PATRICIA J. DELISI, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, APPELLEE
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Patricia DeLisi was denied unemployment compensation benefits after her full-time job termination because she performed services at a video store business she co-owned, which the Unemployment Appeals Commission deemed disqualifying self-employment. The court reversed, holding that part-time expansion into a business that generates losses during interim job search does not constitute disqualifying self-employment under Florida law.
The court held that DeLisi qualifies as totally unemployed and is eligible for unemployment benefits. Self-directed work activity that increases only in time devoted during layoff from regular employment, with no indication it became the claimant's primary source of livelihood and unable to support the claimant, does not constitute disqualifying self-employment.
[1] A claimant is not disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits for self-employment if the self-directed activity does not become the individual's primar…
[2] Unemployment compensation law favors a flexible construction of the term "self-employment" when determining eligibility for benefits.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when self-directed work activity changes "only in that the individual devoted more time to it, sometimes full time, during the period of layoff from his regular employment, but there were no factors suggesting that the self-directed activity became the individual's primary source of livelihood ..., the activity does not constitute self-employment for purposes of unemployment compensation benefits."”
Establishes the controlling legal standard from Hartenstein for determining when expanded self-directed work during job search does not disqualify claimant from unemployment benefits
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDeLisi was employed full-time at Eaton Corporation from 1981 to 1993 until her discharge. She co-owned with her husband a video store that generated $…
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FRANK, Chief Judge.
Patricia DeLisi sought unemployment compensation after she was discharged from her full time job at Eaton Corporation, where she had been employed from 1981 to 1993. At the time of her termination, DeLisi was part owner, with her husband, of a video store, which generated no income for the couple and in fact resulted in a loss. During her tenure with Eaton DeLisi worked part time in the store, but she expanded her hours to full time while looking for other permanent employment. DeLisi did perform substantial services for a business that grossed $2,500 per month and from that fact alone, the Unemployment Appeals Commission determined that she was not “totally unemployed” as that term is used in section 443.036(32)(a), Florida Statutes (1993). The Commission denied her claim for benefits. We reverse.
Our decision in Hartenstein v. Florida Dep’t of Labor and Employment Security, 391 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), controls this case. Hartenstein operated his own one-man accounting and tax return firm while working full time as a bookkeeper. When he was laid off from his bookkeeper job, he began looking for other full time employment, but in the interim he spent most of his time at his own business office. This court reversed the Commission, which had held that the claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits during the time he was self-employed but searching for other full time employment.
In Hartenstein this court decided that when self-directed work activity changes “only in that the individual devoted more time to it, sometimes full time, during the period of layoff from his regular employment, but there were no factors suggesting that the self-directed activity became the individual’s primary source of livelihood ..., the activity does not constitute self-employment for purposes of unemployment compensation benefits.” 391 So. 2d at 388. By adopting this rule in Hartenstein we exhibited a preference for a more flexible construction of the term “self-employment” and considered whether the claimant could support himself from his business. In this case DeLisi’s accountant testified that it was impossible for DeLisi to support herself from her work at the video store which, although generating income, yielded a loss rather than a profit.
In light of the foregoing, we reverse and vacate the order of the Unemployment Appeals Commission and remand this matter for entry of an order allowing DeLisi’s claim for benefits.
PATTERSON and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
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Momsen v. State, 706 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…“gross remuneration derived from work, professional service, or self-employment but does not include income derived from invested capital or ownership of property.” § 443.036(14), Fla. Stat. (1995). In DeLisi v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 646 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), this court held that DeLisi’s self-directed work activity did not constitute self-employment and did not disqualify her from receiving benefits. There, DeLisi and her husband owned a video store which generated $2,500 in revenue…
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Grover v. Brumell Investigations, Inc., 915 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…ss, even conceding Referee Riggins’s authority to reconsider the issue of whether Mr. Grover was unemployed and available for work, she erred when she applied the facts to the applicable law. This court, in DeLisi v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 646 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), examined a similar factual situation. When DeLisi was laid off from her job, she began working fulltime at a video store she co-owned with her husband. The store, however, was losing money, and she received essentially no wages.…
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Smith v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. & Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 852 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…om that work is “unemployed” pursuant to section 443.036(39), and therefore remains eligible to receive unemployment benefits. Momsen v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 706 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); DeLisi v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 646 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); see also § 443.111(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001) (providing [*299] for partial unemployment benefits when claimant earns income that is less than the amount of the weekly unemployment benefit).1 According to Mr. Smith, Bankers Life d…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hartenstein v. Fla. Dep't of Labor & Emp. Sec., 391 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)