JAMES JOHN HUFF, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James John Huff was convicted of multiple crimes including RICO violations, grand theft, and securities fraud related to selling unregistered investment securities. The appellate court reversed convictions for crimes requiring specific intent because the trial court improperly excluded evidence that Huff relied on counsel's advice, while affirming convictions for strict liability securities crimes where such advice is irrelevant.
The court affirmed Huff's convictions for strict liability securities crimes (sale of security by unregistered dealer, sale of unregistered security) where advice of counsel is irrelevant because scienter is not an element. The court reversed convictions for specific intent crimes (conspiracy to commit RICO, organized scheme to defraud, first-degree grand theft, grand theft, and fraudulent transaction in sale of security) because advice of counsel can be a valid defense to such crimes and the trial court erred in precluding this evidence.
[1] Advice of counsel can be a valid defense to specific intent crimes.
[2] Reliance on advice of counsel is not a defense to strict liability crimes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Advice of counsel can be a valid defense to specific intent crimes.”
Establishes the legal principle that distinguishes strict liability from specific intent crimes regarding the admissibility of reliance on counsel as a defense
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHuff was president of Ashley Financial Corporation, which sold investment interests (initially characterized as 'fractionalized mortgages' and later s…
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PATTERSON, Judge.
James John Huff (Huff) was charged with RICO violations, conspiracy to commit RICO, organized scheme to defraud, operating a boiler room, twelve counts of first-degree grand theft, five counts of grand theft, fifty-four counts of sale of a security by an unregistered dealer, fifty-four counts of sale of unregistered security, and fifty-four counts of fraudulent transaction in the sale of a security. He was acquitted of operating a boiler room and convicted of the balance of the charges. Because the trial court precluded Huff from presenting his defense to the jury that he relied upon the advice of counsel, we reverse his convictions for the crimes requiring specific intent, and we affirm his convictions for the strict liability crimes.
Huff was the president of Ashley Financial Corporation (Ashley). Ashley developed apartment buildings and affordable housing in Collier County. It attracted investors by advertising a rate of return of 18% to 21%. The investment was to be secured by a first mortgage on the property to be developed. The state characterized the investment as “fractionalized mortgages,” since several investors would jointly hold a single mortgage.
In January 1986, the office of the state comptroller determined that these “fraction-alized mortgages” were securities. Since Ashley did not register the securities or employ a licensed securities dealer, the comptroller compelled Ashley to stop selling these investments. No criminal charges were brought at that time. Ashley then began selling its stock in place of the mortgage interests. It was likewise unauthorized to sell stock. At this juncture, the comptroller referred the case for prosecution.
In a pretrial proceeding, the state moved in limine to preclude Huff from presenting any evidence that he had relied on advice of counsel with regard to the sale of the mortgage interests. The judge granted the motion as to the offenses relating to the unauthorized sale of securities, which are strict liability crimes, and denied the motion as to the balance of the charges. This ruling was correct because scienter is not an element of security law violations. State v. Houghtaling, 181 So. 2d 636 (Fla.1965). It was irrelevant whether Huffs violation of the securities laws was the result of erroneous legal advice.
At a subsequent hearing before a successor judge, the state renewed its motion in limine and the successor judge, without explanation, granted the motion as to all the charges. This was error. Advice of counsel can be a valid defense to specific intent crimes. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Lazzam Oil Co., 601 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); United States v. Dyer, 750 F.Supp. 1278 (E.D.Ya.1990). We therefore affirm Huffs convictions for RICO,1 sale of a security by an unregistered dealer, sale of an unregistered security and reverse and remand for new trial the convictions for conspiracy to commit RICO, organized scheme to defraud, first-degree grand theft, grand theft, and fraudulent transaction in the sale of a security.
FRANK, C.J., and ALTENBERND, J., concur. . The RICO charge was predicated on both strict liability crimes and specific intent crimes. Even without the specific intent crimes, there are sufficient predicate acts to support the RICO conviction.
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State v. Lorette Franchi, 746 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…ic intent and that the undisputed facts established a “misadvice of counsel” defense, the trial court dismissed the information. Both parties agree that advice of counsel can constitute a valid defense to a specific intent crime. See Huff v. State, 646 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). They disagree, however, on whether aiding escape is a general intent or specific intent crime. The state further argues that intent, whether general or specific, is a jury question not properly addressed in a sworn motion to dism…
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Beshore v. Dep't OF Fin. Servs., 928 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…no need to read a knowledge element into section 626.901(1) to preserve the principle that misconduct must be personal to the licensee. We also note that even in some criminal matters, scienter is not always a requirement. See, e.g., Huff v. State, 646 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that scienter was not an element of a statute prohibiting the unauthorized sale of securities); Love v. State, 584 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (holding that scienter was not an element of a statute prohibiting, the poss…
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Krupkin v. State, 119 So. 3d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…39-40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), we conclude he failed to carry his burden. Good faith reliance on the advice of counsel can be a defense to a specific intent crime. See generally Aversano v. State, 966 So. 2d 493, 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Huff v. State, 646 So. 2d 742, 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (same). Krupkin's testimony, at the motion hearing, that he relied on his lawyer’s advice in responding to the Department’s question did not establish ipso facto the reliance was in good faith. Krupkin said his lawyer told hi…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Houghtaling, 181 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 1965)
- Reliance Ins. Co. v. Lazzara OIL Co., 601 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)