CHARLIE EDWARD RODGERS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1994-10-11
No. 94-1030
ERVIN, BARFIELD and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.
645 So. 2d 20 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1994) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Charlie Edward Rodgers appealed a post-conviction relief denial after conviction for two counts of false application for a driver's license and fleeing police. The appellate court affirmed most of the trial court's denial but reversed on four claims relating to sentencing errors that were improperly found procedurally barred.


Holding

The court affirmed the trial court's denial of most claims but reversed and remanded on four issues: (1) the sentencing structure for counts I, II, and IV requiring reconsideration; (2) jail time credit entitlement; (3) habitualization under the allegedly unconstitutional 1989 version of the Habitual Offender Act; and (4) imposition of consecutive five-year mandatory minimums. These four claims could not be procedurally barred because sentencing errors causing unlawful restraint may be heard in any manner.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must reconsider claims regarding the concurrency of sentences when the sentencing documents are ambiguous or misconstrued.

[2] Sentencing errors that result in a period of incarceration longer than legally permissible may be raised through any available legal avenue.

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Key Quotes

“a sentencing error which causes an individual to be restrained for a time longer than that allowed by law may be heard in any and every manner possible”

Establishes that sentencing errors extending unlawful restraint are not procedurally barred and can be raised in post-conviction relief regardless of direct appeal requirements.

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Facts & Procedural History

Rodgers was tried by jury and found guilty of two third-degree felonies for false driver's license applications (counts I and II) and a misdemeanor fo…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Charlie Edward Rodgers appeals an order of the Circuit Court for Duval County which denied his motion for post-conviction relief. We find that the trial court must give further consideration to some of appellant’s claims and accordingly we affirm in part and reverse in part.

Rodgers was tried by a jury and found guilty of two felonies, apparently two counts of false application for a driver’s license, a third-degree felony under section 322.212(5) and (6), Florida Statutes (counts I and II below).

He was also found guilty of fleeing a police officer, a misdemeanor, in the trial court’s count IV. He was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender to a ten-year term as to count I with a five-year minimum mandatory consecutive to count IV. The sentence itself was also ordered to run consecutive to count IV. His sentence for the second felony count was also ten years, to run concurrent with the sentence for count I but with an additional five-year minimum mandatory to be consecutive to that served in count I. The sentence for the misdemean-or in count IV was a term of one year with credit for 113 days of jail time.

In his claim number 4 in the motion for post-conviction relief, Rodgers argued that his sentences for counts II and IV should be concurrent because they arose from a single criminal episode. The trial court denied this claim, attaching copies of the sentencing documents and concluding that the sentences for counts I and II are concurrent. However, we read these sentencing documents to indicate that the sentences for counts I and II are to be served concurrently and consecutive to the sentence in count IV. We therefore find it necessary to reverse and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of this claim.

Rodgers’ claim number 5 concerned his entitlement to certain jail time credit. In claim number 10 he argued that he was habitualized for sentencing under the 1989 version of the Habitual Offender Act found unconstitutional in State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1993). He further contended that he could not have been habitualized under the earlier version of the act. In claim number 12, Rodgers argued that the imposition of consecutive five-year mandatory minimums was impermissible under Daniels v. State, 595 So. 2d 952 (Fla.1992).

The trial court denied each of these claims upon a finding that they could have been raised on direct appeal and they therefore were procedurally barred.

However, a sentencing error which causes an individual to be restrained for a time longer than that allowed by law may be heard in any and every manner possible. Jones v. State, 599 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

The trial court erred in finding these claims to be procedurally barred and we reverse and remand for further proceedings as to these four issues.

The remaining twelve claims presented below by the appellant were properly denied, either as procedurally barred or because the claims were facially insufficient. We therefore affirm the trial court’s disposition of those claims.

Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED and REMANDED in part for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

ERVIN, BARFIELD and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Brown v. State, 658 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
    …osed consecutive habitual sentences in violation of Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1993). We find that this allegation also raises a preliminary ground for relief pursuant to rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Rodgers v. State, 645 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Rosier v. State, 655 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). We remand to the trial court for [*660] further proceedings consistent with this opinion. WOLF and WEBSTER, JJ., concur. LAWRENCE, J., concurs in result only.…
  • Love v. State, 654 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
    …enhancement of habitual offender sentences under section 775.084(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1993). 630 So. 2d at 524-25. Appellant’s allegation of error in the trial court’s imposition of sentence is facially sufficient. See Hale; Rodgers v. State, 645 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). The trial court erroneously denied the claim as a matter of law and did not attach any portion of the record conclusively demonstrating that Love is not entitled to relief. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings co…
  • Rodgers v. State, 668 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
    …om a final order denying his motion for posteonvietion relief pursuant to rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. We find that the trial court should have treated the motion as a motion to enforce mandate in the case of Rodgers v. State, 645 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), and should have granted the motion. We, therefore, reverse and remand for the trial court to comply with the mandate from our previous case. In Rodgers v. State, supra, appellant appealed from a denial of his motion for post-co…

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