JOSE ARBOLEDA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jose Arboleda appealed his cocaine trafficking conviction, arguing the trial court erred by refusing to give part four of the standard jury instruction on trafficking, which requires proof of the defendant's intent to traffic. The court reversed, holding that the omitted instruction was reversible error because it addressed the heart of the defendant's case.
The trial court committed reversible error by failing to give part four of the standard jury instruction for cocaine trafficking. The omitted instruction went to the heart of the defendant's case because his testimony directly concerned his intent to traffic in cocaine, and he was entitled to a jury instruction on the theory of his defense when evidence supported it.
[1] Failure to give a standard jury instruction is reversible error when the omitted instruction goes to the heart of the defendant's case.
[2] A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the theory of his defense if there is evidence in the record to support it.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Part four was promulgated by the Supreme Court after the legislature amended section 983.12, Florida Statutes (1987). It specifies that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to sell, purchase, manufacture, deliver, bring into Florida or possess the specific substance alleged.”
Establishes what part four of the jury instruction requires—proof of intent to traffic in the specific substance.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCustoms inspectors intercepted a package from Colombia containing 666.9 grams of cocaine concealed in a marble pedestal. Law enforcement conducted a c…
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PER CURIAM.
Jose Arboleda appeals his conviction for trafficking in cocaine. He alleges as error the trial court’s failure to give part four of the standard jury instruction dealing with trafficking. For the following reasons, we reverse.
Evidence at trial showed that customs inspectors had intercepted a package from Colombia that contained a marble pedestal with 666.9 grams of cocaine concealed inside. Law enforcement officers set up a controlled delivery, and persuaded the defendant to come pick up the package. There was conflicting testimony about whether the defendant, when placing the package in his ear, would have been able to see the cocaine inside the pedestal. At trial, the defendant testified that he did not know there was cocaine in the package, that he was picking up the package only as a favor for his sister in Colombia, and that the pedestal was intended as a birthday present for the mother of his sister’s friend.
Over both prosecution and defense objections, the trial court refused to give the fourth part of the standard jury instruction for trafficking in cocaine. Part four was promulgated by the Supreme Court after the legislature amended section 983.12, Florida Statutes (1987). It specifies that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to sell, purchase, manufacture, deliver, bring into Florida or possess the specific substance alleged. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 233. Instead, the trial court gave the jury an instruction based on State v. Dominguez, 509 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1987), that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed cocaine.
The State argues on appeal that the elements of the crime were sufficiently covered by the first three parts of the standard jury instruction plus the Dominguez instruction on knowledge, and that the additional instruction would have only confused the jury. The trial court committed revers ible error when it failed to give part four of the standard jury instruction.
Failure to give a standard jury instruction is reversible error when the omitted standard jury instruction goes to the heart of the defendant’s case. See Pieczynski v. State, 516 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (“It is axiomatic that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the theory of his defense if there is evidence in the record to support it.”) (citations omitted); see also McCoy v. State, 493 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Davis v. State, 254 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). Here, the defendant’s testimony directly concerned his intent to traffic in cocaine. This court also previously has noted that the 1987 amendment to section 983.12 may well have abrogated the Dominguez rule, Ledo v. State, 587 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), contradicting the State’s argument that the crime’s elements were sufficiently covered by the instructions given.
Because the trial court committed reversible error in the failure to give a portion of the standard jury instruction for trafficking in cocaine1, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
. In view of oUr reversal, we do not reach defendant’s remaining point.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Hosnedl v. State, 126 So. 3d 400 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…discretion standard.” Larsen v. State, 82 So. 3d 971, 974 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). “Failure to give a standard jury instruction is reversible error when the omitted standard jury instruction goes to the heart of the defendant’s case.” Arboleda v. State, 645 So. 2d 48, 50 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury on justifiable use of deadly force, and declined to instruct the jury on justifiable use of non-deadly force, including defense of property. The requested standard ins…
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Radler v. State, 290 So. 3d 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)…We agree. “Failure to give a standard jury instruction is reversible error when the omitted standard jury instruction goes to the heart of the defendant’s case.” Hosnedl v. State, 126 So. 3d 400, 403 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Arboleda v. State, 645 So. 2d 48, 50 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)). Although we could find no case law that specifically addresses the standard to be applied in assessing state of mind in the context of non-deadly force, we agree with the State that, similar to the context of deadly force,…
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Cunningham v. State, 676 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…justify citation.” White v. State, 324 So. 2d 115, 116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. dismissed, 339 So. 2d 1173 (1976). We find that the jury instructions given adequately covered the issue addressed in the requested instructions. In Arboleda v. State, 645 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), this court addressed factual circumstance very similar to those in the instant case. There the defendant picked up a package from Colombia as a favor to his sister. The package contained a marble pedestal which, in turn, had 666.…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Dominguez, 509 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1987)
- Pieczynski v. State, 516 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- McCOY v. State, 493 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Echols v. State, 254 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)
- Davis v. State, 254 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Augustine Antonio Ledo v. State, 587 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)