TERRI DIANNE BRYANT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1994-09-02
No. 93-2457
HARRIS, C.J., and THOMPSON, J., concur.
644 So. 2d 513 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1994) Positive Treatment
Cited by 16 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Terri Bryant appeals her conviction and sentence for vehicular homicide and driving with a suspended license resulting in death. The court affirms, holding that her guilty plea to both counts was a valid bargained-for plea that waived any double jeopardy challenge.


Holding

The court affirms the conviction and sentence, holding that Bryant's plea was a valid bargained-for plea that waived any double jeopardy attack. The court rejects Bryant's argument that the plea was not truly bargained for because she remained within the same sentencing range, finding this argument lacks both legal and factual merit.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant waives a double jeopardy challenge to a plea-based conviction when the record reflects a bargained-for plea.

[2] A plea agreement is considered bargained-for even if the defendant remains within the same sentencing range.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“where the record reflects a bargained-for plea, any double jeopardy attack on the plea-based conviction is waived”

Establishes the governing legal principle from Novaton that controls the case

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Bryant struck and killed 13-year-old Christopher Johnson while driving. She was charged with DUI/manslaughter (second degree felony), vehicular homici…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
GRIFFIN, Judge.

GRIFFIN, Judge.

The court sua sponte files the following connected opinion:

Bryant appeals her judgement and sentence and the denial of her motioij to correct illegal sentence. We affirm.1

Bryant was charged by information with DUI/manslaughter,2 a second degree felony, vehicular homicide,3 a third degree felony, and driving with license suspended resulting in death or serious bodily injury,4 a third degree felony. These charges arose out of an incident where Bryant, while driving a motor vehicle, struck and killed 13 year old Christopher Johnson.

Bryant entered into a “best interests” plea to vehicular homicide and driving while license suspended resulting in death. As part of the plea agreement, the DUI manslaughter charge was nolle prossed.

During the plea colloquy, the defendant said she believed the plea to be in her best interest and she fully understood all the rights she gave up by entering the guilty plea.

Her scoresheet totaled 97 points for a permitted range sentence up to twelve years of incarceration. On September 7, 1993, Bryant was sentenced to five years incarceration on the vehicular homicide count and a consecutive term of five years on the driving with license suspended resulting in death count.

On September 23, 1993, Bryant filed a motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence. This motion alleged that under a double jeopardy analysis she could not be convicted of both the counts to which she pled. Bryant sought to have one of the two convictions and sentences vacated. The trial court denied the motion.

As the state correctly points out, this case is controlled by Novaton v. State, 634 So. 2d 607 (Fla.1994). There the court held that where the record reflects a bargained- for plea, any double jeopardy attack on the plea-based conviction is waived. After Novaton, appellant is reduced to arguing that the plea was not truly “bargained for” since she remained in the same sentencing range. This argument lacks legal merit since no case we have found suggests that a “bargained for plea” requires the courts to weigh the wisdom or sufficiency of consideration. It also lacks a factual basis. Had appellant elected to go through the cost and rigors of trial, she risked conviction of a higher degree felony with the attendant consequences of a section 316.193 conviction. We also observe that appellant did not seek to withdraw the plea. Based on this record, there is no basis to set aside a conviction for an offense to which the appellant pleaded guilty.

AFFIRMED.

HARRIS, C.J., and THOMPSON, J., concur. . As the lower court correctly noted, it was improper to assert this claim as a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 3.800, Sanders v. State, 621 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 629 So. 2d 135 (Fla.1993), State v. Spella, 567 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); however, as in those cases, we elect to affirm with an opinion that addresses the basis for the claim in order to save judicial labor. . See § 316.193(3), Fla.Stat. . See § 782.071, Fla.Stat. . See § 322.34(3), Fla.Stat. . As explained to Bryant by the lower court at the time of her plea:

"The State Attorney’s Office has agreed in exchange for your plea of guiliy to nol-pros at the time of sentencing count one, DUI manslaughter.”

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Wilfrid Metellus v. State, 817 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
    …ims as to the conviction and sentence are waived.”) (citations omitted); Colson v. State, 717 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Johnson v. State, 676 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Powell v. State, 657 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Bryant v. State, 644 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), rev. denied, 654 So. 2d 130 (Fla.1995); [*1013] see also Jones v. State, 711 So. 2d 633, 634 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) ("There was no plea bargain involved here; the double jeopardy violation is apparent from the record; and there is…
  • Lewis v. State, 827 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
    …o the conviction and sentence are waived.”) (citations omitted); Colson v. State, 717 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Johnson v. State, 676 [*1053] So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Powell v. State, 657 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Bryant v. State, 644 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), review denied, 654 So. 2d 130 (Fla.1995). Even if the plea agreement was not bargained for, Lewis is precluded from challenging her convictions based on a double jeopardy violation because she did not reserve the right to appeal…
  • Collins v. State, 732 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
    …he facts. She argues that the plea agreement considered by the court in Novaton included the sentence the defendant was to receive, whereas the plea bargain here does not include a sentence. This is not a controlling difference. See Bryant v. State, 644 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)(holding that a similar distinction “lacks legal merit since no case we have found suggests that a ‘bargained for plea’ requires the courts to weigh the wisdom or sufficiency of consideration.”) rev. den. 654 So. 2d 130 (Fla.1995)…

Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw