FLORIDA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION, PETITIONER,
v.
MICHAEL J. DEMARKO, AS JUDGE OF COMPENSATION CLAIMS, AND MARY E. THOMAS, ON BEHALF OF BRADLEY THOMAS, RESPONDENTS
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The Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association sought a writ of prohibition to challenge a judge of compensation claims' retention of jurisdiction over a birth injury claim. The court granted the writ, holding that a statutory amendment transferring jurisdiction from judges of compensation claims to the Division of Administrative Hearings was immediately applicable to the pending case because it was procedural in nature and contained no savings clause.
The judge of compensation claims lost jurisdiction over the claim and could not enter a final order. Because the statute transferring jurisdiction contained no explicit savings clause, jurisdiction now rests exclusively with the Division of Administrative Hearings, even though the final hearing had already been conducted.
[1] A statute transferring jurisdiction from one quasi-judicial tribunal to another is procedural and may be immediately applicable to pending cases.
[2] When a statute that confers jurisdiction is amended to transfer jurisdiction to a different tribunal, jurisdiction over pending cases falls to the original tribunal unles…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[remedial or procedural statutes do not fall within the constitutional prohibition against retroactive legislation and they may be held immediately applicable to pending cases.”
Establishes the principle that procedural statutes apply to pending cases without explicit retroactive language
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMary E. Thomas brought a claim under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act on behalf of her son in 1991. A final hearing was …
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PER CURIAM.
A petition for writ of prohibition challenges the retention of jurisdiction of the judge of compensation claims over an action brought under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act (the Act), sections 766.301-766.316, Florida Statutes (1988). While judges of compensation claims had jurisdiction over claims originally brought under the Act, an amendment to section 766.304 transferred jurisdiction over such claims to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Because of the effect of the amendment, we determine that the judge of compensation claims has lost jurisdiction over the claim, and we grant the writ.
In 1991, Mary E. Thomas brought a claim under the Act on behalf of her son. A final hearing was held before JCC Michael J. DeMarko in January of 1993, but a final order was not entered. The amendment to section 766.304 transferred jurisdiction over such claims to the Division of Administrative Hearings effective May 15, 1993. Despite the fact that jurisdiction now lies with the Division of Administrative Hearings, the respondents urge this court to allow the judge of compensation claims to enter a final order because he has already conducted the final hearing. While we agree that judicial resources would be conserved if the judge of compensation claims could enter the final order, he lacks jurisdiction to do so.
It is well settled that “[rjemedial or procedural statutes do not fall within the constitutional prohibition against retroactive legislation and they may be held immediately applicable to pending cases.” Village of El Portal v. City of Miami Shores, 362 So. 2d 275, 278 (Fla.1978). A statute transferring jurisdiction from one quasi-judicial tribunal to another is procedural in nature. In State ex rel. Arnold v. Revels, 109 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla.1959), the court held that “when the jurisdiction of a court depends upon a statute which is repealed or otherwise nullified, the jurisdiction falls even over pending causes, unless the repealing statute contains a savings clause.” Quoting De La Rama S.S. Co. v. United States, 344 U.S. 386, 390, 73 S.Ct. 381, 383, 97 L.Ed. 422 (1953) the court stated that
[wjhen the very purpose of Congress is to take away jurisdiction, of course it does not survive, even as to pending suits, unless expressly reserved.... If the aim is to destroy a tribunal or to take away cases from it, there is no basis for finding saving exceptions unless they are made explicit.
Here the statute was amended, not repealed, but we believe the rule of law announced in State ex rel. Arnold controls. Because section 766.304 contains no explicit savings clause, the judge of compensation claims has lost jurisdiction over the cause and jurisdiction now lies with the Division of Administrative Hearings.
WRIT ISSUED.
ERVIN, BOOTH and ALLEN, JJ., concur.
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Flamily v. City OF Orlando & City of Orlando Risk Mgmt., 924 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…, Florida Statutes, which granted the JCC jurisdiction to determine whether fraud occurred in workers’ compensation cases, was a procedural change and should apply retroactively); Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass’n v. DeMarko, 640 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (holding that a statute transferring jurisdiction from one quasi-judicial tribunal to another was procedural in nature and should apply retroactively). Because the statute applies retroactively, the JCC lacked subject matter juri…
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State v. KEY W. Conch Harbor, Inc., 683 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…is repealed, it is as if the repealed statute never existed. See Ex Parte McCardle, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) at 506, 19 L.Ed. 264; Yaffee v. Internat'l Co., 80 So. 2d 910 (Fla.1955); Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass’n v. DeMarko, 640 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). To put it in terms fitting to this case, “[w]hen the root is cut, the branches fall.” Smallwood v. Gallardo, 275 U.S. 56, 48 S.Ct. 23, 72 L.Ed. 152 (1927). Commercial developers have no right at common law to claim title to coa…
Authorities Cited
- De la Rama S.S. Co., Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1953)
- Vill. OF EL Portal v. City OF Miami Shores, 362 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1978)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Walter G. Arnold v. Revels, 109 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1959)