JOYCE ANN GARDNER, APPELLANT,
v.
DAVID ALLEN STOCK, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1994-10-21
No. 93-2364
W. SHARP, J., concurs., GOSHORN, J., dissents without opinion.
645 So. 2d 33 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1994) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Joyce Ann Gardner appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in part but vacated paragraph 14 concerning asset and debt distribution, remanding for the trial court to determine whether specific vehicles and liabilities are marital or non-marital property and to properly apply statutory factors in distributing marital assets.


Holding

The court vacated paragraph 14 and remanded for the trial court to determine whether the vehicles and liabilities are marital or non-marital and to apply the statutory factors in section 61.075(1) to justify asset distribution. The court affirmed the remainder of the judgment, rejecting the wife's other claims because she failed to raise them properly at trial or pursue appropriate procedural remedies.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must determine whether vehicles and liabilities are marital or non-marital assets in a dissolution of marriage judgment.

[2] A trial court must reference statutory factors to justify the distribution of marital assets in a dissolution of marriage judgment.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“Determine whether the vehicles and the liabilities set forth in paragraph 14 of the final judgment are marital or non-marital. Bussey v. Bussey, 611 So.2d 1354 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); § 61.075(3), Fla.Stat.”

The court's primary instruction on remand regarding proper classification of assets and application of statutory provisions.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the trial court entered a final judgment distributing marital assets and liabilities. The judgment included t…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PETERSON, Judge.

PETERSON, Judge.

Joyce Ann Gardner appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. We vacate only paragraph 14 of the final judgment and remand with instructions to the trial court to:

1. Determine whether the vehicles and the liabilities set forth in paragraph 14 of the final judgment are marital or non-marital. Bussey v. Bussey, 611 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); § 61.075(3), Fla.Stat. 2. Reference the factors listed in section 61.075(1) in order to justify the distribution of the marital assets. McMonagle v. McMonagle, 617 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).

We note that there is a disparity in the values of the automobiles awarded to each of the parties, that, on the advice of counsel, the husband withdrew $5400 from the parties’ joint bank account of which no portion was awarded to the wife, and that the tuition loan incurred by the wife during marriage may be a marital debt.

The appellant also claims that the court did not sign the Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) that she prepared post-judgment, that her alimony of $850 per month is inadequate because her basic expenses are $1200 per month, that the husband failed to answer interrogatories, that the trial judge was biased because he had been a student at the university where her husband was a professor, and for various other reasons. The appellant appeared pro se in all but the early portion of the dissolution proceedings. That probably explains why she failed to obtain a hearing date to obtain a QDRO, why she failed to inform the trial court that her basic expenses were $1200 per month and waited until this appeal to assert that amount, why she failed to move for sanctions when the husband failed to answer her interrogatories,1 and, if she felt so strongly about the alleged bias of the trial judge, why she failed to move for recusal.

The judgment is affirmed except that paragraph 14, which distributes the vehicles and the debt, is vacated. This cause is remanded for compliance with the instructions set forth above.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED.

W. SHARP, J., concurs.

GOSHORN, J., dissents without opinion.

. We note that an objection to appellant's interrogatories was made because the request for answers was not provided timely before trial. The objection was sustained.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Nichols v. Eicholtz, 750 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
    …titlement to damages under a quantum meruit theory which is an alternative theory of recovery to an action on an express contract. See Practice Management Associates, Inc. v. Bitet, 654 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Bodon Industries, Inc. v. Brown, 645 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Entropic Landscapes, Inc. v. Brown, 615 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).1 We reject appellee’s argument that the parties tried the unpled action on an express contract by implied consent because an unpled theory may not be tried…
  • Gardner v. Stock, 658 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
    …PER CURIAM. Joyce Ann Gardner appeals the amended final judgment of dissolution rendered by the trial court upon remand from this court’s mandate in Gardner v. Stock, 645 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). This court directed the trial court to: 1. Determine whether the vehicles and the liabilities set forth in paragraph 14 of the final judgment are marital or non-marital. Bussey v. Bussey, 611 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); §…
  • Cordis Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 678 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
    …ntractual expression of such an intent....” Hoskins v. Midland Ins. Co., 395 So. 2d 1159, 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 407 So. 2d 1104 (Fla.1981). Arising in a similar factual context, the Fifth District’s opinion in Bodon Indus., Inc. v. Brown, 645 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), is instructive in construing indemnity agreements of the kind here at issue! “The indemnity agreement ... between [Cordis] and [Baxter] merely protected [Cordis] against a surprise claim for a commission by a person unknown to […

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw