STEAVEN C. CONNER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1994-07-06
No. 93-1366
GLICKSTEIN, J., and BROWN, LUCY, Associate Judges concur.
641 So. 2d 143 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1994) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed Conner's conviction for resisting arrest without violence, holding that police lacked authority to make a warrantless entry into his home based on minor misdemeanor charges. Applying Welsh v. Wisconsin, the court found that the government failed to demonstrate exigent circumstances sufficient to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness attaching to warrantless home entries.


Holding

The warrantless entry into defendant's home was unconstitutional because the government failed to demonstrate exigent circumstances sufficient to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness. Application of Welsh v. Wisconsin establishes that warrantless home entries for minor offenses should rarely be sanctioned, and defendant's minor misdemeanors did not justify the intrusion.


Headnotes

[1] The government bears the burden to demonstrate exigent circumstances to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness attached to all warrantless home entries.

[2] The presumption of unreasonableness for warrantless home entries is difficult to rebut when the government's interest is solely to arrest for a minor offense.

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries.”

Establishes the fundamental principle that warrantless home entries require exigent circumstances to overcome constitutional presumption of unreasonableness.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Police responded to a 911 hang-up call from defendant's residence and found him in the garage playing pool with friends. When defendant attempted to s…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
FARMER, Judge.

FARMER, Judge.

In Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984), the Court invalidated a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor made by police who gained noncon-sensual access to defendant’s home. In explaining the Court said:

“Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. Payton v. New York, [445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) ]. When the government’s interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, that presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate.”

466 U.S. at 750, 104 S.Ct. at 2098. The Court went on to hold that:

“although no exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has been committed, * * * application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue in this ease [drunken driving], has been committed.”

466 U.S. at 763, 104 S.Ct. at 2099.

In the present case, police responded to a “911 hang-up” call originating from defendant’s residence. The police spoke to defendant in the garage, while he was playing pool with a group of friends. In an effort to demonstrate that the last number he had called on his cordless telephone was not 911, defendant sought to hold the handset next to the ear of one of the officers. The officer misunderstood the gesture, thought he was being assaulted, and swung at defendant.

That led to a heated exchange between defendant and the officers, one of whom meanwhile also talked to defendant’s mother. Defendant attempted ultimately to close the garage door to end the conversation and told the officers to leave. While so doing, the police saw defendant push and slap his mother. He then ran into the house. The police ran after him, forced their way into the house and after an altercation therein arrested him. He was charged with misdemeanors of battery and resisting arrest without violence and two counts of felony battery on a law enforcement officer based on the altercation within his home. He was convicted of resisting arrest without violence and acquitted of all other charges.

Applying Welsh, we do not believe that the misdemeanor of resisting arrest without violence or even the “battery” on the mother constituted serious enough offenses to uphold the warrantless entry into defendant’s home for what were then two minor misdemeanors. There was no suggestion that defendant would not have been available later after the officers had presented their story to a neutral magistrate and obtained a warrant for his arrest. As the Court emphasized in Welsh, court approval of warrantless home entries for minor offenses should be rare. This-is simply not one of them.

REVERSED.

GLICKSTEIN, J., and BROWN, LUCY, Associate Judges concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Espiet v. State, 797 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
    …1st DCA 1999). The courts generally agree that a law enforcement officer may not make a warrantless entry into a person’s home to arrest the person for a misdemeanor offense. See M.J.R. v. State, 716 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Conner v. State, 641 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 649 So. 2d 234 (Fla.1994); Ortiz v. State, 600 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Johnson v. State, 395 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). When Deputy Engle-bright entered the house to arrest Espiet on the misdemeanor charge of…
  • State v. Markus, 211 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2017)
    …(“The underlying offenses for which M. J.R. could have been, and was, arrested are only misdemeanors, and there is no authority given to a police officer to enter a suspect’s home to effect a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor.”); Conner v. State, 641 So. 2d 143, 144 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (“Applying Welsh, we do not believe that the misdemeanor of resisting arrest without violence or even the ‘battery’ [that defendant committed in pushing and slapping another person] constituted serious enough offenses to uph…
  • M.J.R. a Child v. State, 715 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
    …or a misdemeanor, especially where the building to be entered is a person’s home). Stated differently, no exigent circumstance existed to justify the warrantless arrest of appellant in his home. See Welsh, at 750-53, 104 S.Ct. 2091; Conner v. State, 641 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 649 So. 2d 234 (Fla.1994) (defendant’s misdemeanor of resisting arrest without violence or even “battery” on the mother did not constitute serious enough offenses to uphold the warrantless entry into defendant’s home for…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw