RODNEY GRAHAM, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Graham appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his split sentence of 5½ years incarceration plus 5 years probation exceeds the 5½-year term agreed to in his plea agreement. The court affirms, holding that a sentence which is otherwise legal under statutory law is not rendered illegal merely because it exceeds an agreed sentence under a plea agreement.
A sentence that is otherwise legal under statutory law is not rendered illegal merely because it exceeds an agreed sentence under a plea agreement. Rule 3.800(a) is intended to address whether the terms and conditions of punishment are permissible as a matter of law, not to re-examine procedural compliance or plea agreement terms.
[1] A sentence is not rendered illegal merely because it exceeds an agreed sentence under a plea agreement.
[2] Rule 3.800(a) provides relief for sentences that impose a penalty not authorized by law, not for procedural errors in sentencing.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Rule 3.800(a) is intended to provide relief for a narrow category of cases in which the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized by law. It is concerned primarily with whether the terms and conditions of the punishment for a particular offense are permissible as a matter of law.”
Establishes the limited scope of rule 3.800(a) relief and why plea agreement deviations do not constitute illegal sentences
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGraham pleaded nolo contendere to two second-degree felonies, each punishable by up to 15 years imprisonment. Under the plea agreement, Graham was to …
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DIAMANTES, Judge.
Rodney Graham appeals the summary denial of his rule 3.800(a)1 motion to correct an illegal sentence, contending that his sentence is illegal because it exceeds the agreed sentence under his plea agreement. The record reflects that Graham pled nolo contendere to two second-degree felonies, which are each punishable by a prison sentence not to exceed 15 years,2 in return for a prison sentence of 5½ years; however, the trial court sentenced Graham to a split sentence of 5½ years incarceration followed by 5 years probation. We affirm because a sen tence which is otherwise legal is not rendered illegal merely because it exceeds an agreed sentence under a plea agreement. As the court in Judge v. State, 596 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), rev. denied, 613 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1992), explained:
Rule 3.800(a) is intended to provide relief for a narrow category of cases in which the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized by law. It is concerned primarily with whether the terms and conditions of the punishment for a particular offense are permissible as a matter of law. It is not a vehicle designed to re-examine whether the procedure employed to impose the punishment comported with statutory law and due process.
Id. at 77. See also Nowlin v. State, 639 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Young v. State, 616 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Kelly v. State, 599 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
We note that Graham’s proper remedy in this case is to file a 3.850 motion3 asserting that the plea should be set aside because, although a sentencing court is not required to impose a sentence in conformity with a plea agreement, if the court cannot abide by the terms of the agreement, the defendant must be given the opportunity to withdraw his plea. See Jenkins v. State, 549 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Graham’s rule 3.800(a) motion without prejudice to Graham filing a rule 3.850motion in which he may seek to be sentenced within the terms of his plea agreement. If the trial court determines that it cannot abide by the plea agreement, Graham should be given the opportunity to withdraw his plea.
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800(a).
. See § 775.082(3)(c), Fla.Stat. (1993).
. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Judge v. State, 596 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Young v. State, 616 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- Nowlin v. State, 639 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Kelly v. State, 599 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Kennedy, 549 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)