ROBERT LEE STEVENS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Robert Lee Stevens was convicted of delivery of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, delivery of cocaine within 200 feet of a public housing facility, and possession of cocaine. The appellate court affirmed the first and third convictions but vacated the second conviction, finding the statute unconstitutionally vague under Florida Supreme Court precedent.
The court held that the codefendant's statement was not hearsay and did not violate Bruton because it was admitted to show its effect on the defendant and his participation in the offense, not for its truth. However, the conviction under the statute prohibiting delivery within 200 feet of a public housing facility was vacated as the Florida Supreme Court had found that statute unconstitutionally vague.
[1] A codefendant's statement is admissible as a verbal act, not for its truth, but to show its effect on the defendant and to prove the nature of the act or transaction.
[2] Testimony regarding a codefendant's statement is not hearsay if it is introduced to demonstrate the defendant's participation in an offense, rather than to prove the trut…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Bruton prohibits as hearsay the admission of a codefendant's confession or statement that implicates the defendant.”
Establishes the legal standard for Bruton violations
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStevens was involved in a drug transaction observed by an undercover officer. The officer testified that a codefendant named Hill asked what the offic…
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellant was found guilty by a jury of delivery of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school (§ 893.13(l)(e), Fla.Stat. (1991)), delivery of cocaine within 200 feet of a public housing facility (§ 893.13(l)(i), Fla.Stat. (1991)), and possession of cocaine (§ 893.-13(l)(f), Fla.Stat. (1991)). He challenges his convictions on evidentiary and constitutional grounds. We find no merit in appellant’s evidentiary argument, but agree with him that his conviction under section 893.13(l)(i) must be vacated since the Florida Supreme Court has held that statute unconstitutionally vague.
Appellant first argues that admission of his codefendant Hill’s statement violated Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). However, the incident complained of could not be a Bruton violation. Bruton prohibits as hearsay the admission of a codefendant’s confession or statement that implicates the defendant.- The officer’s testimony concerning Hill’s statement here was not hearsay, however, since the testimony was not introduced for its truth, but to show its effect on appellant. It was properly admissible as verbal acts since it served to prove the nature of the act or transaction. See Decile v. State, 516 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Araujo v. State, 452 So. 2d 54, 56 n. 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Contrast Harris v. State, 544 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). The officer was merely relating what he saw and heard to show that appellant participated in the offense. The complained-of testimony, based on the officer’s presence at the scene, was as follows:
Okay. Basically he (Hill) asked what I needed, what was I looking for. I told him I was looking for a dime, that is $10 worth of cocaine. And then he asked me, “Powder?” And I said, “Sure if you have it but I only have $9.” He says, “That’s no problem,” At that point—
At which point he turned away from my car and he started walking to — there’s a building right here and he met Mr. Stevens which was standing right here. As he was walking over to the car I heard him yell out “I need a dime” to Mr. Stevens in this direction.
Okay, when Mr. Hill met Mr. Stevens, Mr. Hill was standing approximately right here side-by-side with Mr. Stevens. Um, I saw Mr. Stevens reach into his pocket, I don’t — I’m not sure which one, and grab a whole bunch of plastic baggies; at which point he gave Mr. Hill one, put the rest back in his pocket, then Mr. Hill came back to me.
Clearly, Hill’s yelling out, “I need a dime,” was not offered for the truth (that Hill needed a dime), but to show that appellant was a participant and acknowledged Hill’s statement by acting on it. Appellant’s participation could not have been demonstrated any other way. Since the testimony was not offered for its truth, it is not hearsay, and cannot violated the Bruton rule. We, accordingly, affirm appellant’s convictions for delivery of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and possession of cocaine.
We agree with appellant as to his second point, however. The Supreme Court has found section 893.13(l)(i) unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Brown v. State, 629 So. 2d 841 (Fla.1994). Accordingly, we vacate appellant’s conviction for delivery of cocaine within 200 feet of a public housing facility.
FRANK, C.J., and PARKER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Anthony Banks v. State, 790 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2001)…PER CURIAM. We have for review Banks v. State, 755 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), which expressly and directly conflicts with Consalvo v. State, 697 So. 2d 805 (Fla.1996), Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1982), and Stevens v. State, 642 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons set forth below, we quash the district court’s decision and hold that Banks is entitled to a new trial because of the erroneous admission and use of hearsay…1 / 2
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Arguelles v. State, 842 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…For example, the statements “I need eight” followed by the response “[n]o problem, come inside, I get you rocks,” were verbal acts because they constituted part of the underlying transaction. See Decile, 516 So. 2d at 1139-40; also Stevens v. State, 642 So. 2d 828, 829 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (“I need a dime.”). On the other hand, a statement to a police officer that a specific person is dealing cocaine at a specific place is not a verbal act because it is not part of the [*943] transaction. See Harris, 544 So. 2d…1 / 2
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Anthony Banks v. State, 755 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…statements.” Id. at 1140. In simpler terms, it was not important whether the informant actually “need [*144] ed eight,” what was significant was De-cile’s verbal and non-verbal response and conduct after hearing that statement. In Stevens v. State, 642 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), which is materially indistinguishable from the case at hand, an undercover police officer had a conversation with a man named Hill who asked him what he was looking for. The police officer responded that he was looking for a dime…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (U.S. 1968)
- Brown v. State, 629 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1994)
- Bartelmy Harris v. State, 544 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Destine Decile v. State, 516 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- del Risco v. JEM Constr. Corp., 452 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)