney's fees at the trial level. However, the court reversed and remanded on the cross-appeal because the trial court failed to make detailed findings breaking down reasonable hours expended by counsel, his associate, law clerk, and paralegal as required by Florida law, and improperly included interest charges in the fee award.
[1] A trial court must make specific findings regarding the reasonable hours expended by each category of legal personnel when awarding attorney's fees in dissolution of marr…
[2] Awards of attorney's fees in dissolution of marriage proceedings may not include interest charged by counsel to their clients, absent specific statutory authority.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We agree with the former husband that it was reversible error for the trial court not to make findings as to the breakdown of reasonable hours expended among the various personnel in counsel's office, nor to make the other findings required by Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe”
Establishes the key error requiring reversal and remand—failure to provide detailed hour breakdowns by personnel category
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were divorced and the former wife sought modification of her rehabilitative alimony. She also claimed attorney's fees for the modification…
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POLEN, Judge.
These consolidated appeals involve post-final judgment modification proceedings wherein the former wife sought an extension of her rehabilitative alimony, or in the alternative, conversion to permanent periodic alimony. The trial court found she was not entitled to modification, but granted in part her claim for attorney’s fees, awarding approximately two-thirds of the amount her counsel claimed as fees, costs and interest, or $37,000. She now appeals the denial of modification, and the trial court’s failure to award the full amount of her attorney’s fees. We affirm as to those issues raised by the former wife’s appeal. On the former husband’s cross-appeal, directed to the former wife’s trial and appellate attorney’s fees, we reverse in part and affirm in part.
Once again, we are called upon to review an award of attorney’s fees in a dissolution of marriage (or post-judgment) proceeding which we believe to be clearly excessive.1 Counsel for the former wife sought an award of some $55,000 in fees and costs for what appears to be a single-issue (other than fees), uncomplicated modification proceeding. As indicated above, we find unpersuasive the former wife’s argument that the trial court erred in awarding “only” about two-thirds of those fees and costs.
The former husband’s cross-appeal raises two points directed at the award of fees and costs. His second point, that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees and costs to former wife’s counsel for this appeal, we find equally unpersuasive. His first point, however, has merit.
The former husband argues that the trial court erred in failing to make findings breaking down the reasonable hours expended by the former wife’s lead counsel, his associate, his law clerk, and his paralegal. The court did indicate counsel’s firm sought a total of 278.75 hours for work expended between May 1, 1991, and June 17, 1992, 237 hours of which were expended in the first 4$ months up to the date of the modification hearing. (It should be noted that former wife's trial counsel succeeded another attorney who had been paid $11,000 in fees.) The court then deducted $4,801.15 for various hours disallowed from the aggregate amount of $59,-963.05 counsel was seeking for fees ($51,-485.00), costs ($5,305.32), and interest ($3,172.73). This left a balance of $55,161.90, which the trial court found to be “reasonable.” It ordered the former husband to pay $37,000 of that amount. The one issue upon which we can agree with the trial court here is its statement: “This is a lot of money.” We agree with the former husband that it was reversible error for the trial court not to make findings as to the breakdown of reasonable hours expended among the various personnel in counsel’s office, nor to make the other findings required by Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985); see also Seaton v. Seaton, 563 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). We further hold that it was error to include any portion of the interest which former wife’s counsel charged his client, in the award to be paid by the former husband. The cases cited by former wife as support for the interest award are not marital cases, and we decline to extend them holding to cases such as this, where the entitlement to such fees arises solely from section 61.16, Florida Statutes (1991).
Lastly, we agree with the trial court’s determination that former wife’s counsel’s billing practices did not constitute improper “unit billing” as was disapproved of in Browne v. Costales, 579 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
Reversed and remanded on cross-appeal for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
GLICKSTEIN and WARNER, JJ., concur. . See Tomaino v. Tomaino, 629 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Whitney v. Whitney, 638 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 3d 1994); Dralus v. Dralus, 627 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
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Citator
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Cole v. Roberts, 661 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…remand of the specific factual findings. It appears that, here, the trial court erred by failing to make the specific factual findings required by Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985). See also Carlson v. Carlson, 639 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). In addition, there is merit to the wife’s argument that the trial court erred when it determined, as reasonable, her entitlement to fees of $13,559.30; then, without explanation, required the husband to pay 'only $7,593.21, the…
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Whitlow v. S. Ga. Natural GAS Co., 650 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…order, however, disclosing whether the court considered the time devoted by counsel’s legal assistants,1 as required under section 57.104, Florida Statutes (1989). Loper v. Allstate Ins. Co., 616 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Carlson v. Carlson, 639 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). In the appraisers’ affidavits, Phillip Pickens sought fees of $3,714, and Susan Brewer $11,810. The court considered these amounts excessive, stating that “much of the work involved was utilized in another ease where Ms. Brewer…
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Levinson v. Levinson, 895 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…litigious conduct, the trial court did not make such a finding. In fact, the trial court did not make any findings to support the conclusion that [*434] such fees, which we consider to be excessive, were reasonable. See generally Carlson v. Carlson, 639 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (reversing excessive fee award in single-issue, uncomplicated modification proceeding where trial court failed to make appropriate findings). Finally, we hold that the trial court erred in prohibiting the former husband from enc…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)
- Dralus v. Dralus, 627 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Tomaino v. Tomaino, 629 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Browne v. Miryam Costales, 579 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
- Whitney v. Drue Leslye Whitney, 638 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
- Homell Calhoun and Lorraine Calhoun v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 563 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)