KEITH MICHAEL RAGAN, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ragan sought review of a trial court's denial of his second Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court affirmed the denial, holding that the successive motion was procedurally barred as an abuse of process because Ragan failed to demonstrate that the grounds could not have been known at the time of his initial motion.
The court affirmed the denial of the successive motion as procedurally barred for abuse of process. A movant raising successive ineffective assistance claims must show the grounds were not known and could not have been known at the time of the initial motion; Ragan failed to meet this burden. Additionally, even on the merits, Ragan failed to show the trial outcome would have differed with further investigation.
[1] A defendant cannot raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on a piecemeal basis by filing successive motions.
[2] A trial court may deny a successive motion for postconviction relief raising additional grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel if abuse of process is evident.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where an initial motion for postconviction relief raises the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court may deny a successive motion which raises additional grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel if abuse of process is evident.”
Establishes the legal framework for evaluating successive ineffective assistance motions and the abuse of process doctrine
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRagan filed a second Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. His first motion, denied on May 19, 1994…
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BARKDULL, Judge.
Appellant seeks review of the trial court’s denial of a 3.850 motion for posteonviction relief.
, This is appellant’s second motion for post-eonviction relief. Prior to the instant motion, appellant filed a 3.850 motion in which he alleged that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. That motion was denied by the trial court on May 19, 1994. In the motion sub judice, appellant once again complains that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. However, in this motion appellant raises new grounds to support the allegation. Specifically, appellant complains that had counsel conducted an adequate investigation he would have discovered that the state did not have enough evidence to prove a prima facie case of the crimes charged. In turn, appellant urges that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been aware of this claim.
Appellant fails to recognize that he cannot raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on a piecemeal basis by filing successive motions. Francis v. Barton, 581 So. 2d 583 (Fla.1991) cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1245, 111 S.Ct. 2879, 115 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1991); Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla.1991).
Where an initial motion for posteon-viction relief raises the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court may deny a successive motion which raises additional grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel if abuse of process is evident. Card v. Dugger, 512 So. 2d 829 (Fla.1987).
To overcome this bar, the movant must allege that the grounds asserted were not known and could not have been known at the time of the initial motion. Christopher v. State, 489 So. 2d 22, 24 (Fla.1986).
Although appellant alleges the discovery of new facts in order to avoid application of the abuse of process doctrine, he has failed to demonstrate that the facts could not have been known to him at the time of his earlier motion. Having failed to show any justification for his failure to raise the present claims in his initial posteonviction motion, the instant motion constitutes abuse of process. See Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455 (Fla.1992); Spaziano v. State, 545 So. 2d 843 (Fla.1989); Tafero v. State, 524 So. 2d 987, 988 (Fla.1987); Booker v. State, 503 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla.1987); Christopher, 489 So. 2d at 25.
Thus, appellant’s motion is procedurally barred. Even if there were no procedural bar, appellant’s claim would not succeed. Assuming that the allegations are true, appellant has not shown that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the public defender conducted further investigation. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). According to the facts recited in appellant’s motion, the evidence was sufficient to support a prima facie case of the crimes charged.
Therefore, the trial judge’s denial of the motion is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Cited By (21 total)
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McCONN v. State, 708 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…ure to include the issues in the prior motion. See Preston v. State, 528 So. 2d 896 (Fla.1988) (trial court properly declined to rule on issues raised in motions filed after the movant had an evidentiary hearing on his 3.850 motion); Ragan v. State, 643 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (successive motion constituted an abuse where movant failed to demonstrate facts to support his new claim could not have been known to him at the time of the prior motion); Torres v. State, 554 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (tria…
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Scott v. State, 656 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…t ruled all claims were legally insufficient and Scott appealed. The issues raised by Scott in this proceeding are in substance the same as those raised in his first 3.850 motion. As such, they are successive and must be denied. See Ragan v. State, 643 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Even if Scott’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were different this time around, he would be barred from raising them on a piecemeal basis by filing successive motions. Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla.1991).…
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McKENLEY v. State, 937 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…hich he argued ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied his motion finding that the defendant cannot present grounds for post-conviction relief in a piecemeal fashion. See Francis v. State, 581 So. 2d 583 (Fla.1991); Ragan v. State, 643 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)(finding that, to overcome a bar on raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a piecemeal fashion by filing successive motions, the defendant must allege that the grounds asserted in a successive motion were not known…
Previewing 3 of 21 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984)
- Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1991)
- Tortoise Island Cmtys., Inc. v. The Moorings Ass'n, Inc., 489 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1986)
- Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1992)
- Francis v. Barton, 581 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1991)
- Card v. Dugger, 512 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1987)
- Booker v. State, 503 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1987)
- Spaziano v. State, 545 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1989)
- Tafero v. State, 524 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1987)
- Francis v. Singletary, 501 U.S. 1245 (U.S. 1991)