FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, APPELLANT,
v.
WALTER D. SHEALY, III, APPELLEE
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The court held that an individual who prevailed in an administrative proceeding was not a "small business party" entitled to attorney's fees under section 57.111, Florida Statutes, because the corporation he owned was not a party to the proceeding.
[1] A party seeking attorney's fees under section 57.111, Florida Statutes, must qualify as a "small business party" as defined by the statute.
[2] Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, defines a qualifying small business party as a corporation, partnership, or sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, and does not…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Florida Real Estate Commission denied an individual's application for a real estate license. The individual challenged this denial and prevailed i…
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ALLEN, Judge.
The Florida Real Estate Commission appeals an order by which the appellee was awarded an attorney’s fee under section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Because the appel-lee was not a small business party as required by the statute, the appealed order must be reversed. The Commission initially denied the appel-lee’s application for a real estate sales license. The appellee challenged this action and prevailed in an administrative proceeding, eventually obtaining licensure. The appellee then sought a section 57.111 attorney’s fee, which may be recovered by a prevailing small business party. The appellee indicated that he desired the license for work which he intended to perform on behalf of a corporation wholly owned by himself and his spouse. However, the corporation was not a party to any of the proceedings below, and the appel-lee appeared in his individual capacity.
Section 57.111 authorizes an attorney’s fee for a qualifying small business party, which must be a corporation, a partnership, or a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business. See § 57.111(3)(d)l.a and b, Pla.Stat. This does not encompass individual employees. Department of Professional Regulation v. Toledo Realty, 549 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Thompson v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 533 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Although the appellee and the corporation were found to be “one and the same entity” based on the appellee’s control of the business, the statute does not permit such disregard of the corporate form.* The appellee was not a small business party as defined by the statute, and he thus should not have been awarded a section 57.111 attorney’s fee.
The appealed order is reversed.
BARFIELD and WOLF, JJ., concur. *
This case is unlike Ann & Jan Retirement Villa v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 580 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), where a corporation and its sole owner were described as “one and the same entity.” In Ann & Jan the corporation, rather than the individual, was awarded the attorney’s fee.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Daniels v. Fla. Dep't OF Health, 898 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 2005)…that Daniels had failed to allege sufficient facts to support her argument that she was a “small business party” within the definition of FEAJA. In the final order, the administrative law judge, relying on Florida Real Estate Commission v. Shealy, 647 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), stated that the action in the underlying case was brought against Daniels individually and not her corporation. Thus, he found that allowing her to seek' FEAJA fees for acts which she allegedly committed in her individual capaci…
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Daniels v. State, 868 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…on 57.111(3)(d). A review of the record shows that the administrative complaint was filed against the petitioner individually, rather than her corporation. On this basis, the ALJ’s denial of fees was proper. See Florida Real Estate Comm’n v. Shealy, 647 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Department of Profl Regulation, [*552] Div. of Real Estate v. Toledo Realty, Inc., 549 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Thompson v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 533 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Accordingly, we…
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Gonzalez v. State (11th Cir. Ct. App. Div. 2020)
Authorities Cited
- Dep't OF Prof'l Reg. v. Toledo Realty, Inc., 549 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Stokes v. State, 549 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- ANN & JAN Ret. Villa, Inc. v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 580 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- Ira W. Thompson v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 533 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)