ROBERT LEE BLOTZ, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1994-08-12
No. 93-01497
HALL, A.C.J., and PARKER and BLUE, JJ., concur.
640 So. 2d 1240 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1994) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Robert Lee Blotz appealed his sentencing as a habitual offender for three life felonies. The court affirmed his convictions but remanded for resentencing because the sentencing documents improperly indicated habitual offender status on his two life felony convictions and consecutive habitual offender sentences may have been improperly imposed.


Holding

The court affirmed Blotz's convictions but found merit in his contentions regarding sentencing. Habitual offender status was properly imposed on the kidnapping conviction despite it being classified as first-degree felony rather than life felony. However, the sentencing documents improperly indicated habitual offender status on the two life felony sexual battery convictions, and consecutive habitual offender sentences may have been improperly imposed under Hale v. State and Dietrich v. State.


Headnotes

[1] Habitual offender status may be properly imposed on a first-degree felony conviction even if the crime could have been charged as a more serious offense but was not.

[2] Sentencing documents must accurately reflect the trial court's oral pronouncements regarding habitual offender status, especially when the court acknowledges that such st…

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Key Quotes

“habitual offender status may properly be imposed on a first-degree felony conviction pursuant to section 775.084”

Establishes that habitual offender designation on the kidnapping conviction was proper even though it could have been charged as a life felony

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Facts & Procedural History

Blotz was charged with kidnapping, two counts of sexual battery, and aggravated assault. He pled no contest and was convicted of first-degree kidnappi…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Robert Lee Blotz, contends the trial court erred in sentencing him as a habitual offender for three life felonies. Since, however, the record shows that Blotz was properly convicted and sentenced as a habitual offender for a crime which could have been classified as a life felony but was not, we find merit only in Blotz’s contention that the sentencing documents on his two actual life felony convictions improperly indicate habitual offender status. We also find that consecutive habitual offender sentences may have been improperly imposed on Blotz in this instance. For that reason, we affirm Blotz’s convictions, but remand this cause for resentencing.

Blotz was charged with kidnapping in violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1991), count one; sexual battery in violation of section 794.011, counts two and three; and aggravated assault in violation of section 784.021, count four. After Blotz pled no contest to the charges against him, the trial court adjudicated him guilty of a first-degree felony punishable by life for kidnapping, a life felony for each count of sexual battery, and a third-degree felony for aggravated assault. Blotz was, thus, sentenced as a habitual offender to forty years’ imprisonment on the kidnapping conviction, forty years’ imprisonment on each sexual battery, and ten years’ imprisonment as a habitual offender on the aggravated assault conviction. All terms were ordered to run consecutively.

Because Blotz used a weapon at the time he committed the kidnapping offense herein, the state could have officially charged him with armed kidnapping, which is a life felony. See §§ 787.01 and 775.087, Fla.Stat. (1991). The state, however, chose not to actually charge Blotz with the enhanced crime. Blotz, thus, pled no contest to the kidnapping charge, which the record reflects was at all times treated as a first-degree felony punishable by life. Since habitual offender status may properly be imposed on a first-degree felony conviction pursuant to section 775.084, we find Blotz’s contention that he was improperly habitualized on the kidnapping charge merely because that crime could have been enhanced, to be without merit.

As to Blotz’s two life felonies, i.e., the two sexual battery convictions, the record shows that though the trial court acknowledged and orally pronounced that habitual offender sentences cannot be imposed on life felonies pursuant to Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla.1992), the sentencing documents erroneously indicate that habitual offender status was imposed on such convictions. Those documents are, thus, in need of correction.

Further, the record shows that all prison terms imposed in this instance were ordered to run consecutively — including the habitual offender sentences imposed on the kidnapping and aggravated assault convictions, i.e., counts one and four. We find that such a sentencing scheme may be erroneous pursuant to Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1993), and Dietrich v. State, 635 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), which hold that consecutive habitual offender sentences for crimes arising out of the same criminal episode are improper. For that reason, we remand the instant cause for resentencing. Blotz’s convictions are, otherwise, affirmed.

Accordingly, the instant cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

HALL, A.C.J., and PARKER and BLUE, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Toro v. State, 691 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
    …, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla.1992); Joe v. State, 668 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). However, the kidnapping offense is a first degree felony, and the punishment for a first degree felony can be enhanced under the habitual offender statute. Blotz v. State, 640 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Toro argues the kidnapping offense is a life felony because use of a firearm was charged in the information and the jury found him guilty as charged. Despite the language in the information, a felony can only be reclassified pu…
  • Hollingsworth v. State, 711 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
    …rth was sentenced as a habitual offender for the sexual battery, which is a life felony. See § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (1993). At the time of the offense, a defendant could not be sentenced as a habitual offender on a life felony. See Blotz v. State, 640 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). On remand, the defendant must be resentenced for this offense. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. THREADGILL, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND and NORTHCUTT, JJ., concur.…

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