ROBERT TAYLOR THOMAS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1994-11-09
No. 94-304
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and LEVY, JJ.
644 So. 2d 352 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1994) Positive Treatment
Cited by 1 case

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Synopsis

Robert Taylor Thomas appealed his probation revocation sentence, arguing he was entitled to credit for time served during his initial arrest and while in a Day Reporting Program as a special probation condition. The court reversed and remanded for a hearing to determine whether Thomas was incarcerated during those periods and therefore entitled to time credit under Florida law.


Holding

While a defendant is not entitled to credit for time spent on probation, Florida law requires credit for any time a defendant is incarcerated before sentence if the defendant was confined in a governmental institution with liberty circumscribed to the functional equivalent of county jail custody. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine factually whether Thomas was incarcerated during the relevant periods.


Headnotes

[1] A court is required to award credit for any time during which a defendant is incarcerated before sentence.

[2] Incarceration, for purposes of sentence credit, is defined as confinement in a governmental institution where liberty is circumscribed to the functional equivalent of cou…

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Key Quotes

“While a defendant is not entitled to credit for time spent on probation, a court is required to award credit for any time during which a defendant is incarcerated before sentence.”

Establishes the controlling legal rule distinguishing probation time from incarceration time for credit purposes.

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Facts & Procedural History

Thomas initially received a five-year probation sentence with a special condition requiring 364 days custody: six months in a Day Reporting Program fo…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Robert Taylor Thomas initially received a sentence of five years probation in this case, with a special condition that Thomas serve 364 days in the county jail. The first six months were to be served in the “Day Reporting Program,” less any credit for time served, and at the expiration of that time, the remainder of the 364 days was to be served on “house arrest.” Thomas was taken into custody on February 2, 1993, some eight months later, on an allegation of violation of probation; Thomas remained in custody until the trial judge revoked his probation on November 30, 1993. On that date, the court sentenced him to five years, but allowed credit for time served since February 2, 1993. Thomas argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give him credit for the time he served upon his initial arrest and as a special condition of probation. The state concedes there is no record of the nature of Thomas’ earlier detainment.

While a defendant is not entitled to credit for time spent on probation, a court is required to award credit for any time during which a defendant is incarcerated before sentence. Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So. 2d 738 (Fla.1987); § 921.161, Fla.Stat. (1993). Incarceration, here, has been defined as a when defendant is confined in a governmental institution and his liberty is circumscribed to the functional equivalent of custody in the county jail. Fernandez v. State, 627 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), review denied, 639 So. 2d 977 (Fla.1994); see Sims v. State, 369 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1202 (Fla.1980). Due to the inadequate nature of the record on this issue, we remand this case for an evidentiary hearing at which the trial court must test the truth of Thomas’ allegations and make a factual determination as to whether Thomas was incarcerated and was therefore entitled to time credit.

Accordingly, the order under review is reversed and the cause remanded.


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Citator

Cited By

  • McCARTHY v. State, 689 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
    …luntary), rev. denied, 634 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1994). Incarceration has been defined confinement in a governmental institution such that a defendant’s liberty is circumscribed to the functional equivalent of custody in the county jail. Thomas v. State, 644 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), citing Fernandez v. State, 627 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), rev. denied, 639 So. 2d 977 (Fla.1994). A house arrest program in which the defendant wears an electronic bracelet used for monitoring his whereabouts, and checks with a…

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