JOHNNY MARK GOSHAY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Goshay appeals denial of a Rule 3.800(a) motion for sentence correction, challenging consecutive habitual offender sentences imposed for crimes committed during a single criminal episode. The court agrees that consecutive habitual offender sentences violate Florida law when the underlying offenses occur during one criminal episode and reverses.
Consecutive habitual felony offender sentences for offenses committed during a single criminal episode are illegal. The habitual offender statute itself provides the enhanced punishment for repeat felony offenders; imposing consecutive sentences on top of that enhancement constitutes reversible error.
[1] A trial court commits reversible error when it imposes consecutive habitual felony offender sentences for offenses committed during a single criminal episode.
[2] When a sentencing court uses the habitual offender statute to enhance sentences for offenses that occur during a single criminal episode, the court may not further enhanc…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a sentencing court uses the habitual offender statute to enhance sentences for offenses that occur during a single criminal episode, the court may not further enhance the penalties by ordering that the individual sentences be served consecutively.”
Statement of the governing legal rule that dispositive in this case
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn February 7, 1990, Goshay struck a police officer in the face and chest during a frisk attempt, was arrested for resisting with violence, and was fo…
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SHIVERS, Senior Judge.
Johnny Mark Goshay appeals the trial court’s order denying his Rule 3.800(a) Motion for Correction of Sentence. Specifically, Goshay argues that his consecutive habitual offender sentences are illegal because they were imposed for acts occurring during a single criminal episode. We agree and reverse.
On February 20, 1990, Goshay was charged in a single information with possession of cocaine, resisting an officer with violence, and possession of paraphernalia. All of the offenses occurred on February 7,1990. According to the stipulation of facts introduced at Goshay’s plea hearing, Goshay struck a police officer in the face and chest after the officer attempted to frisk him. Go-shay was then subdued and arrested for resisting an officer with violence. The officer then searched Goshay’s jacket, finding a crack cocaine smoking pipe, which contained cocaine, and a cleaning rod for the pipe.
Goshay subsequently pled nolo contendere to the offenses of possession of cocaine (Count I), resisting an officer with violence (Count II), and possession of drug paraphernalia (Count III). He was adjudicated guilty and sentenced as an habitual felony offender to 10 years in prison for Count I, 10 years in prison for Count II (to run consecutive to the sentence for Count I), and one year in jail for Count III (to run concurrent to the sentences in Count I and II).
When a sentencing court uses the habitual offender statute to enhance sentences for offenses that occur during a single criminal episode, the court may not further enhance the penalties by ordering that the individual sentences be served consecutively. Brooks v. State, 630 So. 2d 527 (Fla.1993); Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1993). In Hale, the Florida Supreme Court noted that the enactment of the habitual offender statute satisfied the legislature’s intent to provide for longer terms of incarceration for repeat felony offenders. 630 So. 2d at 524. The Court further noted that
[w]e find nothing in the language of the habitual offender statute which suggests that the legislature also intended that, once the sentences from multiple crimes committed during a single criminal episode have been enhanced through the habitual offender statutes, the total penalty should then be further increased by ordering that the sentences run consecutively.
Id. Accordingly, a trial court commits reversible error when it imposes consecutive habitual felony offender sentences for offenses committed during a single criminal episode. Walker v. State, 636 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Dietrich v. State, 635 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
Because the offenses for which Go-shay was convicted arose out of a single criminal episode, the trial court erred in both enhancing Goshay’s sentences by use of the habitual offender statute and imposing the sentence for Count II to run consecutive to the sentence for Count I. Accordingly, the trial court’s order denying Goshay’s Rule 3.800(a) motion should be reversed and the case remanded with directions that the sentence for Count II be imposed to run concur rently with the sentences imposed in Counts I and III.
MICKLE, J., concurs.
LAWRENCE, J., concurs in result only.
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Brown v. State, 652 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…e probation order, requiring Brown to pay the $240 to First Step of Volusia County, Inc., was improperly imposed. This court recently considered this issue en banc and held that the imposition of costs to First Step is improper. See Tibero v. State, 646 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Further, the court’s oral pronouncement was for court costs in the amount of $225, while special condition 29 orders Brown to pay court costs in the amount of $255. Upon remand, the award of court costs in the amount of $255 as…
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Norris v. State, 659 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…rtunity to reimpose the lien upon compliance with section 27.56(7) and with rule 3.720(d)(1). Finally, we strike the imposition of a payment of $60 to First Step of Volusia County because no statutory basis exists for this payment. Tibero v. State, 646 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (en banc). JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; SENTENCE REVERSED and REMANDED for resen-tencing consistent with this opinion. W. SHARP, J., concurs. DAUKSCH, J., dissents with opinion. . §§ 784.03, 784.07(2), Fla.Stat. (1993). . § 39.061, Fl…
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Johnson v. State, 648 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…on the part of the trial judge has been shown in this ease for not permitting Johnson to withdraw his plea.2 However, we strike the $60.00 fee for First Step because there is no statutory authority for the imposition of this cost. Tibero v. State, 646 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Eckenrode v. State, 638 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Gedeon v. State, 636 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Botts v. State, 634 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). In all other respects the judgment and sentence is AFFIRMED. COBB…
Previewing 3 of 56 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993)
- Brooks v. State, 630 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 1993)
- Dietrich v. State, 635 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- City OF Miami v. Bell, 636 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)