FERNANDO G. DIAZ, APPELLANT,
v.
SANTAFE HEALTHCARE, INC., APPELLEE
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A physician successfully sued his former employer for unpaid compensation under an employment contract and was awarded attorney fees under Florida Statute § 448.08. The appellate court affirmed the fee award but reversed in part, holding that the trial court has discretion to include attorney time spent establishing the amount of fees, not just time spent establishing entitlement to fees.
The trial court has discretion, in an appropriate case, to make a fee award under section 448.08 that encompasses time spent establishing the amount of the fee. The fee award may also include time spent establishing entitlement to the use of a multiplier if the trial court believes such time benefited the client.
[1] A contractual or statutory right to an award of attorney fees generally extends to time spent by counsel litigating entitlement to fees.
[2] The purpose of a statutory attorney fee provision can inform whether time spent establishing the amount of the fee is compensable.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The general rule is that a contractual or statutory right to an award of fees extends to time spent by counsel litigating entitlement to fees, because the client has an interest in the amount of such award.”
Establishes the foundational rule regarding compensability of time spent on fee-related litigation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFernando Diaz, a physician, brought suit against Santafe Healthcare, Inc. for various types of compensation due under an employment contract. Diaz pre…
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PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on appeal from a final order awarding attorney fees under section 448.08, Florida Statutes, following a successful suit by appellant, a physician, against appellee for various types of compensation due under an employment contract. We affirm as to all issues raised by appellant, with the exception of appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in limiting its attorney fee award to the time expended by counsel pursuing the claim for lost wages, and in declining to make a fee award for time expended by counsel establishing the right to a fee and the amount of the fee.
The general rule is that a contractual or statutory right to an award of fees extends to time spent by counsel litigating entitlement to fees, because the client has an interest in the amount of such award. Ganson v. Department of Administration, 554 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), quashed on other grounds, 566 So. 2d 791 (Fla.1990); Inacio v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 550 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
On the issue of whether counsel’s time spent establishing the amount of the fee is compensable, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Palma, 629 So. 2d 830 (Fla.1993), is instructive. In Palma, the claim for attorney fees was under section 627.428(1), Florida Statutes, which requires that in suits by an insured against an insurer, the insured shall be awarded reasonable fees as compensation for having prosecuted the suit, if the insured prevails. The court acknowledged that federal courts ordinarily permit compensability for the entire time spent litigating attorney fees, including the time spent establishing the amount of the fee, on the premise that doing so comports with the purpose behind most statutory fee authorizations, to encourage attorneys to represent indigent clients. The court in Palma explained, however, that the purpose of section 627.428(1), Florida Statutes, is to discourage insurance companies from contesting valid claims. Permitting recovery for time spent establishing entitlement to a fee, but not time spent establishing the amount of the fee, comports with the purpose and language of the statute.
Accordingly, only the time spent establishing the entitlement to a fee was held compensable.
At least one apparent purpose of section 448.08, Florida Statutes, is to encourage attorneys to represent indigent persons in disputes for unpaid wages. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court has discretion, in an appropriate case, to make a fee award under the statute which encompasses time spent establishing the amount of the fee. In an appropriate case, the fee award may include time spent establishing entitlement to the use of a multiplier if the trial court is of the opinion that such time was of benefit to the client.
For the foregoing reasons, the order appealed from is reversed in part, affirmed in part, and this cause is remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
BOOTH, MICKLE and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.
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Mediplex Constr. OF Fla., Inc. v. Schaub, 856 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…ate of Fla. v. Robbins and Robbins, Inc., 700 So. 2d 782, 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (barring fees for fees under sections 73.091 and 73.092, Florida Statutes (1993), in eminent domain proceeding). The Schaubs rely on Diaz v. SantaFe Healthcare, Inc., 642 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), in an attempt to limit Palma’s holding to section 627.428(1). In Diaz, the first district expressly chose to limit Pal-ma and held that in an action for unpaid wages under Florida Statutes, section 448.08 (1993), the trial court…
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Paladyne Corp. v. Weindruch, 867 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…r, 794 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Mangel v. Bob Dance Dodge, Inc., 739 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Seminole County v. Butler, 676 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 686 So. 2d 581 (Fla.1996). Contra, Diaz v. Santa Fe Healthcare, Inc., 642 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Mr. Weindruch attempts to avoid the holding in these cases by suggesting that his attorney’s fee contract gives him an interest in the recovery of the fee. First of all, we find nothing in the attorney’s fee contract that would…
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Nat'l Portland Cement Co. v. Federico A. Goudie, 718 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…amount of the fee and affirm in all other respects. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. ALTENBERND and CASANUEVA, JJ., concur. . In so holding, we appear to be in conflict with the First District’s opinion in Diaz v. Santa Fe Healthcare, Inc., 642 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), which holds that, in an action for unpaid wages, the trial court has discretion to award attorney's fees for time spent establishing the amount of fees.…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1993)
- Inacio v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 550 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Dep't of Admin. v. Ganson, 566 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1990)
- Ganson v. State, 554 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)