DEVINDAR MARAJ, PETITIONER,
v.
NORMA MARAJ, RESPONDENT
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A Florida court denied a husband's petition for certiorari challenging the trial court's refusal to dismiss or abate a dissolution action filed by the wife in Florida, despite the husband's prior filing of a divorce suit in Trinidad and Tobago. The appellate court held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion under comity principles by considering the parties' substantial connections to Florida and the broader relief available under Florida law.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Although Florida courts generally acknowledge priority in favor of foreign courts first exercising concurrent jurisdiction, the trial court properly exercised its discretion here by considering the parties' substantial connections to Florida, the location of their children, property, and business interests, and the broader relief available under Florida law.
[1] Florida courts generally acknowledge priority in favor of foreign courts first exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
[2] A trial court retains discretion in applying comity principles, even when a foreign court has concurrent jurisdiction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Generally, Florida courts will acknowledge priority in favor of foreign courts first exercising concurrent jurisdiction.”
Establishes the general comity principle that Florida courts defer to foreign courts with priority
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were initially domiciled in Trinidad and Tobago, but both have resided in Florida since 1987. They have five children, with only one resid…
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STONE, Judge.
Petition for writ of certiorari denied.
The husband seeks review of a trial court order denying his motion to dismiss, or abate, the pending Florida dissolution action filed by the wife and declining to defer, as a matter of comity, to a divorce suit previously filed by the husband in Trinidad and Tobago.
Generally, Florida courts will acknowledge priority in favor of foreign courts first exercising concurrent jurisdiction. E.g. Norris v. Norris, 573 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Reuther v. Reuther, 524 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 534 So. 2d 401 (Fla.1988); Robinson v. Royal Bank of Canada, 462 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Bedingfield v. Bedingfield, 417 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. dismissed, 427 So. 2d 736 (Fla.1983).
However, here, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision departed from the essential requirements of law. There remains a degree of trial court discretion in applying comity principles where supported, as here, by the record. Although the marital domicile was initially in Trinidad, the parties have resided in Florida since 1987. Only one of their five children resides in Trinidad. The parties own and operate a business and have substantial other property here. The Florida proceeding involves a multitude of issues including child support, temporary and permanent alimony, equitable distribution of marital assets, custody, possession of the marital home, and temporary and permanent attorney’s fees.
We recognize that the wife does not assert, nor is there any reason to believe, that deferring to a Trinidad court would result in injustice. Nevertheless, the trial court has discretion to accept the wife’s contention that the issues in the Trinidad action differ from those pled here, in that she seeks the more extensive relief afforded under chapter 61, Florida Statutes, and because the parties’ children, primary residences, property, and extensive business interests are located here. Cf. Siegel v. Siegel, 575 So. 2d 1267 (Fla.1991); Markofsky v. Markofsky, 384 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). In Siegel, the supreme court recognized that there are circumstances warranting a trial court’s denial of a stay, notwithstanding an earlier filing in another jurisdiction.
This is not a ease, such as Norris or Bedingfield, where the competing jurisdiction’s equal or overriding interest is apparent. In Norris, we also acknowledged Florida’s overriding interest in certain issues such as custody, visitation, and support. Furthermore, with respect to custody, support, and visitation issues, there is obviously no rational basis, where Florida’s jurisdiction is clear, to adopt a policy that recognizes a lesser state interest in maintaining jurisdiction, visa-vis the remote jurisdiction, than is afforded under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Section 61.1314, Florida Statutes.
Therefore, the petition is denied.
ANSTEAD and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.
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In re Guardianship OF Joseph Scott Morrison v. Morrison, 972 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…(Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Norris, 573 So. 2d at 1086. At least one court has found special circumstances in a dissolution action when primary residences, property, business interests, and most of the parties’ children were in Florida. See Maraj v. Maraj, 642 So. 2d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). In this case, the Florida court did not make any findings of special circumstances to explain its decision not to apply the principle of priority as a matter of comity. Instead, the court found that the New Jersey judgmen…
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Toth v. Toth, 359 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)…n, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). The exceptional circumstances which may support denying a stay include, for example, time-sensitive cases involving child custody, visitation, and support, or probate issues. See, e.g., Maraj v. Maraj, 642 So. 2d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (child custody, visitation, and support); Parker v. Estate of Bealer, 890 So. 2d 508, 512 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (probate). “In applying the principle of priority, the pivotal question is whether the second-filed action…
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Rainer Hasslacher v. Hasslacher, 664 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…ida Statutes (1993), cannot be met. Other cases involving resident aliens, political refugees, or those remaining illegally after the expiration of a visa are not on point. Even if Florida does have jurisdiction, I do not find that Maraj v. Maraj, 642 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), compels the result here. I would apply Siegel v. Siegel, 575 So. 2d 1267 (Fla.1991), and grant the writ, ordering that Florida proceedings be stayed, recognizing the priority of the German courts to resolve this marriage dissolu…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bedingfield v. Bedingfield, 417 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Siegel v. Siegel, 575 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1991)
- Gottlieb v. State, 462 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Hans J. Reuther v. Sigrid Reuther, 524 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 524 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Norris v. Norris, 573 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- Markofsky v. Gertrude Markofsky, 384 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)