STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, ON BEHALF OF CATHY L. DODGE, APPELLANT,
v.
DONALD M. DODGE, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Second District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's modification of a child support settlement agreement that unilaterally eliminated the father's obligation to pay support beyond age eighteen. The court held that the trial judge exceeded its authority by sua sponte modifying a settlement provision that neither party sought to change.
The trial court erred in modifying the settlement agreement's child support provision beyond age eighteen because that relief was neither requested by the parties nor contemplated by them. A trial court may only modify child support provisions in settlement agreements to the extent allowed under established standards, and cannot sua sponte remake agreements between parties.
[1] A trial court errs when it modifies a settlement agreement provision regarding child support beyond the age of eighteen when such relief was neither requested nor contemp…
[2] A party seeking a reduction in child support established in a settlement agreement must meet a "heavier burden" standard than a party seeking an increase.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The child support amount in a settlement agreement and incorporated in a final judgment of a dissolution of marriage is subject to modification by the court.”
Establishes that settlement agreements are modifiable but within limits
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCathy Dodge, the former wife, filed a petition to increase child support from $200 bi-weekly for two minor children. Donald Dodge, the former husband,…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Petition For Modification Of Child Support cases and more on FLexlaw
QUINCE, Judge.
Cathy Dodge, the former wife, asks this court to review an order of the trial court which modifies a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement requires the former husband, Donald M. Dodge, to pay child support while the child is in college, up to age twenty-one. The trial judge in making a modification of the amount of child support also changed this provision. We reverse that portion of the modification order since that relief was neither requested nor contemplated by the parties.
The former wife filed a petition for modification of child support, requesting an increase from the $200.00 bi-weekly she was receiving for the two minor children. The former husband filed a response to the petition but did not request a change in the settlement provision. The trial court entered a final order on modification increasing the support to $117.76 per week ($235.52 biweekly). Additionally, the order stated the husband’s child support obligation would continue until age eighteen, noting specifically he would not enforce the settlement agreement which called for support beyond the age of eighteen.
Appellant argues and we agree that the trial court erred in modifying appellee’s support obligation in that respect. The child support amount in a settlement agreement and incorporated in a final judgment of a dissolution of marriage is subject to modification by the court. The Florida Supreme Court in Tietig v. Boggs, 602 So. 2d 1250 (Fla.1992), indicated a party seeking an increase in the child support established in a settlement agreement need only demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances. However, a party seeking a reduction in that amount must meet the “heavier burden” standard articulated in Burdack v. Burdack, 371 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) and Lacy v. Lacy, 413 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
The change ordered by the trial court is the equivalent of a reduction in child support. As such, a party seeking such a reduction must demonstrate the need for same under the heavier burden standard. The former husband never requested such relief. He argues the former wife requested such a reduction by the wording of her modification petition which tracked general language concerning a parent’s obligation to pay support until age eighteen. Even if this language could be interpreted so broadly, there is no evidence that the heavier burden required for this type of modification was met.
Indeed, the wording of the trial court’s order indicates this issue was not addressed by the parties. The court said:
The Court upon its own, has decided that the property settlement agreement entered into by the parties prior to the Dissolution of Marriage should not be enforced as it relates to child support beyond eighteen (18) years of age.
Thus, the court in this instance sought, sua sponte, to remake the agreement between the parties. This was error. The trial court may only modify child support provisions contained in a settlement agreement to the extent allowed in Tietig v. Boggs.
We remand this ease to the trial court for deletion from the final judgment that portion concerning nonenforcement of the child support beyond age eighteen.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and LAZZARA, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Riggs v. Lowrance, 766 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…final judgment of dissolution in 1997. Even when child support has been fixed in this way, however, the amount may be increased based on a substantial change of circumstances. See State, Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Svcs. ex rel. Dodge v. Dodge, 647 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). The Mother argues that she met her burden by showing an increase in the Father’s income and by application of the child support guidelines. The Father concedes that his income has increased but contends that the trial court may t…
-
Neville v. Neville, 34 So. 3d 779 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)…t for him. Because the trial court failed to order Mr. Neville to pay child support for C.W. in accordance with the agreement and as required by the final judgment, it erred. Cf. State, Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. ex rel. Dodge v. Dodge, 647 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Accordingly, we reverse and remand this cause to the trial court to calculate the child support Mr. Neville owes for C.W. from the time support was terminated to the time C.W. turned 19 and to order payment of that amount in com…
Authorities Cited
- Tietig v. Boggs, 602 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1992)
- Burdack v. Friedrich W. Burdack, 371 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Lacy v. Lacy, 413 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)