ROBERT MASON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Robert Mason appeals his sentencing as a habitual violent felony offender, arguing the sentencing court violated a substantial assistance agreement that would have resulted in a guidelines sentence. The appellate court vacates the sentence due to inadequate record-keeping regarding the alleged agreement violations and remands for a new sentencing hearing with a complete record.
The court held that the substantial assistance agreement is enforceable even though not physically incorporated into the written plea, as long as its terms are certain and ascertainable at the time of the plea. However, the sentence is vacated because the record does not contain sufficient information to determine whether Mason actually violated the agreement.
[1] A substantial assistance agreement executed by both parties is enforceable even if not physically incorporated into the written plea agreement, provided its terms are cer…
[2] A court cannot affirm a sentence when the record on appeal is insufficient to determine whether the defendant violated a substantial assistance agreement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because we are unable to affirm on this record, we vacate the sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.”
The court's holding that the inadequate record requires vacation and remand, establishing the central issue on appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMason pled guilty to two counts of armed robbery in exchange for a guidelines sentence, conditioned on compliance with a "substantial assistance" agre…
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GRIFFIN, Judge.
Robert Mason (“Mason”) timely appeals his sentencing as a habitual violent felony offender. Because we are unable to affirm on this record, we vacate the sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
Mason pled guilty to two counts of armed robbery in exchange for a guidelines sentence. The sentence was conditioned on Mason’s compliance with a “substantial assistance” agreement he executed with the state. In the event of noncomplianee, the agreement provided that Mason would be habitual-ized as a violent felony offender. Mason’s threshold argument, which we reject, is that the substantial assistance agreement is unenforceable because it was not made part of the written plea. See McCoy v. State, 599 So. 2d 645, 649 (Fla.1992). The plea colloquy reveals that the plea expressly required compliance with a substantial assistance agreement that had been executed by both parties. The terms of the agreement can be determined by reference to the document and there is no requirement that it be incorporated into the plea. The McCoy court plainly intended that the terms of the substantial assistance agreement be certain and ascertainable as of the time of the plea, not necessarily that they physically be a part of the plea. 599 So. 2d at 647-649.
The record of the sentencing hearing indicates that Mason did violate his substantial performance agreement in one or, perhaps, two material respects. Although all concerned evidently had copies of the agreement at the hearing, it was not made a part of the record at sentencing and we have been unable to divine with certainty its terms from the record on appeal. It is impossible for this court to tell whether, as the state asserts, Mason violated the agreement by the manner in which he testified at the trial of his co-defendant and whether the statement Mason gave to the prosecutor was a substantial violation of his obligation to give a “sworn and truthful statement.” The statement Mason gave to the prosecutor also was not made a part of the record, so that we are unable to compare the statement with Mason’s obligations under the agreement.
Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing that will create a record adequate to determine on appellate review whether appellant is entitled to the benefits of the substantial assistance agreement.
HARRIS, C.J., and W. SHARP, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Wilfrid Metellus v. State, 817 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…DCA 1999), stated, "In order to ensure that there are no misunderstandings between the parties, the terms of the agreement should be clearly set forth in the contract or discussed at the plea hearing." (Emphasis added). Likewise, in Mason v. State, 646 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), this court ruled that a substantial assistance agreement was enforceable, notwithstanding that it was not made a part of the written plea agreement, where the plea colloquy revealed that the plea expressly required compliance wi…
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Mason v. State, 677 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…n an earlier appeal. In the first appeal this court found the record [*101] on appeal failed to provide a basis from which this court could determine whether Mason was entitled to the benefits of his substantive assistance agreement. Mason v. State, 646 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). It is from the re-imposition of the sentence upon remand that this appeal now arises. The record now contains a “Memorandum of Substantial Assistance Agreement.” Pursuant to this agreement, Mason was to make himself available f…
Authorities Cited
- McCOY v. State, 599 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1992)