JOHN G. TIERNEY, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, AND BERN'S STEAK HOUSE, INC., APPELLEES
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Appellant Tierney challenged his disqualification from unemployment benefits after voluntarily leaving a part-time job at Bern's Steak House. The court held that while Tierney voluntarily quit without good cause, he remained entitled to partial unemployment benefits from his previous full-time job with First Florida Bank, which he had left under nondisqualifying circumstances.
An individual in Tierney's position should be disqualified from benefits only to the extent that benefits would have been decreased by income from the part-time employment, entitling him to partial unemployment compensation benefits from his previous full-time employment despite voluntarily quitting the part-time job.
[1] A claimant is entitled to partial unemployment compensation benefits from previous full-time employment when they voluntarily quit a subsequent part-time job without good…
[2] Voluntarily quitting a part-time job without good cause does not disqualify an individual from receiving partial unemployment benefits from prior full-time employment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To deny benefits to an individual in appellant's position would not further the legislative purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Law — to ease the financial hardships caused by unemployment — but could discourage part time employment and give a windfall in the form of reduced contribution rates to the former full time employer.”
Establishes the court's rationale for why complete disqualification would contradict statutory purposes
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTierney was initially employed full-time by First Florida Bank and separated under nondisqualifying circumstances, entitling him to full unemployment …
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant, John G. Tierney, challenges the Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission’s order affirming the appeals referee’s determination that the appellant was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits because he voluntarily left his part time job with Bern’s Steak House, Inc. (Bern’s) without good cause. We agree with the appellant’s position and, accordingly, reverse.
It appears that the parties have stipulated that the appellant’s former employment with First Florida Bank ended under nondisquali-fying circumstances and, as a result, that the appellant was awarded full time unemployment compensation benefits. The appellant subsequently took a part time job with Bern’s. Although not disclosed in the record, it appears that the earnings from the part time job reduced the amount of full time benefits to which the appellant was otherwise entitled. § 443.111(3), Fla.Stat. (1993).
On the appellant’s fourth day of work at Bern’s, he decided to leave that job because his wages were too low and he desired to go to school at night. The appellant again filed for unemployment compensation with the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Unemployment Compensation (the Division). The Division denied benefits, finding he was disqualified pursuant to section 443.101, Florida Statutes (1993), because he voluntarily quit his part time job without good cause attributable to Bern’s. The appeals referee and the Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission affirmed and the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
The appellant contends that he is entitled to partial unemployment compensation benefits from his previous full time employment with First Florida Bank from which he had separated under a nondisqualifying condition. We agree.
To deny benefits to an individual in appellant’s position would not further the legislative purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Law — to ease the financial hardships caused by unemployment — but could discourage part time employment and give a windfall in the form of reduced contribution rates to the former full time employer. Wright v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 512 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); see Neese v. Sizzler Family Steak House, 404 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), rev. denied, 412 So. 2d 471 (Fla.1982). In the instant case, the appellant did not dispute that he voluntarily quit his part time job with Bern’s. Despite that fact, the appellant should have been disqualified from benefits only to the extent that his benefits would have been decreased by the income from his part time employment. Wright; see Barry v. Faulk Invs., Inc., 621 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). We, accordingly, reverse and remand with instructions to award the appellant partial unemployment compensation benefits from his previous full time employment with First Florida Bank.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
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Alderman v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 664 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…r’s award of unemployment benefits because the worker quits a part-time job which the worker obtained after such benefits had been awarded based upon the worker’s previous full-time employment. See Tierney v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 640 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Coelho v. Balasky, 631 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Barry v. Faulk Investments, Inc., 621 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). The UAC suggests that reliance upon case law s…
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Groudas v. Pinellas Cnty. Sch. Bd. & Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 793 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…ak House, 404 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Berger v. Asolo Ctr. for the Performing Arts, Inc., 686 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Alderman v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 664 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Tierney v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 640 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Coelho v. Balasky, 631 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), the 1999 amendment to section 443.101(l)(a)(l) — which became effective July 1, 1999 — was expressly enacted to over…
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Rochussen v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n & Opinion Research Corp., 795 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…rn Neese and its progeny (Berger v. Asolo Center for the Performing Arts, Inc., 686 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)); Alderman v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 664 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Tierney v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 640 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Coelho v. Balasky, 631 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). This bill would require the total disqualification of individuals who work a full-time and part-time job simultaneou…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Neese v. Sizzler Fam. Steak House & Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 404 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- The City OF Coral Gables v. Mayol, 512 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Barry v. Faulk Invs., Inc., 621 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)