DANIEL RENFROE, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, DEFENDANT IN ERROR

Fla. | 1918-10-26
Taylor, Whitfield and Ellis, J. J., concur., West, J., disqualified.
76 Fla. 392 Florida Supreme Court (1918) Caution
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

Daniel Renfroe was convicted of killing a sheep, but the jury verdict failed to include the essential element of willfulness and malice required by Florida law. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the verdict was a nullity because it did not describe any offense known to Florida law.


Holding

The verdict was a nullity because it failed to include the essential element of willfulness and malice required by the indictment. A verdict that merely finds the defendant guilty of killing a sheep belonging to another, without these elements, does not describe any offense known to Florida law and is therefore invalid.


Key Quotes

“This fails to state any offense known to the laws of Florida, and the verdict is a nullity. The defendant was charged with "wilfully and maliciously" killing a beast belonging to another person, and without the essential element of wilfulness and malice the killing constituted no offense.”

Establishes the core holding that a verdict lacking essential elements of the crime is void

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Facts & Procedural History

Renfroe was indicted in Santa Rosa County under two separate indictments for unlawfully, willfully, and maliciously killing an ewe sheep. The first in…

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Opinion of the Court
Browne, C. J.

Browne, C. J.

Two indictments were found in Santa Rosa County against the plaintiff in error, Daniel Renfroe, for unlawfully, wilfully and maliciously killing one ewe sheep. . In one indictment the ownership of the sheep Avas laid in George Allen, and in the other in Leslie Allen, Tom Allen, Leon Allen and Ray Allen. By agreement of counsel the two cases AATere merged into one trial and the following verdicts rendered: “Indictment No. 1 Ave the jury find the defendant guilty of killing one ewe sheep belonging to George Allen of the first indictment. J. LL .Tomkins,. foreman.” “Indictment No. 2. We, the jury, find the defendant not guilty of killing Leslie Allen, Tom Allen, Leon Allen, Ray Allen’s ewe sheep, sign J. H. Tomkins, Foreman for No. 1, 2.”

It is contended that the verdict which found the defendant guilty, described no offense known to the laws of Florida, and that it was not responsive to the indictment. Had the verdict found the defendant “guilty” or “guilty as charged in the indictment,” it would have been sufficient. Instead of this the jury set out the offense of which they found the defendant guilty, to-wit, “killing one ewe sheep belonging to George Allen of the first indictment.” This fails to state any offense known to the laws of Florida, and the verdict is a nullity. The defendant was charged with “wilfully and maliciously” killing a beast belonging to another person, and without the essential element of wilfulness and malice the killing constituted no offense. The jury merely found that the defendant killed a sheep belonging to another, which without other circumstances is not an offense known to our law.

The principle upon which this decision rests was enunciated and settled in the cases of Harris v. State, 53 Fla. 37, 43 South. Rep. 311, and O’Neal v. State, 54 Fla. 96, 44 South. Rep. 940.

In the Harris case the defendant was prosecuted under an information charging him with “receiving stolen goods knowing the same to have been stolen.” The verdict was, “We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of receiving stolen goods, so say we all,” and this court held that the verdict was not responsive to the charge and was not consistent therewith, and failed to find everything that is necessary to enable the court to render judgment, and further said: “The jury attempted to find him guilty on the second count. The second count charged the defendant with the crime of buying, receiving and aiding in the concealment of stolen property, knowing the same to have been stolen, as provided in Section 3304 of the General Statutes of 1892. An essential element of this crime is the knowledge, on the part of the party charged, that the property received was stolen. This essential element of knowledge was not included in the verdict rendered by the jury in this case.

“The Jury did not find the defendant guilty of having this knowledge that the goods received by him were stolen goods. There is no such crime known to the laws of Florida. It is no offense to receive stolen goods, unless the person so receiving them knows them to have been stolen. The court could not legally punish the defendant for the offense found in the verdict. The verdict is a nullity. No legal judgment or sentence can be predicated upon it.”

The mere killing of a sheep belonging to another Is not an offense under the laws of this State, and that is all that the jury found the defendant guilty of.

The verdict being a nullity, the defendant’s motion to set it aside should have been granted, and the refusal of the court to do so is reversible error. It is not necessary to discuss the assignments based upon the admission of testimony in relation of the killing of the defendant’s dog. This testimony was immaterial and irrelevant, and on another trial of this cause, should be excluded.

The judgment is reversed.

Taylor, Whitfield and Ellis, J. J., concur. West, J., disqualified.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Licata v. State, 81 Fla. 649 (Fla. 1921)
    …ndictment. It is conceded that but for the language “as charged in the information” contained in the verdict it is fatally defective. Harris v. State, 53 Fla. 37, 43 South. Rep. 311; O’Neal v. State, 54 Fla. 96, 44 South. Rep. 940; Renfroe v. State, 76 Fla. 392, 80 South. Rep. 183; Stedman v. State, 80 Fla. 547, 86 South. Rep. 428. [*651] The plea of not guilty puts in issue every material element of the crime charged in the information, and before a jury is warranted in returning a general verdict of guil…
  • Stedman v. State, 80 Fla. 547 (Fla. 1920)
    …eld to have waived such issue.” The verdict of the jury is defective in that it is not responsive to the charge against defendant, and for that reason the judgment must be reversed. Harris v. State, 53 Fla. 37, 43 South. Rep. 311; Renfroe v. State, 76 Fla. 392, 80 South. Rep. 183. At common law abandonment by or neglect of a husband to support his wife was not a criminal offense. 21 Cyc. 1611. The statutes therefore making such acts indictable and punishable as a crime must be strictly construed. “Withhol…
  • Channell v. State, 107 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
    …appellant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the joinder of offenses in the separate counts. As tc the sufficiency of the verdicts rendered, appellant contends that the opinion of this court conflicts with the cases of Renfroe v. State, 1918, 76 Fla. 392, 80 So. 183; and Harris v. State, 1907, 53 Fla. 37, 43 So. 311. The court has already distinguished and shown the inapplicability of the Harris case to the verdict in the present case. The Renfroe case, too, may be distinguished. In that case the ve…

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