DAVID MOORE AND ELLEN MOORE, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
RIVER RANCH, INC. D/B/A RIVER RANCH RESORTS, A FLORIDA CORPORATION; OUTDOOR RESORTS OF AMERICA, INC., A TENNESSEE CORPORATION; OUTDOOR RESORTS OF RIVER RANCH, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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The Moores appeal a summary judgment dismissing their negligence action against River Ranch Resort after Mr. Moore was injured in an ultralight plane crash at the resort. The appellate court reverses, holding that the existence of an agency relationship between River Ranch and the ultralight operators presents a jury question that precludes summary judgment.
The court reversed the summary judgment, holding that the existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury and can only be resolved by summary judgment when the evidence is capable of only one interpretation. The facts in the record create a jury question regarding whether an agency relationship existed between River Ranch and the ultralight operators.
[1] The existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question of fact for the trier of fact.
[2] Summary judgment is appropriate to resolve the existence of an agency relationship only when the evidence is capable of only one interpretation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact”
Establishes the general rule that agency questions are for the jury, not for summary judgment
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn July 29, 1989, David Moore was injured when an ultralight plane crashed while he was a guest at River Ranch Resort in Lake Wales, Florida. The Moor…
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PER CURIAM.
The plaintiffs, David Moore and Ellen Moore, appeal from a final summary judgment in favor of the defendants, River Ranch, Inc. d/b/a River Ranch Resorts, a Florida corporation; Outdoor Resorts of America, Inc., a Tennessee corporation; Outdoor Resorts of River Ranch, Inc., a Florida corporation (“River Ranch”). Because a jury question is created by the facts established in the record, we reverse.
On July 29, 1989, the Moores traveled to the River Ranch Resort in Lake Wales, Florida, for a weekend retreat. While a guest at that resort, Mr. Moore rode in an ultralight plane and was injured when the plane crashed. The Moores filed a complaint alleging, in part, that River Ranch represented that it operated and/or provided the ultralight plane rides to the public; that the ultralight plane personnel were agents of River Ranch; that River Ranch had a duty to provide reasonably safe activities for the guests; that River Ranch failed to supervise the operators of the ultralight plane to insure that the plane was in proper order and that the pilot was capable of controlling the plane; and that the activity was unreasonably dangerous to the public.
River Ranch filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that it did not have a duty to Mr. Moore because it did not know or have reason to know that the ultralight ride was dangerous and, further, that River Ranch never made any representations that the owners or operators of the ride were its agents. The trial court entered an order granting summary judgment finding that no actual or apparent agency relationship existed between River Ranch and the operators of the ultralight aircraft and that River Ranch owed no duty to the Moores. Thereafter, final judgment was rendered in favor of River Ranch.
It is well settled under Florida law that the existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. Orlando Executive Park v. Robbins, 433 So. 2d 491, 494 (Fla.1983); McCabe v. Howard, 281 So. 2d 362, 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). The determination of an agency relationship can be resolved by summary judgment only when the evidence is capable of just one interpretation. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. v. Weiner, 543 So. 2d 794, 797 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 553 So. 2d 1164 (Fla.1989), and cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1028, 110 S.Ct. 1475, 108 L.Ed.2d 612 (1990); Folwell v. Bernard, 477 So. 2d 1060, 1062 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 486 So. 2d 595 (Fla.1986); Jaar v. Univ. of Miami 474 So. 2d 239, 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 484 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1986). The facts established by the record in this case create a jury question as to whether an agency relationship existed between River Ranch and the operators of the ultralight plane rides. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and'BLUE and FULMER, JJ., concur.
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Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. Robbins, 433 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1983)
- Jaar v. The Univ. OF Miami, 474 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Folwell v. Bernard, 477 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- McCABE v. Howard, 281 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Yosef v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 494 U.S. 1028 (U.S. 1990)
- Florida v. Christian, 494 U.S. 1028 (U.S. 1990)
- Blue Cross/Blue Shield OF Fla., Inc. v. Weiner, 543 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)